Opinion
No. 2-05-432-CR
June 7, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
Appeal from criminal district court no. 1 of tarrant county.
PANEL B: DAUPHINOT, HOLMAN, and MCCOY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
In four points, appellant Samuel Mata appeals his conviction for capital murder. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged with committing the capital murder of Ann Barton Williams on or about November 10, 2004, by stabbing her and then committing or attempting to commit arson or robbery. He pled not guilty. Ferrell Coleman testified that Appellant had moved into Coleman's house two weeks before November 10 and did not have his own vehicle. Coleman testified that he knew Williams, that he dropped Appellant off at Williams' apartment on November 9, between six and seven p.m., and that he saw Appellant the next day, when Appellant came home around five a.m. Coleman testified that Appellant told him that he had killed Williams and her dog and then had set Williams' apartment on fire. Appellant showed Coleman his knife and told him that he had parked Williams' van around the corner. Coleman testified that although he did not believe Appellant at first, when he saw a brief news report about a woman, a dog, and an apartment on fire, he knew that Appellant had told him the truth. Coleman testified that he told Appellant to get rid of the van because that was the only thing he could think of to get Appellant out of the house and that Appellant said to meet him at a McDonald's in south Dallas. After Appellant left, Coleman and his family went to the Arlington police station. He testified, We went to the desk, me, and Cherry and Sheila. . . . and I told [the desk officer] that I wanted to talk to them about the — about the homicide this morning. And they said, well, what homicide, you talking about the fire, you know. They didn't know that a murder had been committed at all yet. . . . Arlington police sergeant Mark Simpson testified that on November 10, three people came to the police station to report the murder of a woman and that one of those people was Coleman. Sergeant Simpson testified that Coleman told him about Appellant's plan to meet Coleman at the McDonald's. Dallas police officer James Swinney testified that he had been on patrol on November 10 when he received a "be on the look out" alert for Williams' van. He testified that he and his partner went to the location they had been told that the suspect might be, a McDonald's, and that there was a white van parked in the parking lot when they drove up. They arrested Appellant, patted him down, and located the knife. The knife tested positive for Williams' blood and DNA. Arlington police officer Chad Willie testified that the Dallas police officers transferred Appellant to him at the McDonald's. He testified that the additional items taken from Appellant at book-in included a credit card with Williams' name on it and some items of jewelry. Williams' brother and daughter identified the jewelry, admitted into evidence at trial, as belonging to Williams. Appellant confessed to his involvement in Williams' death in a videotaped police statement, which was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. Testimony from the various firefighters provided details about the fire in Williams' apartment(although all four burners on the stove and the oven had been turned on high, the fire itself occurred in Williams' bedroom. A Coleman fuel can, located on the bed in Williams' bedroom, was admitted into evidence. Arlington fire investigator Stuart Brozgold testified that in his opinion, the fire had been a set fire, not an accidental one. The medical examiner testified that the heat injuries to Williams' body occurred after she was already dead, that the four stab wounds were the cause of her death, that the blade width of the knife was small enough to have produced Williams' wounds, and that her injuries were not consistent with an accident, but had required four separate thrusts. The jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder. The trial court rendered judgment on that verdict and assessed punishment at life imprisonment.SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first two points, Appellant complains that the evidence was not legally and factually sufficient to support his conviction for capital murder.Standard Of Review
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we ask whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder's determination is manifestly unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). To reverse under the second ground, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417. We must give due deference to the fact-finder's determinations, "particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence." Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9.Capital Murder
A person commits capital murder if he intentionally causes the death of an individual in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery or arson, among other offenses. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2005 Supp. 2006). Appellant's sole complaint with regard to legal and factual sufficiency is that the record indicates that he did not have the specific intent to kill Williams. He claims that the knife was held up to Williams "in a manner that was intended to cause her to back away from him in her enraged state," and that he accidentally stabbed her. We must consider all the evidence admitted at trial, even improperly admitted evidence, when performing a legal sufficiency review. Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489-90 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). And, in a legal sufficiency review, the jury's inference of intent is afforded more deference than the evidence supporting proof of conduct. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Circumstantial evidence of a defendant's guilty knowledge is not "required to meet the same rigorous criteria for sufficiency as circumstantial proof of other offensive elements." Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995)). In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence to show an appellant's intent, and faced with a record that supports conflicting inferences, we "must presume(even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record(that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Specific intent can be inferred from conduct, remarks, or all the surrounding circumstances. See Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 163 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). An oral expression of intent is not required, and a defendant's conduct alone is sufficient to infer intent. See id. The jury watched Appellant's videotaped confession, in which Appellant stated that he choked Williams with his hands. He claimed that he hit her with his knife one time and that it was an accident. He indicated that he thought she was just choking and that he knocked the lighted candle onto the bed. He stated that he did not know how to stop the blood and did not try to stop the bleeding. He said that he did not know if the bed caught on fire and that he just left. He used her keys to lock the door. He stated that the apartment was smoky when he left. In addition to Appellant's videotaped confession, the jury also heard testimony from the medical examiner that Williams was killed by four stab wounds, caused by four separate thrusts. Photographs of the stab wounds were admitted into evidence and explained and published to the jury. The jury also heard Coleman's testimony that Appellant told him that he had killed Williams and showed Coleman his knife. Coleman's own criminal history was revealed to the jury before any of his testimony about Appellant. Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the specific intent to kill Williams. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. The jury could have inferred this intent from the photographs and testimony about the four stab wounds and resolved Appellant's conflicting claim in his videotaped confession, that he accidentally hit Williams once with the knife, by choosing to disbelieve him. See Margraves, 34 S.W.3d at 919; Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 846. Further, reviewing this evidence in a neutral light and giving due deference to the jury's determination, we draw the same conclusion. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414. The photographs, the medical examiner's testimony, Coleman's testimony that Appellant said he killed Williams and set the apartment on fire, Appellant's own statements that he knocked the lighted candle onto the bed and left the smoky apartment using Williams' keys to lock the door provided the basis upon which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant had the specific intent to kill Williams, against the sole conflicting evidence presented by Appellant's statement that it was an accident. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9, 11. We overrule Appellant's first and second points.MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his third point, Appellant complains that the trial court erred by overruling Appellant's motion to suppress the video statement, which he alleges was taken in violation of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005).Standard Of ReviewWe review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd). But when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review de novo a trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those fact findings. Id. at 818-19. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 819. We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004); Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856; Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543.Suppression Hearing Findings
The trial judge made the following oral findings of fact and conclusions of law at the conclusion of the suppression hearing:
While neither party moved for written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and none were filed, it is apparent from the record that the trial court intended for its findings and conclusions to be expressed via its oral pronouncements. In reviewing a motion to suppress, oral findings of fact can be considered as findings of fact on the record and given due deference. State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (stating that the trial court's findings and conclusions from the suppression hearing need to be recorded in some way, whether written out and filed by the trial court, or stated on the record at the hearing); see also Flores v. State, 177 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (reviewing trial court's oral findings of fact on a motion to suppress), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2298 (2006).
On November the 10th of 2004, the Arlington Police Detective, David Frias, came in contact with [Appellant] when he was booked into the city jail. He took him to an interview room in the police department, gave him his Miranda warnings, which are located on the videotape itself, and the card was signed by [Appellant], which is admitted as State's Exhibit No. 3. That he made a recording of his entire interview with [Appellant] and the third person located in the interview was . . . Detective Ben Lopez[,] who is identified, and [Appellant]. That the recording device worked correctly. That it was operated by a Detective Johnson . . . [t]hat the operator was competent and that it's accurate. . . . State's Exhibit 1 has not been altered. State's Exhibit 2 has been altered to remove agreed-upon items.]
State's Exhibit 2 is a copy of State's Exhibit 1 with redaction of sound in parts that do not pertain to the capital murder case, such as Appellant's mention, twice, that he had been in prison in California.
That the interrogation lasted one and a half hours and was completely recorded. That [Appellant] never was threatened. That he understood what was going on. That he was responsive to the questions asked. That he had no complaints about his physical or mental health. And that he had no complaints about any treatment by any officer.
[Appellant's] first Miranda warning was given on the tape, and he indicated that he understood all parts of that Miranda warning, and then he voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights and gave the statement that's contained in State's Exhibit No. 1. And the Court finds that the statement is freely and voluntarily made. That [Appellant] intelligently waived his rights, and as a matter of law, finds that the statement is admissible.Detective Frias testified at the suppression hearing, and the trial judge watched the videotape before making his findings and conclusions.