Opinion
CV166056972
07-18-2017
Tracey Mason v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #119
Michael P. Kamp, J.
The motion before the court is the defendant's motion to strike counts one and three of the plaintiff's revised complaint on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a dishonest purpose, sinister motive, or malice on the part of the defendant as required to state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (2) the assignment of a legal malpractice claim to an adversary in the same litigation that gave rise to the alleged malpractice is against public policy. For the reasons cited herein, the defendant's motion to strike counts one and three is granted.
FACTS
On January 4, 2017, the plaintiff, Tracey Mason, filed a four-count revised complaint against seven defendants: (1) Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty); (2) the law offices of Loccisano, Turret & Rosenbaum; (3) the law offices of Meehan, Turret & Rosenbaum; (4) Denise Drews; (5) Mary Ann McCluskey; (6) Shari Pearlman; and (7) Vincent di Palma. In count one of the revised complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The defendant law offices consist of a group of attorneys, namely, the defendant attorneys, " who are employees of Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., " and the defendant Liberty operates as a subsidiary of that corporation. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant law offices " were an in house or captive law office and its employees, including [the defendant attorneys] were agents, servants and/or employees of [the defendant Liberty]."
The law offices of Loccisano, Turret & Rosenbaum and the law offices of Meehan, Turret & Rosenbaum, although named as two separate defendants in the present action, refer to the same group of attorneys alleged to be employed by both Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., and the defendant Liberty as a subsidiary of that corporation. Accordingly, for sake of clarity, both offices will collectively be referred to herein as the defendant law offices. In addition, the defendants Drews, McCluskey, Pearlman, and di Palma, alleged to be the attorneys working within those law offices, will collectively be referred to herein as the defendant attorneys.
In 2013, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant Liberty's insureds, Wendell Wilson and Hyshema Barnes, as a result of injuries sustained from a car accident. The defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys legally represented Wilson in the aforementioned action by the plaintiff. While the action was pending, the plaintiff filed an offer of compromise within the limits of the subject policy that was subsequently rejected. Thereafter, the plaintiff recovered a final judgment against the defendant Liberty's insured, Wilson, in the sum of $155, 122.92 in damages and $42, 012.40 in costs and interest for a total of $197, 135.32. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant Liberty, " through itself and through [the defendant law offices] and [the defendant attorneys], failed to act fairly and in good faith with regards to the interest of its insured, Wendell Wilson, " and, as a result, Wilson has been damaged in the amount of the total unpaid balance of $197, 135.32. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Liberty, through itself and through its agents, the defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys: failed to accept in a timely manner the offer of compromise; rejected the offer of compromise without filing a motion for extension of time to respond; failed to timely, reasonably and properly investigate the plaintiff's claim; failed to communicate with Wilson about the risks of judgment entering in excess of the policy; failed to advise Wilson to seek outside counsel; failed and refused to reasonably settle the case; allowed a default to enter against Wilson; failed to file notice of defenses on behalf of Wilson; failed to protect the legal right of Wilson to present a valid liability defense; failed to defend Wilson fairly and in breach of the implied covenant of good faith inherent in the insurance contract; and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not settling the case within the policy limits.
Accordingly, in counts one and three of the revised complaint, the plaintiff asserts causes of action, pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321, for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and legal malpractice, respectively, against the defendant Liberty. In count three, the plaintiff re-alleges the same allegations from count one and further alleges that the damages sustained by Wilson were caused by the negligent acts and/or omissions of the defendant Liberty, acting through the defendant attorneys, in the following ways: failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Wilson; failure to zealously represent the interests of Wilson; allowing the court to enter a default against Wilson; failure to open the default entered against Wilson; failure to file notices of defenses on behalf of Wilson; and failure to promptly notify Wilson and " [concealing] the fact that the [c]ourt entered a default against him and the legal ramifications of said default." In counts two and four, the plaintiff asserts the same causes of action, pursuant to § 38a-321, for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and legal malpractice, respectively, against the defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys.
General Statutes § 38a-321 provides, in relevant part: " Each insurance company which issues a policy to any person . . . insuring against loss or damage on account of the bodily injury . . . by accident of any person, or damage to the property of any person, for which loss or damage such person . . . is legally responsible, shall, whenever a loss occurs under such policy, become absolutely liable . . . Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person . . . by any person . . . for loss or damage on account of bodily injury . . . or damage to property, if the defendant in such action was insured against such loss or damage at the time when the right of action arose and if such judgment is not satisfied within thirty days after the date when it was rendered, such judgment creditor shall be subrogated to all the rights of the defendant and shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent that the defendant in such action could have enforced his claim against such insurer had such defendant paid such judgment."
On February 7, 2017, the defendant filed the present motion to strike counts one and three of the plaintiff's revised complaint on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a dishonest purpose, sinister motive, or malice on the part of the defendant as required to state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (2) the assignment of a legal malpractice claim to an adversary in the same litigation that gave rise to the alleged malpractice is against public policy. The defendant also filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike. On May 25, 2017, the plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum of law in opposition to the present motion to strike. The court heard oral argument at short calendar on May 30, 2017.
The present motion to strike involves only the defendant Liberty. A separate motion to strike (entry #117) was filed by the defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys. Accordingly, the defendant Liberty will be referred to herein as the defendant.
DISCUSSION
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016).
In its memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike, the defendant argues that counts one and three of the plaintiff's revised complaint must be stricken. Specifically, the defendant contends that count one must be stricken because the plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations that would constitute the requisite " bad faith" to support a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As to count three, the defendant argues that § 38a-321 does not afford the plaintiff the right to bring a legal malpractice claim against her adversary's defense attorneys on behalf of that adversary because a legal malpractice claim is personal in nature and thus, cannot be assigned. At oral argument, the defendant emphasized that, whether brought as a direct action or as an assignment, the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim is against public policy.
In response, in her memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that her theory of responsibility against the defendant is partly grounded in the doctrine of vicarious liability with respect to the actions of the defendant's employees, namely, the defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys. The plaintiff further contends that she has alleged sufficient facts to support the allegations of " bad faith" necessary to support a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, the plaintiff maintains that her legal malpractice claim is brought as a statutory right, pursuant to § 38a-321, rather than as an assignment.
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
In count one of the revised complaint, the plaintiff asserts a cause of action, pursuant to § 38a-321, for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the defendant. " [I]t is axiomatic that the . . . duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship . . . In other words, every contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement . . . The covenant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and purpose of the contract are agreed upon by the parties and that what is in dispute is a party's discretionary application or interpretation of a contract term." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capstone Building Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 794, 67 A.3d 961 (2013). " To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 424, 433, 849 A.2d 382 (2004). " Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive . . . Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capstone Building Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., supra, 795.
" [T]here is a split of authority among Superior Courts as to what factual allegations are sufficient to constitute the element of bad faith . . . The first line of cases requires specific allegations establishing a dishonest purpose or malice. In alleging a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, courts have stressed that such a claim must be alleged in terms of wanton and malicious injury [and] evil motive . . . The second line of cases generally holds parties to a less stringent standard requiring that a plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts or allegations from which a reasonable inference of sinister motive can be made . . . Even where courts have used an inference analysis, however, they have looked to allegations that the conduct at issue was engaged in purposefully." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Steven Auto, LLC v. National Casualty Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-14-6023906-S, (February 11, 2016, Roraback, J.).
In Jello-Pitkin v. Geico Indemnity Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-09-5012395-S (August 16, 2011, Cosgrove, J.) (52 Conn.L.Rptr. 453), the court denied the defendant's motion to strike where the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant " stalled, delayed and refused to diligently process the plaintiff Jello-Pitkin's claim or to properly negotiate settlement of the claim . . . in order to profit from the [p]laintiff's vulnerable position, " and that the defendant " acted with a sinister intent, an intent of wanton or malicious injury and/or evil motive, exhibiting a reckless indifference of the interests of others, " and " knowingly, willfully, and deliberately ignored the [p]laintiff's demand for the payment of a reasonable settlement amount behaving in a way evidencing dishonest purpose, malice or evil motive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for bad faith. See also Metcalf v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-09-6000686-S (January 21, 2010, Roche, J.) (denying motion to strike where plaintiff " [used] the terms 'intentionally and willfully' in connection with an alleged 'representation' by the defendant, and later suggests that the defendant misled the plaintiff'); Algiere v. Utica National Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-04-0569670-S (February 7, 2005, Jones, J.) (denying motion to strike where plaintiff alleged that defendant had " knowingly, willfully, deliberately and repeatedly ignored the workers' compensation commission orders; such continued defiance is unlikely to be attributable to an honest mistake or mere negligence").
Similarly, in Kowalchuk v. Travelers Personal Security Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-11-6012608-S (June 4, 2014, Shortall, J.T.R.) (58 Conn.L.Rptr. 336), the court denied the motion to strike where the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant " (1) failed appropriately to value and consider all of his medical records and bills; (2) failed to give appropriate consideration to the opinions of his treating physicians; and (3) forced the plaintiff to incur the significant time and expense of trial based on the 'cynical calculation' that, since the company did not have a significant amount of exposure at trial, it would force [the plaintiff] to try his case, in the hope that he would decide to forego that imposition and agree to accept a lesser settlement."
The court in Kowalchuk v. Travelers Personal Security Ins. Co., supra, held that " the allegations, when viewed together and when construed broadly in favor of sustaining their legal sufficiency, are sufficient to draw a reasonable inference that [the defendant] committed misconduct with a sinister motive, including the motive to pay [the plaintiff] a smaller sum under the contract than he is entitled to." In support of its conclusion, the court found that " [the plaintiff's] allegation that [the defendant] forced him to incur the significant time and expense of trial based on the 'cynical calculation' that he would decide to forego that imposition and agree to accept a lesser settlement, strongly implies a sinister motive on the part of [the defendant]." See also Urban Apparel Plus, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6035293-S (October 31, 2013, Fischer, J.) (57 Conn.L.Rptr. 124) (finding reasonable inference of sinister motive where plaintiff alleged that defendant " denied its claim in bad faith because it intentionally breached its duty to adjust and negotiate the plaintiff's claims and engaged in this conduct in an effort to deprive the plaintiff of its right to payment, " and " failed to interview witnesses and obtain documents, ignored facts that showed that there was no legitimate basis for its delay or denial of the plaintiff's claim, and selectively collected facts in an effort to support its delay and denial of the claim" [emphasis added]); Potter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-12-6015263-S (April 18, 2013, Devine, J.) (finding reasonable inference of sinister motive where plaintiff alleged " that the defendant's conduct in denying her insurance claim [was] intentional, unfairly saddled her with medical bills and caused the defendant to improperly profit from its actions" [emphasis added]).
In the present case, regardless of whether the court adopts the more stringent standard, requiring specific allegations establishing a dishonest purpose or malice, or the less stringent standard, requiring allegations from which a reasonable inference of sinister motive can be made, the plaintiff's revised complaint is legally insufficient to state a claim for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Under the more stringent standard, the plaintiff fails to put forth any specific allegations establishing a dishonest purpose or malice. There are no allegations that the defendant, through itself or through its agents, the defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys, engaged in any of the alleged conduct with a wanton or evil motive.
Under the less stringent standard, the plaintiff similarly fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of bad faith. The plaintiff alleges, in count one, that the defendant, through itself and through its agents, the defendant law offices and the defendant attorneys: failed to accept in a timely manner the offer of compromise; rejected the offer of compromise without filing a motion for extension of time to respond; failed to timely, reasonably and properly investigate the plaintiff's claim; failed to communicate with Wilson about the risks of judgment entering in excess of the policy; failed to advise Wilson to seek outside counsel; failed and refused to reasonably settle the case " when it knew or should have known their failure to do so would expose its insured to an excess judgment"; allowed a default to enter against Wilson; failed to file notice of defenses on behalf of Wilson; failed to protect the legal right of Wilson to present a valid liability defense " to the Plaintiff, Tracey Mason's lawsuit, when the Defendant knew or in the exercise of due care, should have known, that Wendell Wilson wished to do so"; failed to defend Wilson fairly and in breach of the implied covenant of good faith inherent in the insurance contract; and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not settling the case within the policy limits. There are no allegations from which the court may properly infer that the defendant intentionally or purposefully engaged in the aforementioned conduct. Thus, the plaintiff's revised complaint also fails under the less stringent standard because the allegations, even viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency, are insufficient to reasonably infer a sinister motive. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike as to count one.
II
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
In count three of the revised complaint, the plaintiff asserts a legal malpractice claim against the defendant. " In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney's wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn.App. 289, 297, 975 A.2d 715 (2009). Here, the plaintiff does not allege that she was involved in an attorney-client relationship with the defendant through its agents, the defendant attorneys. Rather, just as with count one, the plaintiff brings her cause of action for legal malpractice pursuant to § 38a-321.
The relevant portion of § 38a-321 as it pertains to this claim provides, in relevant part, that a judgment creditor " shall be subrogated to all the rights of the defendant and shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent that the defendant in such action could have enforced his claim against such insurer had such defendant paid such judgment." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, in order for the plaintiff to prevail, the court would need to construe this provision of § 38a-321 to allow for a judgment creditor to bring a legal malpractice claim against an insurer on behalf of the insured third party.
" When construing a statute, [the court's] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs [the court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629, 633-34, 148 A.3d 1052 (2016).
With respect to § 38a-321, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that " the intention of the [statute] is to give to the [judgment creditor] the same rights under the policy as the assured . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 198, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995); Guerin v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 107 Conn. 649, 653, 142 A. 268 (1928); see also Brown v. Employer's Reinsurance Corp., 206 Conn. 668, 672, 539 A.2d 138 (1988) (" [t]he legislature's purpose in enacting the 'direct action' statute was to remedy ' [t]he unfairness to the assured of contracts of insurance ' with provisions that the insurer should be liable only in cases where the assured had actually paid a judgment obtained against him" [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]).
In Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 235 Conn. 187, Barry Schuss (Schuss) started a fire that caused extensive damage to a West Hartford synagogue. After obtaining a judgment against Schuss for the damages sustained by the fire, the plaintiff, the synagogue's insurer, brought a subrogation action against the defendant, the insurer of Schuss' parents, to recover the amount of the judgment. Id., 189. During the course of that litigation, the plaintiff filed an application for an order, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-146f, for the release of Schuss' confidential psychiatric records on the ground that the defendant had made Schuss' mental condition an issue in the case. Id., 190. The trial court denied the application and concluded " that under the principles of subrogation [the plaintiff] held the contractual rights of Schuss but not his personal rights such as the privilege of confidentiality." Id. After the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, and on appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that it was entitled to access of Schuss' psychiatric records because, as the subrogee of Schuss' rights under the defendant's insurance policy, pursuant to § 38a-321, it was empowered to waive confidentiality. Id., 193.
Stating that the plaintiff's argument " misperceives the reach of our subrogation statute, " the Supreme Court rejected the claim, and found that Schuss' right to maintain the confidentiality of his psychiatric records arose under § 52-146f, and not under his insurance contract with the defendant. Id., 197-98. The Supreme Court further noted that " [t]he statutory construction urged by [the plaintiff] would remove . . . control from the patient-subrogor by permitting the subrogee to waive the patient's privilege without regard to the patient's desire to maintain the confidentiality of his or her psychiatric communications and records, " thereby frustrating one of the primary purposes underlying § 52-146f. Id., 200.
In the present case, the plaintiff's argument that a judgment creditor may bring a legal malpractice claim against an insurer on behalf of the insured third party similarly misperceives the reach of § 38a-321. Although the right to bring a legal malpractice claim is distinguishable from the right to maintain the confidentiality of psychiatric records, the reasoning articulated in Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, is still applicable here. The relationship between an attorney and client, like the one between a psychiatrist and patient, is " unique and personal, " thereby eliciting a " need to preserve the sanctity of that relationship." Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, 276 Conn. 257, 268-69, 885 A.2d 163 (2005). In addition, the duty of loyalty and confidentiality owed by an attorney to a client is also akin to the duty of confidentiality owed by a psychiatrist to her patient. Id., 270. Moreover, the court in Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, cited the removal of control from the patient-subrogor, with respect to the waiver of confidentiality, as further support for rejecting the plaintiff's proposed application of § 38a-321. Here, pursuant to the plaintiff's argument, there would be a similar involuntary relinquishment of Wilson's right to bring a legal malpractice claim. Thus, the court does not read § 38a-321 to allow for the involuntary relinquishment of such an inherently personal right.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's right to bring a legal malpractice claim, sounding in negligence, does not arise under Wilson's insurance policy. In count three of the revised complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the damages sustained by Wilson were " caused by the negligent acts and/or omissions" of the defendant through its agents, the defendant attorneys. See Pelletier v. Galske, 105 Conn.App. 77, 83, 936 A.2d 689 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 921, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008) (" [n]otwithstanding that embedded in the language of the plaintiff's claim are the contractual rudiments of promise and breach, [w]here the plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently performed legal services . . . the complaint sounds in negligence, even though [she] also alleges that [she] retained him or engaged his services" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Although the negligent acts and/or omissions alleged in the complaint derive from the legal representation of Wilson during the plaintiff's underlying suit, and therefore are associated to some extent with his insurance policy, Wilson's right to bring a malpractice action arises independently of said policy.
Finally, although the plaintiff argues that the public policy considerations promulgated in Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, supra, 276 Conn. 257, are inapplicable to the present case because the legal malpractice claim is brought as a statutory right, and not as a voluntary assignment, the court is not persuaded. In Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, supra, 268, the Supreme Court addressed, as a matter of first impression, whether a legal malpractice claim may be assigned. In discussing the considerations raised in other jurisdictions, the court explicitly noted " the unique and personal nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the need to preserve the sanctity of that relationship, " and " the incompatibility of the assignment and the attorney duty of loyalty and confidentiality, " as support for prohibiting such assignment. Id., 268-70. Ultimately, in declining to permit the assignment of a legal malpractice claim to an adverse party in the underlying action, the court relied upon a myriad of public policy considerations. Specifically, the court held that allowing such assignments would " convert a legal malpractice action into a commodity; undermine the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship; result in decreasing the availability of legal services to insolvent clients; impact negatively on the duty of confidentiality and further the commercialization of malpractice claims that in turn would spawn an increase in unwarranted malpractice actions . . ." Id., 280.
Here, although the plaintiff is bringing her claim as a statutory right, and not as a voluntary assignment, many of the same public policy considerations are implicated. In particular, permitting a judgment creditor to bring a legal malpractice claim on behalf of the insured third party would equally threaten the sanctity of the " unique and personal" attorney-client relationship. In addition, an attorney's duty of loyalty and confidentiality would be similarly incompatible with this type of claim as brought by a judgment creditor, rather than the insured third party privy to the attorney-client relationship. The inherently personal nature of a legal malpractice claim is still present, whether brought as a statutory right or as a voluntary assignment. Thus, in accordance with the reasoning set forth in both Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, and Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, supra, the plaintiff cannot bring a legal malpractice claim on behalf of the insured, Wendall Wilson, pursuant to the direct action statute, § 38a-321, against the defendant. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike as to count three.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the defendant's motion to strike counts one and three of the plaintiff's revised complaint is granted.