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holding state law claims in replevin and conversion provided adequate due process
Summary of this case from Shrey v. KontzOpinion
Civil Action No. 03-5977.
October 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Marvette Toomer Marsh brings claims against Defendants Trooper Rebecca Ladd, Corporal James Kemm, and Corporal James Heins pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff also brings state law claims consisting of conversion, replevin, trespass, invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy. Presently before this Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part and Plaintiff's motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2001, members of the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") Vice Unit and Montgomery County Detectives executed a search warrant at 4831 N. 18th Street in Philadelphia. The residence belongs to Plaintiff Marvette Toomer Marsh, who purchased her home in 1998. (Marsh Dep. at 6-9.) In 1999, she rented a bedroom on the second floor to Williams Taylor (a.k.a. Peter Bird). ( Id. at 9-11, 13, 18.)
Most of the factual background leading up to the execution of the search warrant is undisputed. Corporal Heins is the supervisor of the PSP Vice Unit, which includes Trooper Ladd and Trooper (now Corporal) Kemm. (Heins Dep. at 19-20, 112.) On June 4, 2001, Detective Erick Echevarria of the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office contacted Corporal Heins to request the Vice Unit's assistance in a planned drug "buy-bust" at the Cheltenham Mall on the border of Philadelphia and Montgomery Counties. ( Id. at 80-81.) Taylor was the target of the operation. Detective Echevarria, working in an undercover capacity with a confidential informant, orchestrated the sale. At the culmination of the operation, Taylor was arrested with thirty-eight pounds of marijuana in the trunk of his car. ( Id. at 78.) Upon his arrest, Taylor indicated that he lived at 4831 N. 18th Street in Philadelphia. ( Id. at 112.)
Following the buy-bust operation, Detective Echevarria requested Corporal Heins's assistance in obtaining a search warrant for Taylor's residence because Detective Echevarria did not have jurisdiction in Philadelphia to obtain the warrant. ( Id. at 82-83.) Thereafter, Corporal Heins assigned Trooper Ladd to assist in the warrant application process. To gather information for the warrant application, Trooper Ladd spoke with Detective Echevarria about the confidential informant and examined both the criminal complaint against Taylor and a phone warrant application that Montgomery County Detective Stephen Forzato had previously prepared. (Ladd Dep. 119-126; Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 2 (Phone Warrant).) Detective Forzato also provided Trooper Ladd with Plaintiff's name and address, which had been acquired pursuant to the phone warrant. (Ladd Dep. at 315.)
Ladd, under the supervision of Corporal Heins, drafted the affidavit of probable cause. Trooper Ladd then presented the affidavit to Bail Commissioner Timothy J. O'Brien. ( Id. at 127-29, 419.) After reviewing the affidavit, the Commissioner asked Trooper Ladd if the confidential informant had previously provided information which led to an arrest or conviction. ( Id. at 128.) Trooper Ladd called Detective Echevarria, who responded affirmatively and provided a case number as proof. ( Id.) The Commissioner directed Trooper Ladd to handwrite the additional information at the end of the affidavit, which Trooper Ladd wrote as follows: "Reference case #2001-0733 from Montgomery County leading in a successful Marijuana arrest." (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1.) The Commissioner then signed the search warrant.
Later that same day, the Vice Unit reassembled at the Plaintiff's residence with the signed search warrant. Taylor was detained at the time and Plaintiff was not at home. (Marsh Dep. at 22.) After knocking and announcing their presence, the Vice Unit forcefully entered the back door. (Heins Dep. at 104, 108; Kemm Dep. at 139 (July 26, 2004); Ladd Dep. at 353.) Trooper Ladd was the investigating officer for the purpose of conducting the search and seizure. (Heins Dep. at 89.) As such, Trooper Ladd retrieved the items covered under the "Items to be Seized" attachment to the affidavit of probable cause. ( Id. at 90; Ladd Dep. at 358.) Trooper Ladd also personally catalogued each item on the inventory receipt. (Heins Dep. at 90; Ladd Dep. at 365.) After Trooper Kemm assisted with the search, he helped Trooper Ladd number and package the items seized. (Heins Dep. at 93-94, 97; Ladd Dep. at 387-88.)
At some point during the search, Plaintiff returned home. (Heins Dep. at 170-71; Ladd Dep. at 390.) She encountered two officers who identified themselves as Montgomery County detectives and asked to speak with her. (Marsh Dep. at 26.) Plaintiff agreed to drive around to the front of the house, but then drove away instead. ( Id. at 26.) After completing the search, Corporal Heins turned some of the seized items over to Detective Echevarria for forfeiture. (Heins Dep. at 158.) Trooper Ladd transported the remaining items back to the state police barracks. (Ladd Dep. at 94.) Plaintiff returned to her home around midnight and testified that it had been ransacked: sofa cushions sliced, carpets torn, and garbage and clothes scattered on the floor. (Marsh Dep. at 33-34.) Plaintiff also claims that some of her bank records, immigration documents, compact discs, clothing, jewelry, pictures, and videos were missing. ( Id. at 40-41.)
On October 25, 2002, at a suppression hearing in the criminal case against Taylor, the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County ruled that the warrant was facially invalid. (Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 15 (Suppression Order).) The suppression hearing transcript indicates the court's concern that the source's tip was too stale to be of any use and that the Commonwealth could not produce a signed copy of the warrant. ( Id. at Ex. 13 (Suppression Hearing) (expressing "reservations about [the house search] in terms of time parameters and in terms of linking it within the orbit of this particular incident").)
Following the suppression hearing, Trooper Ladd made several phone calls to attempt to return Taylor's property. Trooper Ladd testified that she called "the residence" and that the answering machine had a woman's voice. (Ladd Dep. at 257-60.) In the messages, however, Ladd only asked for Taylor, not Plaintiff. (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 14 (Phone Transcript).) None of the Defendants left a message for Plaintiff, sent her a letter, or stopped by her home to return her property. On September 12, 2003, upon Trooper Ladd's order, Plaintiff's property was destroyed. ( Id. at Ex. 12.) Plaintiff instituted the instant action on October 29, 2003.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the admissible evidence fails to demonstrate a dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. 5 P. 56 (c) (1994); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). When the moving party does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thereafter, the nonmoving party demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact if sufficient evidence is provided to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In order to meet this burden, the opposing party must point to specific, affirmative evidence in the record and not simply rely on mere allegations, conclusory or vague statements, or general denials in the pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. In reviewing the record, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in making its determination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see also Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 293 F.3d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. ARGUMENT
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as on the issue of qualified immunity. This Court will address each claim in turn.
A. Fourth Amendment
Both parties have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. This Court begins with Defendants' assertion that Plaintiff's claim is time-barred. Because the statute of limitations issue is dispositive, the Court need not address the validity of the search warrant and qualified immunity. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims under the Fourth Amendment are time-barred because she instituted this action on October 29, 2003, over two years and four months after the alleged illegal search. Plaintiff responds that the action is not time-barred because of the doctrine of equitable tolling.
1. Accrual of Cause of Action
In Pennsylvania, the two-year statute of limitations on § 1983 claims begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Knoll v. Springfield Township Sch. Dist., 763 F.2d 584, 585 (3d Cir. 1985). Accrual of § 1983 claims is governed by federal law. Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 197 n. 16 (3d Cir. 1984). Under federal law, a civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff "knew or had reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the action." Id. at 193; Barnes v. Fraley, No. 97-734, 1998 WL 316031, at *2, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8817, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1998). Furthermore, knowledge of the injury is distinct from knowledge regarding the viability of a legal claim. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-23 (1979) (noting that federal statutes of limitations start running from time of injury, not from time injured party recognizes viability of legal claim); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "a claim accrues in a federal cause of action upon awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness that this injury constitutes a legal wrong"); J.H. Stevedoring Co. v. Fasig-Tipton Co., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("The cause of action accrues when plaintiff should be reasonably aware that she suffered an injury, not when she becomes aware that she has a legal claim.").
Generally, "a claim for illegal search and seizure accrues at the time of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation." Donahue v. Gavin, Civ. A. No. 98-1602, 1999 WL 165700, at *6 n. 7, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2760, at *21 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1999); Johnson v. Cullen, 925 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D. Del. 1996) ("Such cases have uniformly held that in section 1983 cases concerning deprivation of one's property, the violation of one's civil rights accrues when the property is seized."); Barnes, 1998 WL 316031, at *2 (holding that "plaintiffs knew or had reason to know that any injury they suffered as a result" of alleged unlawful search occurred on date of search). In the instant case, there is no dispute that the allegedly illegal search occurred on June 4, 2001, over two years prior to Plaintiff's commencement of this action. Accordingly, Defendants assert, and Plaintiff does not contest, that her Fourth Amendment claim accrued on June 4, 2001.
2. Equitable Tolling
Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that her claim should be equitably tolled. Under this doctrine, it may be appropriate to toll the statute of limitations when: (1) the defendants actively misled the plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; and (2) critical facts that would have alerted her to the unlawfulness of her injury would not have become known to a reasonable person until some later time. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1392; see also Harper v. Court of Common Pleas of Phila., No. Civ. A. 99-4906, 2000 WL 688169, at *3, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7252, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2000). In addition, "[t]o invoke equitable tolling, [Plaintiff] must show that [she] exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [her] claims." New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997); Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390 ("The plaintiff who fails to exercise this reasonable diligence . . . lose[s] the benefit of" equitable tolling doctrine); see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that equitable tolling suspends statute of limitations when "despite all due diligence [plaintiff] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim").
Plaintiff marshals several disputed facts in support of her equitable tolling argument which, according to Plaintiff, necessitate trial on this issue. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendants did not leave a complete copy of the search warrant at the residence for Plaintiff's inspection. According to Plaintiff, although the first page of the warrant directed its recipient to "[r]efer to attached affidavit of probable cause," the affidavit was not included. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, she could not have been aware of the legal deficiencies in the warrant at the time of the search. Defendants dispute Plaintiff's claim. (Ladd Dep. at 66 (stating that a complete copy of the search warrant was left at the Plaintiff's residence).) Second, Plaintiff claims that she could not have gained access to the complete warrant even if she had tried. At Taylor's suppression hearing on October 25, 2002, Trooper Ladd informed the Common Pleas Court that she did not have the signed affidavit of probable cause in her possession despite calling eight different telephone numbers and attempting to locate it over a two week period. (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 21 at 68 (Suppression Hearing R.).) Finally, Plaintiff claims she was misled because officers represented to both Plaintiff and her neighbor that the warrant was in fact valid.
Even viewing all of this evidence in favor of Plaintiff, there is no basis to conclude that these events would have misled a reasonably prudent person, exercising all due diligence, with respect to the existence of her cause of action. First, Plaintiff testified that when she returned to her home the night of June 4, 2001, she found that her house had been searched and ransacked. Although the warrant that was left by the Defendants only referred to Williams Taylor, Plaintiff testified that she soon became aware that many of her own personal items had been seized — including, inter alia, her diaries, bank papers, mortgage documents, clothing and family pictures. (Marsh Dep. at 71-72, 91-92.) She also testified that she believed these items could not have been related to the criminal prosecution of Taylor. ( Id. at 68-69.) A reasonable person returning to find her home ransacked and personal items seized pursuant to a warrant that did not have her name on it would certainly be aware of a potential legal claim. Second, the fact that the affidavit of probable cause, which was referenced on the face of the warrant, was not attached to the warrant could not have led Plaintiff to believe that she had no cause of action. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2 (Search Warrant).) Although the missing affidavit may have impacted Plaintiff's present ability to comprehend the exact nature of her legal claims, it did not preclude her awareness that a claim may exist. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390 ("Equitable tolling . . . keys on a plaintiff's cognizance, or imputed cognizance, of the facts supporting the plaintiff's cause of action."). If anything, rather than misleading Plaintiff into believing the warrant was proper, this alleged omission would heighten a reasonably diligent person's awareness of a possible cause of action.
Furthermore, a finding that Defendants' mere assertion that the warrant was valid could "actively mislead" the Plaintiff and toll the statute of limitations would effectively eviscerate the statute of limitations in § 1983 claims for defective search warrants. See Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 268 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Oshiver and noting that "[i]t is the view of this court that such a position would eviscerate the concept of a limitations period because [i]t implies that a defendant is guilty of fraudulent concealment unless it tells the plaintiff, 'We're firing you because of your age'" (internal quotation omitted)).
Thus, on June 4, 2001, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury underlying her cause of action. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that, thereafter, Defendants engaged in any acts that would have misled a reasonably diligent person with respect to her cause of action. Nonetheless, despite having two years to seek legal assistance or institute this action on her own, she chose to wait to bring suit until after the suppression hearing in Taylor's criminal case. See Kronish v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A] plaintiff need not know each and every relevant fact of his injury or even that the injury implicates a cognizable legal claim. Rather, a claim will accrue when the plaintiff knows, or should know, enough of the critical facts of injury and causation to protect himself by seeking legal advice.") No reasonable juror could fail to find that Plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, enough facts about her injury and its cause to protect herself by seeking legal advice and commencing suit. See Sistrun v. Time-Warner Cable, Civ. A. No. 02-8023, 2004 WL 1858042, at *9, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16681, at *31 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004) ("Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of equitable tolling is to be used sparingly." ( citing National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002))).
Plaintiff testified that, at some point during the summer of 2002, Taylor told her that he believed that the warrant was illegal, but that she had to wait until his criminal trial was over before she could seek the return of her possessions. (Marsh Dep. at 88, 91.)
In conclusion, Plaintiff's allegations, the evidence presented, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are insufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. Therefore, this Court must grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim as time-barred. Although this conclusion forecloses consideration of the substantive merits of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, the Court is compelled to note its deep misgivings regarding the validity of the search warrant executed on Plaintiff's residence.
B. Denial of Access to Courts
The right of access to the courts is one of the most fundamental of constitutional rights, rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974), the Equal Protection Clause, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987), the First Amendment, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) ( citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)), and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Chambers v. Baltimore Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Denial of access claims have taken various forms — from claims of actual physical denial of access to the court system to claims of effective denial of access due to official concealment of evidence. See Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Several courts have found that a state official's actions in covering-up evidence amounted to a denial of access to the courts."); Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that defendant's concealment of information preventing plaintiff from filing suit would be proper basis for denial of access to courts claim).
According to Plaintiff, if the statute of limitations period on her underlying Fourth Amendment claim has expired, then Defendants' conduct of concealing portions of the warrant resulted in her denial of access to the courts because it prevented her from filing this action within the limitations period. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414 (2002) (recognizing claim for denial of access to courts could be based on lost opportunity to sue due to statute of limitations bar). Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, this claim is timely because it would only accrue at the closing of the limitations period on her Fourth Amendment claim. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must show "that the defendants' actions foreclosed her from filing suit . . . or rendered ineffective any state court remedy she previously may have had." Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1263-64.
Plaintiff's denial of access claim must fail for the same reasons as her claim for equitable tolling. As previously stated, Plaintiff has not alleged any activity on behalf of Defendants that prevented her from bringing suit on her underlying Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiff was aware of her injuries on June 4, 2001, and should have sought to protect her rights at that time. Furthermore, even if, as Plaintiff suggests, the warrant was lacking the affidavit of probable cause, such that she was not yet aware of the precise contours of her claim, Plaintiff was nonetheless not prevented from bringing suit. The only impediment to Plaintiff's pursuit of her Fourth Amendment claim was her own delay. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's denial of access claim is granted.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Deprivation of Property
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process of law when her property was destroyed by the PSP. Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim on two grounds: (1) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the claim is barred because there is an adequate state post-deprivation remedy available. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on this claim as well, arguing that there is no adequate state post-deprivation remedy because her property has already been destroyed. This Court will address each of these issues in turn.
Plaintiff's claim for failure to return her property is not barred by the statute of limitations because she did not have a right to possession of the property until the Common Pleas Court's suppression ruling on October 25, 2002. Prior to that time, the property was properly held as evidence in the criminal prosecution of Taylor. Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1997) (claim for return of seized property accrued after court ordered property to be returned); Donaldson v. Askey, 13 Pa. D. C.3d 688, 690 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pls. 1979) ("The general rule is that where property has been lawfully seized for evidentiary purposes, it need not be returned as long as its retention is necessary to serve the purpose of justice."). Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
Next, the Court addresses the issue of adequate state remedy. To maintain an action for intentional or negligent deprivation of property under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that: (1) Defendants acted under color of state law; and (2) Plaintiff has no adequate post-deprivation state remedy to redress the wrong. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Neither party disputes that Defendants acted under color of state law. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 588 provides an adequate state post-deprivation remedy:
A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, whether or not executed pursuant to a warrant, may move for the return of the property on the ground that he or she is entitled to lawful possession thereof. Such motion shall be filed in the court of common pleas for the judicial district in which the property was seized.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 588(a). Plaintiff responds that Rule 588(a) is not an adequate remedy because her property has already been destroyed and that therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Although Rule 588(a) would no longer provide Plaintiff adequate relief, Plaintiff has an adequate state post-deprivation remedy in her state law claims for replevin and conversion. Despite Defendants' claim of sovereign immunity, that defense is waived under the "personal property exception" in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (b)(3). 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (b)(3) (2004) ("[T]he defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by . . . [t]he care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties including . . . property of persons held by a Commonwealth agency. . . ."); see also Madison v. Horn, Civ. A. No. 97-3143, 1998 WL 531830, at *21, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12975, at *65 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1998) ("Although the state remedies may not provide the [complainant] with all the relief which may have been available if he could have proceeded under § 1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process." ( citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1982)); Holmes v. Wasmer, Civ. A. No. 80-3216, 1989 WL 66347, at *2, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6839, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 1989) (holding plaintiff could not proceed under § 1983 because state law conversion claim provides adequate remedy). As there is an adequate state law remedy to vindicate Plaintiff's property claims, the elements of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for failure to return her property are not met as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of property without due process is granted and Plaintiff may only proceed on her state law claims for conversion and replevin.
D. Remaining State Law Claims
Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining state law claims for trespass, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Commonwealth Defendants are shielded from such claims by the doctrine of sovereign immunity except where such immunity has been waived pursuant to 42 PA. CONS .STAT. ANN. § 8522; see also Maples v. Boyd, Civ. A. No. 03-6325, 2004 WL 1792775 at *9 n. 3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15988, at *26 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2004) (listing nine categories in which sovereign immunity has been waived). As none of the exceptions provided in § 8522 cover these specific claims, and as Plaintiff has not contested Defendants' sovereign immunity on these counts, Defendants motion for summary judgment on the remaining state law claims should be granted.
These claims are also barred by their applicable statutes of limitations. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5523(1), 5524(3).
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, summary judgment is granted as to all of Plaintiff's claims except her state law claims for replevin and conversion. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's response thereto, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' response thereto, following oral argument on October 21, 2004, and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Reply Brief (Document No. 34) is DENIED.
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 26) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
a. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims for conversion and replevin is DENIED.
b. Defendants' motion is GRANTED in all other respects.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document No. 27) is DENIED.
4. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 35) is DENIED.