Opinion
No. C 01-3626 CRB (PR) (Docs #2 3)
September 28, 2001
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison, Corcoran, has filed a pro se civil rights action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging various aspects of his confinement while at Salinas Valley State Prison. Plaintiff has not exhausted California's prison administrative process, however.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). They may even file appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. See id. § 3084.1(e).
In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the Director's level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38.
"Congress has mandated exhaustion . . . regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures." Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001). A prisoner "seeking only money damages must complete a prison administrative process" that, like California's prison administrative process, "could provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no money." Id. at 1821.
Plaintiff alleges that this action should be excused from the exhaustion requirement because his administrative appeal has been pending at the Director's level of review for more than 60 days. The plain language of § 1997e(a) makes exhaustion a precondition to filing in federal court: "No action shall be brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiffs action must be dismissed because it is clear that he filed his federal complaint before allowing the administrative process to be completed. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). That his administrative appeal has been pending at the final level of review for more than 60 days does not present extraordinary circumstances which might compel that he be excused from complying with § 1997e(a). Cf. Booth, 121 S.Ct. at 1825 n. 6 (courts should not read "futility or other exceptions" into § 1997e(a)).
For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling after exhausting California's prison administrative process. See White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
The Clerk shall close the File and terminate all pending motions (e.g., docs # 2 3) as moot.
SO ORDERED.