Opinion
C. A. 5:22-2291-RMG-KDW
04-18-2023
Lloyd Daniel Martin, a/k/a Lloyd Daniel Martin, #02262209233, Plaintiff, v. Marcus Rhodes, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Marcus Rhodes and Defendant Beth Lawson.Plaintiff alleges he received inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment while incarcerated at J. Reuben Long Detention Center (“JRLDC”). The operative complaint in this case is Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed on August 3, 2022. ECF No. 20. On October 4, 2022, Defendant Marcus Rhodes filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 35. Plaintiff filed a Response on November 4, 2022. ECF No. 53. This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. Because this Motion is dispositive, a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) is entered for the court's review.
On April 18, 2023, the undersigned recommended dismissing Defendant Lawson from this action. ECF No. 72.
I. Factual Background
At all times relevant to the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at JRLDC. ECF No. 20 at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges that on January 1, 2021, he was in the shower when a large metal showerhead broke off with great force and hit him in the mouth, breaking three of his teeth and damaging others, including one tooth that was knocked out of his mouth. ECF No. 20 at 5. Plaintiff alleges he took the showerhead to Officer Cepado, and Corporal Kennedy had Plaintiff sign a statement about the incident. ECF No. 20 at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges he was seen by a nurse, but he was only provided ibuprofen. ECF No. 20 at 6. Plaintiff alleges that due to his injuries, he suffered pain and injury, including infection. Id. Plaintiff alleges it took unspecified medical staff more than two weeks to provide him ibuprofen, and that while he needed a dentist, he was denied access to one. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was told he was on the “dentist list,” however there was not a dentist working in the facility. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from pain and contracted an infection due to being denied proper medical treatment. Id. Plaintiff alleges he filed grievances related to this incident, including to administration, and asked to be taken to an outside dentist, but the request was denied. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff sued Defendant Director Rhodes in his official capacity. ECF No. 20 at 2. The only allegation in the Amended Complaint pertaining to Defendant Rhodes is as follows: “Director Marcus Rhodes could have made sure I got the proper medical needs by taking me to a outside dentist.” ECF No. 20 at 4.
II. Standard of Review
Defendant Rhodes has moved to dismiss this action based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
This court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support [the legal conclusion].” Young v. City of Mount Rainier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
III. Analysis
Defendant Rhodes provides two arguments as to why this court should grant his Motion to Dismiss: (1) Plaintiff's claims are barred because Defendant Rhodes is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Rhodes because he has not alleged any personal involvement on the part of Defendant Rhodes necessary to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed a Response on November 4, 2022. ECF No. 53. In his Response, Plaintiff again alleges that he was denied “proper” medical treatment, and there was not a dentist at the facility. ECF No. 53 at 1. Further, Plaintiff attached copies of Defendant Lawson's Answer to his Response, arguing that he went through all grievance procedures possible, and that Defendant Lawson was to ensure Plaintiff received proper medical care. Id. The undersigned now considers the arguments made by the parties in this case.
Plaintiff also states, “I beg the courts for help with appointing counsel.” ECF No. 53 at 1. The undersigned has previously considered a Motion to Appoint Counsel filed by Plaintiff on November 4, 2022, at the same time he filed this Response. The undersigned denied the Motion at the time and instructed Plaintiff that the court may revisit the issue should the case proceed to trial. ECF No. 60.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant Rhodes asserts that Plaintiff has only sued him in his official capacity, and he is therefore immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS LONG HELD THAT THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ALSO PRECLUDES SUITS AGAINST A STATE BY ONE OF ITS OWN CITIZENS. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Here, Defendant Rhodes argues that he is a state official and therefore not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Defendant Rhodes argues that a Sheriff, and his or her deputies, are arms of the state. See, e.g., Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988); Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a sheriff, in his capacity as a state official, is immune from suit under § 1983 for money damages); see also Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525, 308 S.C. 109 (S.C. 1992) (holding that sheriffs and deputies are state officials). Plaintiff does not provide a specific response to this argument. Upon review of the applicable case law, the undersigned recommends finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claim pursuant to § 1983 against Defendant Rhodes.
Defendant Rhodes also argues that to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rhodes was negligent, Plaintiff cannot pursue a state tort law claim against him. Defendant Rhodes argues that because he is state official and the State of South Carolina has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiff may not pursue a negligence claim in this court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(e) (stating, “nothing in this chapter is construed as a waiver of the state's or political subdivision's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Defendant Rhodes further argues that, pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the “SCTCA”), because he is an employee of a governmental entity acting in the scope of his employment, he is immune from being sued for state tort claims. The SCTCA confers immunity upon a governmental employee “who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). Plaintiff does not provide a response to this argument. Upon review of the applicable case law and in considering Defendant Rhodes' arguments, the undersigned recommends finding that any state law negligence claims brought by Plaintiff against Defendant Rhodes should also be dismissed.
2. § 1983 Claims
Defendant Rhodes also argues that even if this court were to construe Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as having brought a § 1983 claim against Rhodes in his individual capacity, the Complaint still fails under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations also center around his belief that he was denied adequate medical treatment and suffered cruel and unusual punishment. Def.'s Br. at 5. However, Defendant Rhodes argues that he appears to have been named in this lawsuit simply by virtue of his position of authority. Def.'s Br. at 5. Defendant Rhodes further argues that Plaintiff does not allege that he had any knowledge of Plaintiff's medical condition or that Plaintiff needed additional medical treatment beyond what was provided. Def.'s Br. at 5-6.
The undersigned agrees that Plaintiff does not indicate that he intended to bring any claims against Defendant Rhodes in his individual capacity. However, even liberally construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the undersigned has still considered whether Plaintiff alleges any plausible set of facts to support a finding of any claim against Defendant Rhodes in his individual capacity. The undersigned agrees with Defendant Rhodes that Plaintiff solely alleges that Defendant Rhodes could have ensured he got proper medical care. See ECF No. 20 at 4. This allegation appears to be based on the fact that Defendant Rhodes is the Director of JRLDC. See ECF No. 20 at 2. Thus, Plaintiff appears to include Defendant Rhodes based solely on his supervisory role with the detention center. Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances upon a “recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their case.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 one must show: (1) the “supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury”; (2) the “supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'”; and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege any set of facts in his Amended Complaint that could conceivably establish that Defendant Rhodes was aware of any of Plaintiff's medical issues, or was aware of any other incidents described in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Rhodes was aware or had any knowledge of whether Plaintiff received any dental treatment or was seen by a dentist. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Rhodes was aware of any issues with the showerhead. Nor does Plaintiff allege he was attempting to bring a claim against Defendant Rhodes under a theory of supervisory liability, or that Defendant Rhodes had any knowledge of pervasive conduct or behavior on the part of the medical staff who Plaintiff alleges did not afford him proper medical or dental treatment.
As to whether Defendant Rhodes was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical condition, Plaintiff does not allege any set of facts that would support such a claim, even affording Plaintiff a liberal construction of his pleadings. Prison officials have a duty to maintain “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016). While a pretrial detainee's “failure to protect” claim constitutes a due process violation, the same standard elucidated under the Eighth Amendment by a convicted prisoner applies. King-Fields v. Leggett, No. ELH-11-1491, 2014 WL 694969, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 19, 2014) (citing Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001)). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when two conditions are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). First, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious.” Id. To prevail on a claim based on a failure to prevent harm, an inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Second, the prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at 834 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Under the second prong, the subjective prong, the inmate must demonstrate that the prison official's state of mind was one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.
Plaintiff does not allege any set of facts, such as that Defendant Rhodes knew Plaintiff needed dental treatment, to suggest he was aware of, let alone deliberately indifferent to, Plaintiff's needs or otherwise knew of any conditions that would pose a risk of harm. In analyzing the Amended Complaint to determine whether Plaintiff adequately pled any set of facts to plausibly support a claim under § 1983, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standard in asserting a claim as to Defendant Rhodes, even assuming Plaintiff brought a claim against Defendant Rhodes in his individual capacity. The undersigned therefore recommends finding that any claims brought against Defendant Rhodes in his individual capacity should be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 35, be granted, and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint would therefore be dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).