Opinion
Case No. CIV-18-95-D
03-26-2018
DENNIS MARTIN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al., Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
State prisoner Dennis Martin seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). The Court should summarily DISMISS the petition without prejudice.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to review habeas petitions promptly and to "summarily dismiss [a] petition without ordering a responsive pleading," Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005), "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." See R. 4, R. Governing § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Ct.
The district court may apply any or all" of the Rules governing § 2254 cases to a habeas petition brought under § 2241. R. 1(b), R. Governing § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Ct.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
Petitioner informs the Court that he is confined at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center but he fails to identify anything else about his sentence(s). That is, the Court does not know when or where Petitioner was sentenced, or for what and for how long. See ECF No. 1:1.
In the Petition, Mr. Martin raises four grounds for relief, all of which essentially challenge his conviction on the basis that the state court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. In Ground One, Petitioner states that the federal court system has "exclusive jurisdiction over ALL crimes, committed by anyone, anywhere within the Indian nation, Indian country, or on Indian land or inside an Indian reservation." (ECF No. 1:7) (emphasis in original). Mr. Martin states that he "is Indian, was at all times on Cherokee Nation reservation land, inside Indian country." (ECF No. 1:7) (emphasis in original). As a result, Mr. Martin believes that his current detention in a state facility based on a state court conviction is in violation of federal law, presumably because he believes the state court lacked jurisdiction to render the conviction. (ECF No. 1:6).
In Ground Two, Petitioner essentially argues the same point raised in Ground One, stating that the Oklahoma state court system lacks jurisdiction "over Indians, Indian land, Indian County, Indian nations AND reservations." (ECF No. 1:7). In support of this argument, Petitioner reminds the Court that he is a Native American and "was at all times on Cherokee Nation reservation land, inside Indian country," presumably when he committed his crime. (ECF No. 1:7) (emphasis in original). In support of Ground Two, Petitioner also argues that Oklahoma has discriminated against him by denying him access to the courts and suspending habeas corpus rights. (ECF No. 1:7).
The entirety of Ground Three states:
United-Nations-Resolutions, international law, well established federal law since 1866 Act of Congress-places this matter before this court. Research cannot find where Congress took the authority of this court over crimes committed inside the Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, Chocktaw [sic], and Chickasaw sovereign Indian nations, away, or transferred it to any other court, not even under this doctrine of immonent [sic] domain].(ECF No. 1:7).
Finally, in Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the "failure of the United-States-Government to protect this Indians treaty, U.S. Constitution, rights under clearly established prior cases of this Court involving Indians warrants habeas relief." (ECF No. 1:8).
III. DISMISSAL
It is "the nature of a prisoner's confinement, not the fact of his confinement" that is the gravamen of a Section 2241 petition or challenge. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). Here, Mr. Martin alleges no facts to show that he is challenging the execution of his sentence or the nature of his confinement. He does not, for instance, seek to challenge "certain matters that occur at prison, such as deprivation of good-time credits and other prison disciplinary matters . . . affecting the fact or duration" of his custody. Hale v. Fox, 829 F.3d 1162, 1165 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). Instead, Petitioner's Grounds for relief "attempt[] a frontal assault on his conviction." Prost, 636 F.3d at 581. For example, in Grounds One and Two, Mr. Martin repeatedly argues that the state court lacked jurisdiction to convict him; and because he is Native American, and suggests that he committed his crime on "Indian land," that "exclusive jurisdiction" would have been in a federal court. See ECF No. 1:6-7. While such attacks are proper in a Section 2254 action, McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997), they fail to establish a basis for habeas relief arising under Section 2241 because they do not attack the execution of Petitioner's sentence. Therefore, the claims challenging jurisdiction in Grounds One and Two should be dismissed without prejudice. To the extent Petitioner desires to challenge the validity of his conviction, then he must file an action pursuant to Section 2254 utilizing the proper form. The Court, however, will not construe these claims as ones under Section 2254.
The Court lacks sufficient information about Petitioner's claims to know, for example, whether they have been exhausted in state court or if they are timely. As such, construing the Petition as arising under Section 2254 could have unintended consequences for Petitioner. See, e.g., Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 834-35 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing unintended consequences of construing a petitioner's habeas petition as arising under § 2254). --------
In support of Ground Two, Petitioner also argues that Oklahoma has discriminated against him by denying him access to the courts, and suspending habeas corpus rights. (ECF No. 1:7). But these challenges are not cognizable on habeas review, as they involve direct challenges to Oklahoma state procedural rules and laws. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) "[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law," and "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." (internal quotation marks omitted); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[Petitioner's] claims of state law violations are not cognizable in a federal habeas action.") (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a)); Stryker v. Bear, No. CIV-17-695-W, 2017 WL 4533968, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2017) (unpublished report and recommendation) (finding that petitioner's claim that Oklahoma denied him "access to court, suspended habeas corpus, . . . and denied him equal protection and due process" did "not demonstrate any violation of federal law"), adopted, 2017 WL 4533138 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 10, 2017) (unpublished district court order). Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner directly challenges Oklahoma procedural rules and laws, the Court should dismiss the claims, without prejudice. See Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d 1153, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2000).
In Ground Three, Petitioner provides several bases to support Grounds One and Two, but does not appear to present any additional argument for relief. Therefore, the Court should also dismiss Ground Three in accordance with the reasoning outlined above regarding the dismissal of Grounds One and Two. See supra.
Finally, the Court should dismiss "Ground Four," as it fails to present any additional substantive argument and appears instead to be a restatement of Grounds One and Two and a plea for relief based on the facts as presented in those Grounds. (ECF No. 1:8).
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is recommended that the petition be summarily dismissed, without prejudice.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 12, 2018, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The parties are further advised that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
V. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on March 26, 2018.
/s/_________
SHON T. ERWIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE