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holding that Rooker-Feldman did not apply where a FDCPA plaintiff's state court claims were still pending
Summary of this case from Becker v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.Opinion
Civil No. 03-3251 (PAM/RLE)
April 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the alternative for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lona Mason had a credit card issued by First Chicago-First Card, on which she allegedly incurred a debt of $7,481.80. This alleged debt was sold or assigned to ABL Financial LLC ("ABL") sometime before April 18, 2002. ABL Financial then hired Defendants Messerli Kramer, P.A., to collect the alleged debt from Mason. On May 30, 2002, Mason was personally served with the summons and complaint, filed by Defendants on behalf of ABL. Instead of formally responding, Mason returned it to Defendants. Mason wrote on the summons,." I do not have a credit card to [sic] First Card. Please stop harassing me! Nor do I have any money!" (Derrick Aff. Ex. A.) In response, Defendants sent Mason a letter outlining the source of the debt she allegedly owed, how much she owed, and advising Mason to answer the summons and complaint. Defendants told Mason if she did not answer they would apply for default judgment. (Id. Ex. B.) Mason sent the letter back to Defendants, with this response on the bottom:
1. Your terms and conditions are useless to me. They are too small to read even with my magnifying glass.
2. I do not have a First Card.
3. I do not have and cannot afford legal counsel, and have no idea how to interpose a formal answer. Neither do I have $4,757.27. Lona Mason.
(Id.) Defendants applied for and were granted default judgment on August 12, 2002. (Id. Ex. D.). See ABL Financial L.L.C. v. Lona Mason, Hennepin County District Court File No. DJ-02-13324. In obtaining that default judgment, Defendant Jeffrey Cohen submitted an Affidavit stating that no answer or other pleading had been received from Mason. (Id. Ex. C.)
Following the order of default judgment, there were some post-judgment enforcement proceedings. The Hennepin County District Court vacated the default judgment, on the grounds that Mason's responses on the summons and complaint constituted an answer sufficient to comport with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. (ABL Financial et al. v. Lona Mason, DJ 02-13324, Jan. 31, 2003) ("Jan. 31, 2003, Order"). On October 29, 2003, a jury returned a verdict for ABL, finding that Mason was in breach of her credit card contract and awarding ABL damages. Mason later filed a motion for sanctions against ABL, which the district court denied. In denying sanctions, the district court found that ABL's motion for default judgment was brought in good faith and was reasonable under the circumstances. (Weber Aff. Ex. I.)
Mason's Complaint specifically alleges that Defendants' conduct in the state collection proceeding violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and constituted an invasion of privacy. Mason claims that Defendants violated the FDCPA by telling the state court that Mason had failed to file an answer. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Mason also claims that Defendants' conduct "was intentional and deliberate constituting an invasion of her privacy — intrusion upon seclusion causing her out-of-pocket loss, emotional distress and fear." (Compl. ¶ 19.)
The Court notes that Mason has teamed with another plaintiff, John Resler, and filed a class action complaint against Defendants in Hennepin County District Court, alleging that Defendants violated Mim. Stat. §§ 481.07 and 481.071, which prohibits deceit on the state court. See Mason, et al. v. Messerli Kramer, P.A., et al., Hennepin County District Court File No. 03-133-59 (Weber Aff. Ex. K.). The complaint specifically alleges that the Affidavit of No Answer filed by Defendant Cohen to obtain a default judgment in both Resler and Mason's state collection proceedings constituted deceit on the state court. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. FDCPA Claim
Mason alleges in her Complaint that the Affidavit of No Answer filed with the state court, which asserted that Mason had been served and that "no answer or other pleading has been received by or served on [ABL Financial] or its attorney and [Mason] has not otherwise defended in the action" violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(5), 1692(e)(10), and 1692f. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Mason is asserting that Defendants violated the FDCPA because they lied to the state court in procuring their default judgment. That same claim is currently pending before the state court, in Mason, et al. v. Messerli Kramer, P.A., et al., Hennepin County District Court File No. 03-133-59.
Because Mason's FDCPA claim depends on the claims she has brought in state court, Defendants contend that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this action. However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal court from granting relief that would reverse or vacate a state court decision.Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). AlthoughRooker-Feldman also precludes federal jurisdiction over claims "that are inextricably intertwined with claims adjudicated in state courts," Mason's state court claims are still pending. See Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB, 91 F.ed 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Thus,Rooker-Feldman cannot apply.
Rather, the principles of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), govern the determination of whether the Court should abstain from considering Plaintiffs claims. Although abstention is committed to the discretion of the Court, it is an "extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813. The Supreme Court has emphasized that abstention "can be justified . . . only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 14, quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.
The abstention determination should take into account several factors, including the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained, the source of governing law, the adequacy of the state action to protect the parties' rights, the relative progress of each action, and the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal lawsuit. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817; Moses H. Cone, 469 U.S. at 17 n. 20, 21-26.
Examining all of these factors, the Court concludes that it must abstain and that Mason's FDCPA claim must be dismissed. The Court must abstain from adjudicating a claim that depends wholly on the success of a pending state court claim. The allegations in the state court complaint are nearly identical to the allegations in the federal complaint. Only the underlying causes of action brought in the two complaints differ. It is unclear why Mason has brought claims in both state court and federal court, as the asserted claims arise out of the same facts and circumstances. Although federal courts should abstain only in "extraordinary" and "exceptional" cases, the Court finds that this is such a case. The Court dismisses Mason's FDCPA claim.
B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Mason further claims that Defendants' conduct constituted the state-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The Complaint alleges that Mason is a "retired eighty-year old woman who was shocked, confused and frightened by Defendants' illegal conduct." (Compl. ¶ 18.) Mason further avers that Defendants' no answer affidavit, which resulted in a default judgment, was intentional and deliberate, and thus intruded upon her seclusion by causing her out of pocket loss, emotional distress, and fear. (Id. ¶ 19.) However, because the Court has dismissed Mason's FDCPA claim, there is no independent basis for jurisdiction over Mason's remaining state-law claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dismisses Mason's intrusion upon seclusion claim without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion (Clerk Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Lona Mason's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.