Opinion
Nos. 62598-5-I, 63493-3-I.
February 22, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-2-21635-9, Monica J. Benton, J., entered October 3, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, A.C.J., concurred in by Becker and Leach, JJ.
A superior court's order closing an estate is a final judgment that precludes a litigant from bringing claims in a collateral action that could have been brought in the probate proceeding. David Martin could have raised all of the claims that he brought in this case in the Estate of Jack DelGuzzi probate proceeding. In accordance with the doctrine of res judicata, Martin is precluded from bringing the claims constituting this action. Moreover, any reasonable investigation by Martin's attorney, Charles Cruikshank, would have revealed that there was no proper legal basis for advancing these claims. Thus, the trial court correctly awarded Kathryn Ellis attorney fees pursuant RCW 4.84.185 and imposed sanctions on Cruikshank pursuant to CR 11. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
This appeal is the sixth concerning claims relating to the administration of the Estate of Jack DelGuzzi (the "estate"). See In re Estate of DelGuzzi, noted at 150 Wn. App. 1058, No. 36682-7-II, 2009 WL 1863892 (Wash. App. June 30, 2009) ( DelGuzzi IV); Shaw v. Short Cressman, noted at 150 Wn. App. 1017, No. 60995-5-I, 2009 WL 1366272 (Wash. App. May 18, 2009); In re Estate of DelGuzzi, noted at 108 Wn. App. 1003, No. 24860-3-II, 2001 WL 1001082 (Wash. App. Aug. 31, 2001) ( DelGuzzi III); DelGuzzi v. Wilbert, noted at 105 Wn. App. 1004, No. 45022-1-I, 2001 WL 180995 (Wash. App. Feb. 26, 2001) ( DelGuzzi II); DelGuzzi v. Wilbert, noted at 93 Wn. App. 1048, No. 21752-0-II, 1999 WL 10081 (Wash. App. Jan. 8, 1999) ( DelGuzzi I). These earlier opinions explain in detail the underlying probate proceeding and the various challenges made to the estate's administration. Our discussion of the facts will be limited to those necessary to explain our disposition of this cause.
We may rely on unpublished opinions as evidence of the facts established in earlier proceedings in the same case or in a different case involving the same parties. Island County v. Mackie, 36 Wn. App. 385, 391 n. 3, 675 P.2d 607 (1984). We may also consider unpublished opinions in examining issues such as the law of the case, collateral estoppel, and res judicata. State v. Sanchez, 74 Wn. App. 763, 765 n. 1, 875 P.2d 712 (1994).
The parties involved in this case and the individuals and entities implicated in the earlier litigation are as follows. The Estate of Jack DelGuzzi constitutes the property at the center of the underlying dispute herein and in those related cases listed above. Kathryn Ellis, the defendant-respondent in this action, is the personal representative of the estate. Ellis was appointed to serve as such in 2005 by the Clallam County Superior Court, which conducted the probate proceeding concerning the estate beginning in 1978 and ending with its closure in 2007. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *3. Ellis replaced David Martin, the plaintiff-appellant in this action, who had briefly served as the estate's personal representative in 2004. See Shaw, 2009 WL 1366272, at *2. Prior to Martin's service, William Wilbert served as the estate's personal representative from 1982 until his death in 2004. The law firm of Short Cressman Burgess (SCB) served as the estate's legal counsel from 1982 to 1991. See Shaw, 2009 WL 1366272, at *1-*2. Thereafter, the firm of Chicoine Hallett (CH) represented Wilbert in his capacity as the estate's personal representative. See Shaw, 2009 WL 1366272, at *1-*2.
For clarity and simplicity, we refer by first name to those persons involved in the litigation with the same last names.
The following individuals have challenged the administration of the estate. Gary DelGuzzi, Jack's son and sole heir, first challenged Wilbert's administration of the estate in 1994. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *1. Until his death in 2004, Gary continued to litigate claims against Wilbert and the law firms representing Wilbert and to challenge the administration of the estate in the probate proceeding. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *1-*3. Upon Gary's death, Sidney Shaw became the personal representative of Gary's estate and was substituted for Gary in both the lawsuits that Gary had instituted and in the probate proceeding. See Shaw, 2009 WL 1366272, at *2. As explained below, in 2007, Shaw assigned certain interests and claims held by Gary's estate to Martin. It is on the basis of this assignment that Martin brought the claims constituting the subject matter of the action that is presently before us. At all pertinent times, attorney Charles M. Cruikshank represented Gary, Shaw, and Martin in both the probate proceeding and the collateral lawsuits.
In July of 2007, the Clallam County Superior Court entered an order closing the probate of Jack's estate, approving Ellis's final report, and granting her motion for final distribution of estate assets. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *3. Shaw objected to Ellis's motion and challenged her administration of the estate in the probate proceeding. The superior court's 2007 closing order came nine years after the same court had entered a closing plan. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, *1-*4. It also followed the same court's approval, in 2005 and 2006, of interim reports and interim distributions of estate assets, to which Shaw objected, but from which he did not directly appeal. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, *1-*4. In her 2007 final report and motion for final distribution, Ellis listed the estate properties she had sold, the proceeds from those sales, and the creditor and administrative disbursements she had made upon providing notice to interested parties. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *8.
In May of 2007, two months prior to the closing of the estate, Shaw assigned certain claims and interests held by Gary's estate to Martin. In November of 2007, Martin brought causes of action against Ellis for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Martin subsequently prosecuted his claims against Ellis after Shaw had objected to Ellis's administration in the probate proceeding and while Shaw appealed from the 2007 closing order.
Martin labeled his causes as (1) "Breach of Duty to Preserve Property and Invest in a Prudent Manner," (2) "Breach of Duty to Account and Furnish Information to Beneficiaries and Creditors," (3) "Negligence," (4) "Breach of Duty of Loyalty," and (5) Breach of "Duty to Test Market or Obtain Appraisals."
For the purposes of this appeal, the critical fact is that Shaw and Martin pursued parallel actions concerning Ellis's administration of the estate in different judicial forums. That they did so raises the core issue in this case: whether Martin is precluded from litigating the claims brought in this action.
Because Shaw challenged the administration of the estate in the probate proceeding prior to Martin's commencement of this action, we describe the issues raised by Shaw before describing the claims brought herein by Martin. As Shaw had done with the 2005 and 2006 reports and related motions for interim distributions, he objected in the probate proceeding to the 2007 report and the motion for final distribution and closure, alleging that Ellis had been negligent and had breached her fiduciary duty to the estate. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, *8-*10. Shaw asserted that Ellis had failed to follow statutory notice requirements set forth in RCW 11.28.240 and that she had failed to follow statutory procedures for submitting the final report set forth in RCW 11.76.020-.050. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *8. In particular, Shaw claimed that Ellis failed to notify all devisees of the proposed closing and failed to describe estate property that had not been disposed. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *8. Further, Shaw claimed that Ellis should not have authorized the payment of attorney fees from the estate to SCB. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *9. However, Shaw did not assign specific error to administrative payments made to Wilbert's estate and to SCB in 2007. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *9.
In addition, Shaw asserted that Ellis had failed to properly account for various estate properties near Port Angeles, Washington, in Costa Rica, and in British Columbia. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *9-*10, *11 n. 19. Shaw claimed that Ellis had failed to provide a verified inventory and appraisal of estate property in violation of RCW 11.44.015, .025, and .050. Shaw also raised issues concerning the 1998 closing plan and the superior court's 2005 and 2006 interim orders from which he had not appealed. In addition, he asserted many of the contentions that had been previously raised by Gary in the litigation commenced in 1994 and in various challenges to the administration of the estate, including the allegedly unjustified payment of fees to SCB, that various of Wilbert's actions had constituted breaches of his fiduciary duty, and that Wilbert had mishandled estate property. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *11 n. 19.
The Clallam County Superior Court, in the probate proceeding, and Division II of this court, on appeal, rejected all of Shaw's contentions. On June 30, 2009, Division II affirmed the superior court's 2007 closing order and dismissed as untimely Shaw's challenges to the superior court's pre-2007 approval of interim distributions. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *11. With respect to all actions taken before or in conjunction with the 2006 interim order, Division II concluded that either Shaw or Gary should have raised issues concerning those actions at appropriate earlier times and that Shaw was time-barred from raising them on appeal because of his and Gary's failure to appeal directly from the various challenged orders. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *8-*11. With respect to the issues raised by Shaw concerning Ellis's actions in 2006 and 2007, the court found no merit to Shaw's contentions. See DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *8-*11. Further, the court noted that its decision had "a preclusive effect" on the unresolved issues contained in the litigation commenced in 1994. DelGuzzi IV, 2009 WL 1863892, at *11 n. 19.
We turn now to describing the claims brought by Martin in this action. Again, Martin brought causes of action against Ellis for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Martin generally alleged that Ellis violated statutory requirements and orders of the Clallam County Superior Court relating to the accounting and disbursement of estate assets and the general administration of the estate. Specifically, Martin alleged that Ellis improperly disbursed payments to SCB based on erroneous fee requests, effectively overpaying SCB for legal services rendered from 1982 to 1991 during Wilbert's tenure as personal representative.
With respect to the marshaling and accounting of estate assets, Martin alleged that Ellis had failed to properly investigate and account for estate property in British Columbia, which Wilbert had disposed of while administering the estate and which was the subject of an objection raised by Shaw in 2005 to an interim distribution of estate assets. Martin further alleged that Ellis mishandled the sale of various parcels of property located near Port Angeles, Washington. Martin alleged that Gary's estate held partial interests in these properties, which were also part of the 2005 interim distribution. Martin further alleged that Ellis mishandled the assets of different business organizations held by the estate in which Gary's estate also allegedly held partial interests. In addition, Martin alleged that Ellis failed to take steps to recover from Wilbert's estate allegedly improper real estate sales commissions and payments that Wilbert had assigned to himself while representing Jack's estate. Finally, Martin also alleged that Ellis failed to comply with procedures for closing the estate set forth in RCW 11.28.240 and RCW 11.76.020-.050. Martin's claims do not relate to any action taken by Ellis in her capacity as personal representative of the estate subsequent to the 2007 closing order.
At oral argument, Martin's attorney, Cruikshank, was unable to identify any claim that related to an action taken by Ellis after the closing of the estate in July 2007.
In answering Martin's complaint, Ellis asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including the preclusive defenses of res judicata or claim preclusion and collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, as well as the preclusive defenses of judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel. Ellis also averred in her answer that Martin's complaint was frivolous, indicating that she would seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.185.
Ellis subsequently moved for summary judgment of dismissal as to all claims. She argued both that Martin had failed to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, resulting in her entitlement to judgment on the merits, and that various preclusion doctrines barred Martin from prosecuting these claims against her. The trial court granted summary judgment in Ellis's favor, concluding both that Martin had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded him from attempting to recover against Ellis.
After the grant of summary judgment, Ellis moved for an award of attorney fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 and for the imposition of CR 11 sanctions against Cruikshank. The trial court granted Ellis's motion, expressly finding that Martin's action against Ellis "was frivolous in its entirety and advanced without reasonable cause," (1) because Ellis's powers as personal representative were restricted, (2) because Ellis had a duty to guard against the wastage of estate assets, (3) because Martin had failed to show injury, and (4) because Martin's claims were precluded by the outcomes of collateral judicial proceedings. The court also found that Cruikshank had violated CR 11 by failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into Martin's claims to ensure that they were "well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law, or warranted by a good faith argument for the alteration of existing law." At the trial court's direction, Ellis subsequently filed a motion for an award of fees, requesting approximately $115,000. She supported her request with a declaration and various billing documents. Martin and Cruikshank did not challenge Ellis's request or her calculation, other than to argue that summary judgment was inappropriate and that, therefore, an award of fees and sanctions was unwarranted. The trial court entered a final judgment awarding fees and imposing sanctions in the amount requested by Ellis, holding Martin and Cruikshank jointly and severally liable for the full amount of fees.
Martin timely appealed from the trial court's orders. Before the parties submitted their briefing, Division II of this court affirmed the 2007 closing order.
II
Martin contends that he should be allowed to prosecute his claims against Ellis in the trial court, asserting that the collateral proceedings in the Clallam County Superior Court do not preclude him from doing so. We disagree.
Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, a party is barred from relitigating "claims and issues that were litigated, or might have been litigated, in a prior action." Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wn. App. 62, 69, 11 P.3d 833 (2000). The doctrine "`puts an end to strife, produces certainty as to individual rights, and gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings.'" Marino Prop. Co. v. Port Comm'rs, 97 Wn.2d 307, 312, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982) (quoting Walsh v. Wolff, 32 Wn.2d 285, 287, 201 P.2d 215 (1949)). Although the trial court did not grant summary judgment on the basis that Martin's claims were precluded under the doctrine of res judicata, relying instead on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we may apply res judicata because we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. State v. Carter, 74 Wn. App. 320, 324 n. 2, 875 P.2d 1 (1994) (citing State v. Grundy, 25 Wn. App. 411, 415-16, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980)).
Res judicata applies "where a prior final judgment is identical to the challenged action in `(1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.'" Lynn v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 130 Wn. App. 829, 836, 125 P.3d 202 (2005) (quoting Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995)). The doctrine applies to a collateral challenge to a judicial order closing an estate. Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn.2d 124, 131, 622 P.2d 816 (1980). Whether an action is barred by res judicata is a question of law that we review de novo. Lynn, 130 Wn. App. at 837.
Each element necessary to apply the doctrine in this case is met. In July of 2007, the Clallam County Superior Court entered a decree for the final distribution of estate assets and an order closing the estate. Division II of this court affirmed the superior court's closing order. First, Martin's causes of action involve the same subject matter as that at issue in the probate proceeding: Ellis's administration of the estate and the estate assets. Second, as explained above, many of the causes of action brought by Martin are identical to those unsuccessfully raised by Shaw in both the probate proceeding and on appeal. Regardless of whether Shaw brought all of the causes under which Martin seeks recovery in this case, the causes that Martin has brought herein could have been raised in the probate proceeding. Neither in his briefing nor during oral argument was Martin able to point to a single cause of action that could not have been brought as a challenge to the probate of the estate.
Third, there is concurrence of identity between the persons and parties both in this action and in the probate proceeding because Martin is in privity with Shaw in Shaw's role as personal representative of Gary's estate. When different parties in separate suits are in privity with one another, they are the same parties for purposes of res judicata. Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn. App. 891, 902, ___ P.3d ___ (2009) (citing Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wn. App. 115, 121, 897 P.2d 365 (1995)). Our Supreme Court has explained that
"[p]rivity within the meaning of the doctrine of res judicata is privity as it exists in relation to the subject matter of the litigation, and the rule is construed strictly to mean parties claiming under the same title. It denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same right or property. The binding effect of the adjudication flows from the fact that when the successor acquires an interest in the right it is then affected by the adjudication in the hands of the former owner."
United States v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 140 Wn.2d 104, 111, 994 P.2d 830 (2000) (quoting Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d 564, 568, 354 P.2d 696 (1960)); see also Woodley v. Myers Capital Corp., 67 Wn. App. 328, 337, 835 P.2d 239 (1992) (citing Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 896 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a nonparty in one suit is in privity with a party in an earlier suit for res judicata purposes if the nonparty has succeeded to the party's interest in property, if the nonparty controlled prior litigation, or if the party adequately represented the nonparty's interest in the prior proceeding)).
Although Martin did not challenge Ellis's administration of the estate in the probate proceeding, he obtained the ostensible right to do so as the assignee of claims held by Gary's estate. These claims originate from Gary's status as the sole heir of the estate. Shaw possessed power over these claims as the representative of Gary's estate. Therefore, Martin is in privity with Shaw in Shaw's role as personal representative of Gary's estate.
The fourth element is closely related to the third, and it is also satisfied. For the persons for or against whom the claim is made to be of the same quality, the parties in the collateral action must be bound by the judgment in the prior proceeding. Ensley, 152 Wn. App. at 905 (citing 14A Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Civil Procedure § 35.27, at 464 (1st ed. 2007)). There is no question that Martin and Ellis are bound by the 2007 closing order. The order discharged the probate of the estate and concluded Ellis's duties as personal representative. Martin derives his claims from the interests in Jack's estate that were held by Gary's estate and assigned to Martin by Shaw. Further, the nature of a probate proceeding makes the final order closing the estate binding as to all parties claiming an interest in the estate. "`[O]rders and decrees of distribution made by superior courts in probate proceedings upon due notice provided by statute are final adjudications having the effect of judgments in rem and are conclusive and binding upon all persons having any interest in the estate and upon all the world as well.'" Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 796, 215 P.2d 694 (1950) (quoting Ryan v. Plath, 18 Wn.2d 839, 857, 140 P.2d 968 (1943)). Division II concluded that Ellis provided sufficient notice of the petition for distribution. Therefore, Martin is bound by the 2007 closing order.
Martin's claims amount to challenges to the manner in which Ellis administered the estate. Any challenge to Ellis's administration of the estate should have been brought in the probate proceeding conducted in the Clallam County Superior Court. To allow Martin to collaterally attack the final order of distribution and the order closing the estate would prevent the superior court from ever bringing the probate of Jack's estate to a close. By instituting this action against Ellis in the King County Superior Court, Martin, represented by Cruikshank, has engaged in nothing short of blatant forum shopping. The doctrine of res judicata bars him from doing so. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment of dismissal in Ellis's favor.
III
Martin and Cruikshank contend that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Ellis pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 and in the form of CR 11 sanctions. Again, we disagree.
In the notice of appeal from the trial court's order awarding attorney fees and imposing sanctions that he filed on behalf of Martin, Cruikshank did not identify himself as an aggrieved party in order to personally seek appellate relief. As we have explained previously, an attorney is an aggrieved party for purposes of appealing from an order imposing sanctions against him or her. Polygon N.W. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 143 Wn. App. 753, 768, 189 P.3d 777 (citing In re Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wn. App. 841, 848-50, 776 P.2d 695 (1989)), review denied, 164 Wn.2d 1033 (2008). Although Cruikshank did not properly designate the sanction order in the notice of appeal for our review, as is required by RAP 2.4(a), the parties have briefed this issue as though he had. Accordingly, we elect to review the CR 11 sanction order.
"The decision to make an award of attorney's fees under RCW 4.84.185 is left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse." Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, Inc., 59 Wn. App. 332, 339-40, 798 P.2d 1155 (1990) (citing Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 56 Wn. App. 125, 131-33, 783 P.2d 82 (1989)). "A trial court cannot be said to abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees under RCW 4.84.185 if the facts alleged do not state a cause of action that can be supported by any rational argument on the law or facts." Rhinehart, 59 Wn. App. at 340 (citing Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 52 Wn. App. 531, 539, 762 P.2d 356 (1998)).
RCW 4.84.185 provides:
In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, upon written findings by the judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense. This determination shall be made upon motion by the prevailing party after a voluntary or involuntary order of dismissal, order on summary judgment, final judgment after trial, or other final order terminating the action as to the prevailing party. The judge shall consider all evidence presented at the time of the motion to determine whether the position of the nonprevailing party was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. In no event may such motion be filed more than thirty days after entry of the order.
Each of the causes of action advanced by Martin is precluded either by the interim distribution orders or the 2007 final distribution order. As discussed above, it is a well-established principle that a final distribution order in a probate proceeding is binding as to all persons. See Batey, 35 Wn.2d at 796. Even a modicum of legal research would have uncovered this rule of law. There is no suggestion that any of the claims brought by Martin arose after the entry of the 2007 order closing the estate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees under RCW 4.84.185.
Further, although Cruikshank appears to contend that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees in the amount requested by Ellis because of a lack of evidence that Ellis incurred the fees requested, in his briefing he offers no argument as to why the amount of the award is improper. Accordingly, we will not further consider this assignment of error. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
In his assignments of error, Martin contends that "[t]he trial court erred in granting R.C.W. 4.84.185 sanctions [sic] against Martin and Cruikshank, because: . . . [the statute] only permits recovery of attorney fees and costs to parties who have incurred those expenses."
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing CR 11 sanctions against Cruikshank. A trial court may impose CR 11 sanctions against an attorney who signs a complaint upon finding that the action lacks a basis in fact or is unwarranted by existing law and that the attorney failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of the claim. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 220, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (citing Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)). "The determination of whether a violation of CR 11 has occurred is [also] within the sound discretion of the trial court." Rhinehart, 59 Wn. App. at 341 (citing Doe v. Spokane Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wn. App. 106, 110, 780 P.2d 853 (1989)). Sanctions are mandatory if the court determines that a violation has occurred. Rhinehart, 59 Wn. App. at 341 (citing Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wn. App. 285, 301, 753 P.2d 530 (1988)). A trial court has broad discretion regarding the nature and scope of sanctions it imposes. Rhinehart, 59 Wn. App. at 341 (citing Badgley, 51 Wn. App. at 303).
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion. Contrary to Cruikshank's assertions, the trial court expressly found that Martin's claims were neither factually warranted, warranted by existing law, nor warranted by a good faith argument to change existing law and that Cruikshank failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the basis for Martin's claims. As explained above, the 2007 closing order precludes Martin's claims. Res judicata is a fundamental legal doctrine. Cruikshank, as the attorney who has represented numerous challengers to the administration of the estate since 1994, was well-positioned to comprehend the preclusive effect of the 2007 closing order. The trial court did not err.
IV
Finally, Ellis requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1, CR 11, and RCW 4.84.185 for having to defend against a frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds can differ and is so totally devoid of merit that there was no reasonable possibility of reversal. In re Recall of City of Concrete Mayor Robin Feetham, 149 Wn.2d 860, 872, 72 P.3d 741 (2003). Martin's appeal is frivolous. Well-established legal principles precluded him from bringing any of the claims herein asserted. Upon Ellis's further compliance with RAP 18.1, a commissioner of this court will enter an appropriate order.
Affirmed.