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explaining that the defendants contended that the action was time-barred because the statute of limitations "started to run when the defendants allegedly had their names put on the deed surreptitiously," whereas the "plaintiff contend[ed] that the operative event for purposes of the period of limitations was the defendants' refusal to give her a year-end bank statement for tax purposes and their refusal to let her enter the premises" and that, therefore, "there are questions of fact as to when the [s]tatute of [l]imitations began to run"
Summary of this case from Jaffer v. HirjiOpinion
July 11, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cannavo, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the action raises triable issues of fact regarding the imposition of a constructive trust (see, Fisk v. Campbell, 180 A.D.2d 987; Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119; Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 166 A.D.2d 413).
The defendants also contend that the action is time-barred because the six-year Statute of Limitations started to run when the defendants allegedly had their names put on the deed surreptitiously (see, CPLR 213). The plaintiff contends that the operative event for purposes of the period of limitations was the defendants' refusal to give her a year-end bank statement for tax purposes and their refusal to let her enter the premises.
It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations for the imposition of a constructive trust begins to run either (1) when the constructive trustee's interest in the property first becomes adverse to the plaintiff's interests, or (2) when the constructive trustee wrongfully withholds property acquired lawfully from the beneficiary (see, Sitkowski v. Petzing, 175 A.D.2d 801).
In this case, there are questions of fact as to when the Statute of Limitations began to run (see, Sitkowski v. Petzing, supra, at 801). Lawrence, J.P., Ritter, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.