Opinion
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT; DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL; DENYING MOTION FOR COURT ORDER; GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JEREMY FOGEL, District Judge
Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 18, 2005, the Court ordered service of one of the claims and dismissed one claim without leave to amend. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply. Plaintiff has filed two motions for entry of default, a motion to compel, and a motion for a court order concerning his legal property. Based upon the record and the briefing, the Court concludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED. Plaintiff's motions (docket nos. 9, 13, 15, 16, 25) will be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that an administrative appeal by which he sought permission to correspond with his older brother, Hubert D. Martin, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility ("CTF") in Soledad, California, was partially granted. He claims that Defendant refused to verify his family information with the CTF and replied to Plaintiff that "No one is going to make me do anything... I'll make sure your correspondence is denied." See Complaint at 3. Plaintiff claims that Defendant retaliated against him because Plaintiff previously complained and reported Defendant for an incident of harrassment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant harassed him, threatened him, and abused her power in refusing to allow Plaintiff to correspond with his brother. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requesting an injunction or court order allowing him to correspond with his brother.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Order to Show Cause and Motions for Entry of Default
Plaintiff filed two motions for entry of default and a motion for order to show cause as to whether the Defendant was served. On March 22, 2005, a summons issued to Defendant and to the Attorney General's Office. On May 19, 2005, Defendant, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file a dispositive motion. The Court granted Defendant's motion for extension of time on May 23, 2005. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for order to show cause as to whether Defendant was served (docket no. 9) is DENIED; the official docket reflects that Defendant returned the executed summons on May 24, 2005. Plaintiff's motions for entry of default (docket nos. 13, 15) also are DENIED because Defendant responded within the sixty-day deadline as required by the Court's order of service.
B. Motion to Compel
Plaintiff filed a motion to compel, requesting that the Court order Defendant to provide documents relating to: all disciplinary actions taken against Defendant, all progress reports and any recommendations from the California Department of Corrections ("CDC"), and all pending and out of court lawsuits filed against Defendant as a CDC employee. Plaintiff also requested that the Court order Defendant to respond to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories. The Court concludes that the requested information and documents are not relevant to the issues set forth in the pending motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel (docket no. 16) is DENIED.
C. Motion For Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its' own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and "factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen , 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp v. Catrett , 477 U.S. at 323.
2. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against him by refusing to verify his family information in order for him to obtain permission to correspond with his brother, who is incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility. Defendant allegedly told Plaintiff that "No one is going to make me do anything... I'll make sure your correspondence is denied." See Complaint at 3. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's conduct was motivated by Plaintiff's prior written complaint against Defendant for harassment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant abused her power in refusing to allow him to correspond with his brother, and seeks relief through an injunction or court order allowing him to correspond with his brother.
In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff is now permitted to correspond with his brother as of June 16, 2005. Defendant submitted a copy of the request for inmate correspondence (CDC form 1074) which was approved by both prison facilities as of June 16, 2005. See Decl. of Eloy Medina in Support of Def.'s Motn., Ex. A. Defendant notes that the only relief Plaintiff seeks by his complaint is an injunction or court order allowing him to correspond with his brother. Because this request has already been granted, Defendant contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that no case or controversy presently exists. See Def.'s Motn. at 4-5.
In his opposition, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has not disputed his claim of retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant deliberately retaliated against Plaintiff for "writing her up." See Pl.'s Opp. at 1. Plaintiff claims that there is nothing to prevent Defendant or other CDC staff from revoking their permission for him to correspond with his brother, except for a court injunction. Plaintiff cites to a CDC policy prohibiting any reprisal against an inmate for filing an appeal. See California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.1. Plaintiff also alleges that the two prisons conspired to conceal Defendant's actions by granting Plaintiff's request for correspondence after he filed the instant complaint. Plaintiff repeats that there is nothing to stop the prison administration from cancelling his ability to correspond with his brother after the instant case is resolved. Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an injunction to prohibit the prisons from cancelling his right to correspond with his brother. Plaintiff claims there are material facts in dispute and that he is entitled to relief, including compensation for his emotional distress, costs and attorney pro-se fees. See Pl.'s Opp. at 2-3.
The jurisdiction of federal courts depends on the existence of a "case or controversy" under Article III of the Constitution. PUC v. FERC , 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no effective relief can be granted: "Where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented." Flast v. Cohen , 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see, e.g., Foster v. Carson , 347 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2003) (constitutional challenge requesting declaratory relief to Oregon's "Budget Reduction Plan" suspending certain criminal proceedings and appointment of public defenders for indigent defendants in those proceedings is moot where at time of appeal plan has expired and appellate court unable to provide any relief to plaintiffs). A claim also may be considered moot if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab. , 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive and declaratory relief for unconstitutional blood and urine tests was not mooted by the cessation of the testing because there were lingering effects of the violations that could be remedied, i.e., a defendant retained the test results and could be ordered to expunge the unconstitutional test results from its records). Where injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined in light of the present circumstances. See Mitchell v. Dupnik , 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here, the Court concludes that there is no controversy remaining, nor any requested relief for the Court to provide. "The requirements for the issuance of a permanent injunction are the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law." Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan , 92 F.3d 1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1996). Permanent injunctive relief may not be granted absent a great and immediate threat that the plaintiff will suffer future irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law. See Nava v. City of Dublin , 121 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1997). Past injury to plaintiff is insufficient to satisfy this requirement, as is a threat of future injury to other citizens, rather than to plaintiff specifically. See id. at 459.
In actions involving prison conditions, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") further restricts the power of the court to grant prospective relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a); Oluwa v. Gomez , 133 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998).
In the instant action, Plaintiff concedes that he is able to correspond with his brother at the CTF prison facility. Plaintiff's only request for relief is an injunction to permit him to correspond with his brother. Plaintiff's allegations concerning possible future harm and retaliation is purely speculative. Plaintiff fails to show any irreparable, immediate injury at the present time. Moreover, Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, as he may file a new civil rights action based upon any alleged retaliation in the future. Because Plaintiff did not seek any damages in the instant complaint, he cannot now request damages for emotional distress and fees.
Plaintiff is free to file a new complaint for any damages, if he can do so in good faith. The Court notes that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). A determination that a plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is moot does not mean that the plaintiff's claim for damages is moot as well. See McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger , 369 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding plaintiff's claims for damages were not moot where claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his successful habeas petition and subsequent release); Bernhardt v. Jones , 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff's claim for damages was not moot although the plaintiff's claim for prospective relief was).
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is now moot. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket no. 17) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motions (docket nos. 9, 13, 15, 16, 25) are DENIED. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.