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Martin v. Palaia

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
Jan 29, 2008
2008 Ct. Sup. 1506 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

Opinion

No. CV 05 5000762

January 29, 2008


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND ADDITUR


The plaintiff Amber Martin was a passenger in a car driven by her mother Ouida Martin. On September 21, 2003 Ouida Martin lost control of her vehicle and crashed into a tree stump. Amber Martin brought suit against her mother and Patricia Palaia, the driver of another vehicle that she alleged caused her mother to loss control of her vehicle.

The plaintiff's case was tried to a jury and on November 16, 2007 the jury rendered a defendant's verdict in favor of the defendant Patricia Palaia and plaintiff's verdict as against the co-defendant, Ouida Martin. As against her mother, the jury awarded the plaintiff economic damages of $6,818.00 of economic damages and zero noneconomic damages. The plaintiff now moves to set aside the jury's verdict as against the defendant Ouida Martin claiming the verdict was inadequate as a matter of law and moves for an additur. In the alternative the plaintiff moves for a new trial. The plaintiff has not filed any post-trial motions directed toward the verdict in favor of the defendant Patricia Palaia.

Specifically the plaintiff argues that the award of zero noneconomic damages is logically inconsistent with the award of virtually her entire claim of economic damages. The economic damages awarded were for payment of medical care and treatment that the jury found was necessary and reasonable as a result of the motor vehicle accident.

The defendant Ouida Martin objects to this motion. She claims that the jury's verdict is adequately supported by the evidence and that the jury could reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion. The defendant notes that she has a right to have issues of fact decided by a jury, that the testimony regarding the claims of permanent injury, pain and suffering, and the limitation of activities was inconsistent and at times contradictory. Further the defendant argues that the jury did not award the plaintiff her entire claim of economic damages. There was testimony from Dr. Cianciolo regarding permanent injury and the need for additional treatment in the future. The defendant argues that the jury therefore rejected the plaintiff's claims for future economic damages.

The following evidence was presented at trial. On Sunday, September 21, 2003, the plaintiff was a seat belted front seat passenger in a vehicle driven by her mother. The plaintiff's mother was traveling above the speed limit as she approached the intersection of Woodin Street and Fairview Avenue; the mother she thought the vehicle driven by Patricia Palaia, which was traveling in the opposite direction, was going to turn left in front of her and cause a collision; Ouida Martin slammed on her brakes and steered the vehicle to the right to avoid the collision she perceived as imminent; as a result of this emergency action Ouida Martin lost control of her vehicle, the vehicle drove over a curb, hit a tree stump, went airborne for a number of feet and then came to rest. The car sustained approximately $10,000 worth of damage and was towed from the scene. Patricia Palaia stopped her vehicle and went to the aid of the Martins. She observed the plaintiff Amber Martin crying somewhat hysterically and complaining of pain.

The plaintiff offered evidence of the medical treatment she received after the accident. Although the plaintiff's initial complaints of pain at the scene of the accident related to her jaw, when the plaintiff arrived at the emergency room of St. Raphael's Hospital Medical she complained of neck and back pain in addition to jaw pain. She was discharged from the ER with prescriptions for a narcotic pain reliever, percocet, and Robaxin and Naprosen. The defendant Ouida Martin testified that she observed her daughter, the plaintiff, limit her activities immediately after the accident. When the plaintiff continued to be in pain she was brought by her mother to see Dr. John Cianciolo, a chiropractic physician. Dr. Cianciolo testified that he found clinical evidence to support a diagnosis of midline post-traumatic hyperextension/hyper flexion strain/sprain with myofascitis, L3-L5 subluxation and a Right tricep muscle strain. These conditions would cause pain. The doctor noted the presence of a preexisting alveolar cyst that might have been aggravated by the plaintiff's clenching of her jaw in the collision sequence. The doctor noted that his treatment goals included the elimination of pain and reduction of muscle spasms.

The medical records reveal a pattern of treatment involving 15 appointments over a five-month period. There is then a hiatus of almost three years and the plaintiff returned with recurrent symptomology. The plaintiff treated with the Doctor nine times over a one-month period. The plaintiff was then seen again shortly before the trial for four times. The jury, in its verdict for noneconomic damages awarded the plaintiff all her medical bills from the emergency room, the ambulance and for her past chiropractic treatment.

The physician diagnosed the plaintiff with a permanent physical impairment of her thoraco-lumbar spine.

Also significant for the purpose of reviewing this motion, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had any prior or subsequent injuries to her neck and back.

Standard of Review

"In passing on a motion to set aside a jury verdict, a trial court, like a juror considering the evidence, must draw upon its experience and knowledge of human nature, events and motives and evaluate the verdict in that context." Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 329-30, 789 A.2d 459 (2002). If the court "finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or [was] governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside that verdict and to grant a new trial . . . The trial judge has a broad legal discretion and his action will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 330." Stated another way, "[u]pon issues regarding which, on the evidence there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, the conclusion of a jury, if one at which honest men acting fairly and intelligently might arrive reasonable, must stand, even though the opinion of the trial court . . . be that a different result should have been reached." Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 180 Conn 415, 417 (1980) (internal citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court has articulated a special standard for the review of verdicts like the one at issue here to determine whether inconsistency renders them legally inadequate. "In Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 188, 745 A.2d 789 (2000), [the Supreme Court] held that trial courts, when confronted with jury verdicts awarding economic damages and zero noneconomic damages, must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a verdict is adequate as a matter of law . . . Under Wichers, the jury's decision to award economic damages and zero noneconomic damages is best tested in light of the circumstances of the particular case before it. Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue." Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, supra, at 330. The evidential underpinnings of the verdict itself must be examined, "albeit with deference to the jury's findings. Jacobs, supra, 417. Applying the foregoing standards, our Supreme Court has held that an award of "virtually all" of a plaintiff's claimed economic damages, with no accompanying noneconomic damages, demonstrated an inconsistency in the verdict; see Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, supra, 259 Conn. 332; although it allowed that in a different case, such an award might be proper. Id., 334 n. 5. In Schroeder, the jury found the defendant liable for the costs of the plaintiff's intrusive spinal fusion surgery, but awarded nothing for the pain and permanent disability that necessarily would accompany such a procedure. Id., 333. The Supreme Court concluded that the award was incongruous and held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict. Id., 332.

The defendant emphasizes that this case involves soft tissue injuries and the claim of contradictory and inconsistent statements from the plaintiff. In her closing arguments to the jury the defendant did not argue that the plaintiff had not been injured in the accident but rather that the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff's injuries had abated shortly after the accident and first course of chiropractic treatment and that there was no credible evidence of permanent and continuing injury. The court notes there was no evidence of any preexisting injury or physical disability that would or could explain the medical treatments that the jury found were medically reasonable and necessary. The treatments approved by the jury included not only diagnostic testing but also treatments for the decrease or elimination of pain as well as the increase in function. The court finds that the jury's verdict is internally inconsistent in awarding virtually all of the plaintiff's claim for past economic damages and nothing for the suffering and pain that caused the plaintiff to seek the treatment in the first place. While the evidence before the jury might leave questions with regard to the duration or permanency of the plaintiff's injuries there is a logical disconnect between the awarding of the plaintiff's medical bills as reasonable and necessary expenses and the failure to award any noneconomic damages for the pain and suffering or the loss of function that occasioned the need for the treatment.

The plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Verdict, Motion for Additur, and Motion for New Trial is granted. The verdict is set aside, and a new trial ordered, unless the Defendant Ouida Martin files with the court an additur accepting an addition of $4,500.00 to the amount of the verdict, as noneconomic damages within fifteen days from the date of the filing of this memorandum of decision. In the event the defendant Ouida Martin does not accept the additur a new trial is ordered on the issue of damages. The court limits the new trial to the issues of proximate causation and damages as the jury's verdict in favor of Patricia Palaic eliminates the liability disputes present in the first trial. There was no evidence that the plaintiff, as a passenger contributed to the causing of this accident.


Summaries of

Martin v. Palaia

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
Jan 29, 2008
2008 Ct. Sup. 1506 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)
Case details for

Martin v. Palaia

Case Details

Full title:AMBER MARTIN v. PATRICIA PALAIA ET AL

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

Date published: Jan 29, 2008

Citations

2008 Ct. Sup. 1506 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)