Opinion
07-27-1903
MARTIN v. McFALL.
B. W. Ellicott, for complainant. J. A. Beecher, for defendant.
Suit by Martin against McFall for injunction. Heard on motion to dissolve injunction. Denied.
B. W. Ellicott, for complainant.
J. A. Beecher, for defendant.
PITNEY, V. C. As this case is set for final hearing in the near future, I deem it unwise to express any final or definite opinion on the questions argued on the order to show cause so far as relates to the facts in this case. Some matters, however, seem to be quite well settled: First. That all sorts of laborers may lawfully combine and form what are known as "labor unions," for their mutual benefit, and that they may use all lawful means to promote their own interests, being careful in so doing not to infringe on the rights of others. Second. One lawful I means to that end is the refusal to work on the terms offered by the employer. Third. An unlawful means is to hinder or prevent others from working for an employer on; such terms as they shall see fit. Fourth, One means of such hindering and preventing is in various ways to render it either difficult or uncomfortable for such willing work 1 men so to work. This is unlawful. Fifth.! Another unlawful means in common use to hinder or prevent willing employes in working and to compel employers to accede to terms which they would not otherwise adopt, is the boycott in its various forms. This, in whatever form it assumes, is unlawful.
Applying these principles to the present case, it is unlawful for the defendant to attempt to induce or compel complainant to adopt a particular mode of doing his business by persuading or inducing other persons not to deal with him. It is unlawful by such means to punish him for refusing to accede, in respect to the conduct of his business, to the demands of the union. McFall denies that he has done, or intends doing, anything of the kind. The affidavits on the subject are contradictory, and, in view of the well-known fact that the boycott, such as that against which the bill is aimed, is one of the most usual, and in fact almost the only, means by which the defendants can enforce their demands, I cannot say that complainant is in no danger of being injured. Besides, if McFall and his agents, etc., do not intend to do the things forbidden by the restraining order, then the order will do them no harm. It does not operate to hinder or delay any work or business enterprise, nor, according to my present view, does it in fringe upon the liberty of the individual.
The restraint will be continued until final argument; costs to abide the event of the suit.