Opinion
Case No. 01-CV-74160-DT
August 30, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Jerome Martin, a state prisoner currently confined at the Parr Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights. Petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court in 1997. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve 100 to 150 months imprisonment.
In his pleadings, Petitioner asserts claims concerning the great weight of the evidence, the right of confrontation, the effectiveness of counsel, and sentencing proportionality. For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
I. FACTS
Petitioner's conviction arises from the beating death of Leon Favors at the Atlanta Apartments in Detroit, Michigan on March 18, 1995. Petitioner was charged with second-degree murder following the incident. His first trial on that charge resulted in a mistrial due to a hung jury.
At Petitioner's second trial, the medical examiner testified that Leon Favors died from multiple blunt force injuries to his head, chest, and back. Favors also suffered multiple abrasions, lacerations, and fractured ribs which penetrated the lung cavity. Blood tests showed the presence of alcohol and cocaine.
Lisa Gaines appeared for the prosecution at trial. Prior to her testimony, defense counsel requested assistance in having her name, birth date, and/or social security number run through the LIEN system to determine her true identity and uncover any criminal record. The trial court granted the motion and the subsequent check by the authorities yielded no criminal record.
Lisa Gaines testified that she lived at the Atlanta Apartments on Case Avenue in Detroit, Michigan. She admitted that she also went by the names Babette Harris and Bebette Johnson. During the early morning hours of March 18, 1995, she heard a commotion in the hall. She went out into the hall and saw Leon Favors, who she knew as "Butch" or "True Love," being carried out. She hollered to him and he turned to look at her. He was still alive. When he was out of her view, she went back into her apartment and put on some clothes. She then went outside the building where she saw Petitioner pick Favors up over his head and slam him head first onto the street. She identified Petitioner in court and said that she knew him as "J.R." Gaines said that she yelled out, "No J.R.," just before Petitioner slammed Favors to the ground, but Petitioner cursed at her and told her to shut up. When Favors' body hit the ground, it jerked, then collapsed and went dead. She went back inside to finish getting dressed and then left with a friend who was waiting outside in a car. She was upset, but did not call 911 or attempt to assist Favors. She did not return to her apartment that night, but was questioned by police the next day.
On cross-examination, Gaines testified that Favors walked out of the building. She was also impeached with her police statement which indicated that she did not go back into the building to finish getting dressed. Defense counsel questioned her about her identity, her prior statements to police, and her memory of the incident. She was reluctant to testify and was argumentative at times. On redirect examination, the prosecutor read a portion of her prior statement into the record.
James Record was unavailable to testify at trial, but his testimony from the first trial was read to the jury. James Record stated that he lived and worked at the Atlanta Apartments. During the early morning hours on March 18, 1995, he heard some commotion in the back of the building. He buzzed several people, including Petitioner, into the building. They were escorting Leon Favors. Record remained in the office and the men went down the hallway. A few moments later, he heard a fight. He opened the door and saw Favors lying on the floor with a crowd around him, including Petitioner and men named Ken, Body Guard, and Dark. Favors was holding the butt of a rifle, and was being kicked in the neck and chest area. Record did not see Petitioner doing any kicking. Petitioner, Ken, Body Guard, and another man then escorted Favors outside. A few minutes later, Record looked out of the window and saw four or five people across the street, one of them was carrying Favors. EMS arrived about 20 minutes later. Record recalled seeing Lisa Gaines, whom he identified as "Bam" in the area. He said that she and Favors dated and that she was a prostitute. Record admitted giving police a false name when he was questioned because he had an outstanding arrest warrant. He also admitted using crack cocaine and heroin before work on the night of the incident.
Robert McKeever testified that he lived in the Atlanta Apartments and did maintenance work there. He said that he fixed some windows early in the morning on March 18, 1995 and then mopped the floor in the lobby. Petitioner was also mopping the floor that morning, but had done so on other occasions as well. He was addicted to drugs and alcohol at the time and did not know what had happened.
Several police officers also testified at trial regarding their investigation of the crime scene and homicide.
Petitioner did not testify at trial, but presented several witnesses to testify on his behalf. John Davenport testified that he lived in the apartment building behind the Atlanta Apartments on March 18, 1995 and knew Petitioner, Leon Favors, and Lisa Gaines. That night, he saw Favors yelling in the backyard of the building and saw him break a window into the basement laundry room. Davenport went to the Atlanta Apartments and told Record what Favors was doing.
Artis Taylor testified that he lived in the Atlanta Apartments and worked as a desk clerk. He relieved Record on the morning of the incident. When he came on duty, he did not notice anything unusual in the building. Police arrived and asked him to view Favors' body outside. Prior to going downstairs to work he had seen Favors in the courtyard leaning against a wall yelling for help and saying that people were trying to hurt him and had robbed him.
Gregory Broadnax testified that he had a room and worked at the Atlanta Apartments. On the afternoon of March 18, 1995, Ken and Dark were drinking a lot and were in a rowdy mood. Ken and Dark sold drugs in the building, but moved out shortly after the incident. Broadnax knew Petitioner, Favors, and Gaines and was unaware of any problems between them.
At the close of trial, the jury acquitted Petitioner of second-degree murder, but convicted him of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced him as a habitual offender to 100 to 150 months imprisonment.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction and sentence in a per curiam decision. People v. Martin, No. 206290, 2000 WL 33522086 (Mich.Ct.App. Mar. 21, 2000) (unpublished). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Martin, 618 N.W.2d 913 (Oct. 30, 2000).
Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 30, 2001, raising the following claims as grounds for relief:
I. Where the sole witness as to any culpable conduct by defendant Martin was thoroughly compromised by coercion, where the witness had numerous ahases and her very identity was in doubt, and where she exhibited defiance and disrespect toward the processes of the court and refused to permit effective cross-examination, defendant' s conviction of assault was against the great weight of the evidence.
II. Defendant was denied his constitutional right to confrontation where the trial court denied defendant's request for an inquiry into the identity of the principal witness against him, and further, denied due process in his right of appeal when the trial court denied his post-judgment motion for evidentiary hearing.
III. Defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and due process where the trial court denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and where trial counsel was ineffective in his failure to ascertain the identity of the principal witness against him, and further, defendant was denied due process where the court's denial of his motion impeded his appeal of right.
IV. Defendant's sentence of 100 to 150 months in prison is disproportionate.
Respondent filed an answer to the petition on April 25, 2002, contending that it should be denied for lack of merit.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., govern this case because Petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996)
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the statecourt adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 411. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'S `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertiment United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998)
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Great Weight of the Evidence Claim
Petitioner first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. A federal habeas court has no power to grant habeas relief on the ground that a state conviction is against the great weight of the evidence. Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1097, 1105 (11th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. McLemore, 2001 WL 561216, *5 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2001). A claim that a verdict went against the great weight of the evidence is not of constitutional dimension, for habeas corpus purposes, unless the record is so devoid of evidentiary support that a due process issue is raised. Griggs v. State of Kansas, 814 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D. Kan. 1993); Robinson v. Scully, 683 F. Supp. 941, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The test for habeas relief is not whether the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, but whether there is evidence to support it. United States ex. rel. Victor v. Yeager, 330 F. Supp. 802, 806 (D.N.J. 1971).
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the United States Supreme Court established that a federal court's review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319; see also DeLisle v. Rivers, 161 F.3d 370, 389 (6th Cir. 1998)
Under Michigan law, the elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder are: (1) an attempt or offer with force or violence, to do corporal hurt to another, and (2) an intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84; People v. Smith, 217 Mich. 669, 673, 181 N.W. 304 (1922); People v. Mitchell, 149 Mich. App. 36, 38, 385 N.W.2d 717 (1986)
The Michigan Court of Appeals in this case found that Petitioner's verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, see Martin, 2000 WL 33522086 at *1, but did not address whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction as a matter of federal law. Accordingly, this court must conduct an independent review of the state court's decision. See, e.g., Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000); Morse v. Trippett, 102 F. Supp.2d 392, 402 (E.D. Mich. 2000). This independent review requires the federal court to "review the record and applicable law to determine whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Harris, 212 F.3d at 943. This independent review "is not a full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA." Id.
The testimony of Lisa Gaines, James Record, and the medical examiner provides sufficient evidence to support Petitioner's assault conviction. Lisa Gaines testified that Petitioner picked up Favors and slammed him head first onto the street. James Record indicated that Petitioner was with a group of people who assaulted Favors in the apartment building. The medical examiner testified that Favors died from blunt force injuries to his head, chest, and back. Petitioner's insufficient evidence claim essentially challenges the credibility of Lisa Gaines' testimony and the weight to be accorded certain evidence. However, it is well-settled that "[a] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 286 (6th Cir. 2000). Given the evidence presented at trial, this court finds that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.
B. Confrontation Claim
Petitioner also asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because he was denied his right to confront witness Lisa Gaines about her true identity. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. "The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1973). Further,
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness's story to test the witness's perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness.
Id. at 314.
The right of cross-examination, however, is not absolute.
"[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Michigan Court of Appeals considered this claim as follows:
Next, defendant claims that he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, Art 1, § 20, because he could not ascertain the true identity of Gaines, given her use of different aliases. This claim is meritless. As the trial court noted in denying defendant's motion for a new trial, this case is distinguishable from Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129; 88 S Ct 748; 19 L Ed 2d 956(1968). In Smith, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant was deprived of his right to confront witnesses when he was not allowed to ask the principal prosecution witness questions about his name and where he lived, after the witness had admitted that the first name he gave was false. Id. at 130-133. In this case, defendant was permitted to cross-examine Gaines with regard to her address and other matters of identity, including her use of aliases. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant's claim that he was denied his right of confrontation or due process.
Martin, 2000 WL 33522086, at *1.
This court finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals' determination in this regard is consistent with federal law and constitutes a reasonable application of that law. The record reveals that defense counsel was able to question Lisa Gaines about her identity and her use of aliases. The jury was well aware of her use of multiple names, as well as the fact that she was a prostitute and lived in an area where drug transactions were common. The jury had the opportunity to consider such factors in assessing Gaines' credibility as a witness. Petitioner has failed to establish a violation of his confrontation rights and is thus not entitled to habeas relief on such a basis.
C. Ineffective Assistance Claim
Petitioner relatedly claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ascertain the true identity of witness Lisa Gaines. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for determining whether a habeas petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. Second, the petitioner must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Counsel's errors must have been so serious that they deprived the petitioner of a fair trial or appeal. Id.
With respect to the performance prong, a petitioner must identify acts that were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" in order to prove deficient performance. Id. at 690. The reviewing court's scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. Id. at 689. The court must recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690.
To satisfy the prejudice prong under Strickland, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993), the United States Supreme Court observed that "an analysis focusing solely on outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable is defective." The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has thus concluded that a reviewing court should focus on whether counsel's alleged errors "have undermined the reliability of and confidence in the result." McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir. 1996). "On balance, the benclimark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 1311-12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
Citing Strickland, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, stating in relevant part:
"Counsel's decision to accept the statement of an officer of the court (the prosecutor) made on the record, that a criminal record check yielded negative results, was a "reasonable professional judgment, ' and was in no way "deficient.' Defendant's assertions do not establish that counsel made errors that were so serious that he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth [A]mendment or that the errors prejudiced the defense." Furthermore, defendant has not presented any evidence or offer of proof, either below or on appeal, indicating that any useful information not presented at trial actually exists. Therefore, he has not established the requisite prejudice necessary to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Martin, 2000 WL 33522086, at *2 (quoting the trial court in part). Having reviewed the record, this court finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with Strickland and constitutes a reasonable application thereof. Defense counsel acted reasonably in accepting the authorities' assurances that Lisa Gaines did not have a criminal record. Further, counsel cross-examined Lisa Gaines about her identity and use of aliases and challenged her credibility during the trial. Petitioner fails to indicate what information counsel should have uncovered with further investigation or how such information would have benefitted his defense. Conclusory allegations, without evidentiary support, do not provide a basis for habeas relief. See, e.g., Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276, 287 (6th Cir. 1998) (conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel do not warrant habeas relief). Petitioner has not established that defense counsel's performance fell outside the wide-range of professional, competent legal assistance, nor has he established that he was prejudiced by counsel's investigation of Lisa Gaines. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
D. Sentencing Claim
Lastly, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because his sentence is disproportionate. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner's sentence did not violate the principle of proportionality. Martin, 2000 WL 33522086, at *2.
To the extent that Petitioner claims that his sentence is disproportionate under state law, he fails to state a claim for federal habeas relief. See Atkins v. Overton, 843 F. Supp. 258, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1994). A petitioner has no state-created interest in having the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines applied rigidly in determining his sentence. Thomas v. Foltz, 654 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (E.D. Mich. 1987). There is no federal constitutional right to individualized sentencing. United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995)
Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner alleges that his sentence violates due process or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, he is also not entitled to habeas relief. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for a first offense of possession with intent to distribute more than 650 grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Following Harmelin, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that "there is no requirement of strict proportionality; the Eighth Amendment is offended only by an extreme disparity between crime and sentence." United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit has also stated that "[f]ederal courts will not engage in a Proportionality analysis except in cases where the penalty imposed is death or life in prison without possibility of parole." United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to disturb an HIV-positive defendant's sentence of 110 months imprisonment with four years of supervised release for one count of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver).
Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of 100 to 150 months imprisonment on his assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder conviction. This court finds that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing Petitioner's sentence and there is no extreme disparity between Petitioner's crime and his sentence so as to offend due process or the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented. Accordingly,