Opinion
NO. 09-18-00293-CV
07-16-2020
JEREMY R. MARCANTEL, Appellant v. HENRY PATTERSON, JAMES COOPER, STEVEN TRAVIS GREENE, REX EVANS, MARK ELLINGTON, AND LIBERTY COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 253rd District Court Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CV1408497
MEMORANDUM OPINION
"Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages." As political subdivisions of the State, counties are immune from lawsuits filed against them seeking a recovery of money damages unless the Legislature created a valid statutory exception that waives the immunity counties otherwise enjoy from lawsuits for the type of claim at issue in the plaintiff's suit. According to the Texas Supreme Court, an important purpose served by immunizing governmental entities from suit is practical: it shields "the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments."
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008).
See Harris Cty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2018).
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006).
In this appeal, Jeremy R. Marcantel challenges the trial court's ruling dismissing his suit against Liberty County. In his suit, Marcantel alleged the County, through its employees, violated his rights under the Texas Constitution. To resolve the issues that Marcantel has raised in his appeal, we must decide whether the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over the claims in Marcantel's live pleadings. based on the assumption the facts stated in his claims are true. We reach the same conclusion the trial court reached: Marcantel's live pleadings fail to allege a claim over which the court possessed jurisdiction, so the trial court had no choice other than to dismiss Marcantel's suit.
The final judgment the trial court singed grants the County's plea to the jurisdiction and combined no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment but does not specify between the arguments the County made on its plea to the jurisdiction and the arguments raised by the County in its combined motion for summary judgment. When trial courts grant multiple motions without stating the basis for the ruling, we uphold the ruling if any of the grounds in any of the motions the trial court granted have merit. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003). That said, because a decision granting a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction operates to deprive the courts of jurisdiction over the merits of the plaintiff's claims, we address the trial court's decision granting the County's plea to the jurisdiction first.
Background
Marcantel is a former deputy sheriff who worked for Liberty County in that capacity until March 2011. More than two years after the Liberty County's Sheriff Office terminated his employment, Marcantel sued the County, the Sherriff, and several of the County's deputy sheriffs alleging they had violated his constitutional rights, retaliated against him in violation of the Whistleblower Act, breached an alleged contract of employment he claims to have with the County, defamed him, negligently injured him, intentionally caused him to suffer emotional distress, maliciously prosecuted him by bringing criminal charges against him for official oppression, conspired with others to violate his rights, and wrongfully terminated him from his job as a deputy sheriff.
In 2017, we addressed each of Marcantel's claims, except for those alleging Liberty County, the Sheriff, and the deputy sheriffs employed by Liberty County violated his constitutional rights. In discussing that opinion, we will refer to our prior opinion as Marcantel I. In resolving that appeal, we reversed the trial court's ruling in Marcantel I and agreed with the arguments of Liberty County and its employees that Marcantel failed to allege a viable tort, Whistleblower Act, or contract claim within the trial court's jurisdiction to act. But we chose not to dismiss Marcantel's claims alleging Liberty County, through its employees, violated his constitutional rights, allowing them on remand for only one reason. When we decided Marcantel I, Liberty County had not previously asked the trial court to address Liberty County's claim that Marcantel failed to plead he was seeking equitable relief to remedy the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Instead, Liberty County presented that argument for the first time when it appealed in Marcantel I. Because the trial court had not addressed whether the County was immune from Marcantel's claims the County violated his constitutional rights, we remanded those claims to allow the trial court to address them. Even so, we still warned Marcantel in Marcantel I that no cause of action exists "against a governmental entity based on the governmental entity's alleged violations of an individual's constitutional rights."
Patterson v. Marcantel, No. 09-16-00173-CV, 2017 WL 4844514 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, no pet.) (Marcantel I).
Id. at *17.
Id. Since the parties did not appeal our decision in Marcantel I, the ruling we issued was final on the claims we addressed, leaving open only those claims we chose not to reach in Marcantel I.
Id. at *7, n.4.
On remand, Liberty County amended its plea to the jurisdiction and its combined no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment to address Marcantel's claims alleging that the County, through its employees, had violated Marcantel's constitutional rights. But Marcantel did not amend his pleadings after we returned the case to the court below and chose instead to stand on the same allegations we considered in Marcantel I. On the other hand, Liberty County argued Marcantel's pleadings fail to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of those claims.
Id. at *6.
In June 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on Liberty County's amended plea and its amended motions for summary judgment. Several weeks later, the trial court granted both Liberty County's plea to the jurisdiction and its combined motion for summary judgment. In its final judgment, however, the trial court did not state why it decided to dismiss what we left before the trial court in Marcantel I. Subsequently, Marcantel appealed from the trial court's judgment. In his appeal, he argues the trial court had jurisdiction over his constitutionally based claims because he alleged enough facts in his pleadings to demonstrate that he wanted equitable relief to remedy the constitutional violations that he claimed occurred.
Standard of Review
Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, governmental entities are generally immune from liability and from suits seeking to recover money damages. When immunity from suit exists, it "defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction" and requires the suit to be dismissed. On appeal, we review rulings based on claims of governmental immunity as questions of law, so we review the trial court's ruling on Liberty County's plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard. In resolving whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction over a case involving issues of immunity, we do not weigh the claims' merits but focus on the plaintiff's pleadings and any evidence before the trial court relevant to the jurisdictional dispute.
Lubbock Cty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Church & Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. 2014) (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332).
Tex. Dep't. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. 2004).
Id. at 226.
Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).
Here, resolving the first three issues of Marcantel's appeal—his claims suggesting the trial court erred by dismissing his suit—revolves largely around whether Marcantel's live pleadings allege enough facts that he placed Liberty County on fair notice that he pleaded an equitable claim for the constitutional violations he alleged occurred. Deciding that question requires this Court to reexamine Marcantel's allegations in his First Amended Petition—the same petition we examined in Marcantel I. When evaluating a plaintiff's petition, we construe the petition in the pleader's favor and look to the pleader's intent. If the pleadings are found to be deficient but the deficiency is one the pleader was on fair notice to cure, a court need not allow the pleader another chance to amend to see whether the pleader, with an opportunity to replead, can salvage the deficiency in the pleadings before the court when it issued the ruling that led to the appeal. So in this appeal we must decide whether Marcantel's First Amended Petition alleges "facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause."
Id.
See Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004) (requiring that an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction dismiss ??? the government entity with prejudice if the plaintiff was on notice of the defect in his pleadings before suffering the dismissal).
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)).
Analysis
In his brief, Marcantel contends his First Amended Petition includes claims for equitable relief, arguing he claimed equitable relief in his petition by alleging he wanted to be reinstated and wanted the trial court to restore his fringe benefits and seniority. Marcantel suggests that his pleadings seek these remedies, which he characterizes as equitable remedies, on his claims that Liberty County violated his constitutional rights.
We assume but do not decide whether these are equitable remedies available to Marcantel in the context of his suit. Deciding whether the remedies Marcantel now claims he included in his pleadings are available under the law, however, is unnecessary to our resolution of his appeal. Here, we need focus only on Marcantel's pleadings to decide the appeal. See City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 217-18 (Tex. 2000) (explaining the Court would not express a view on whether reinstatement was available as an equitable remedy for an alleged violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights when the parties had not presented that issue to the Court in the appeal); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 150 (Tex. 1995) (noting that "[h]istorically, Texas common law has not provided a cause of action for damages for the violation of constitutional rights")
We disagree with the construction Marcantel argues we should place on his pleadings. As for Liberty County's allegedly violating his constitutional rights, each of the counts in Marcantel's petition alleging the County violated his constitutional rights concludes with the following paragraph:
The plaintiff requests economic damages in an amount of not less than $1,000,000.00 in aggregate of all claims pled; non-economic damages in an amount of not less than two-times the amount of economic damages awarded: future damages in an amount based on judicially accepted future lost earning calculations; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law; costs of litigation; necessary and reasonable attorney fees; and, all other relief that the plaintiff may be entitled to under the law or in equity.
While Marcantel's petition includes claims alleging he wanted reinstatement, fringe benefits, and his seniority rights restored, he tied those remedies to his claims sounding in tort, breach of contract, and the Whistleblower Act. He never alleged he was seeking those remedies in the counts describing the remedy, money, he was seeking on his claims alleging the County violated his constitutional rights. And when we dismissed Marcantel's tort, contract, and Whistleblower Act claims in the mandate we issued following our decision in Marcantel I, he did not appeal so our dismissal of those claims became final.
We have reexamined Marcantel's First Amended Petition and considered the claims we remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in our opinion in Marcantel I. In this appeal, we hold that Marcantel's First Amended Petition fails to plead a claim alleging an equitable remedy for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The facts he alleged in that petition simply failed to provide the County or its employees that Marcantel sought an equitable remedy for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 45(b), 47(a) (requiring the plaintiff's petition to give the defendant fair notice of the claim involved in plain and concise language); see also Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (concluding the plaintiffs waived any right to recover on a fee forfeiture claim where they failed to allege an equitable claim seeking fee forfeiture as to the fees the executor received).
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27.
Next, we address whether Marcantel should have a chance to amend his pleadings and be given another opportunity to plead a claim within the jurisdiction of the court. In Marcantel I and in Liberty County's amended pleadings, filed following remand, Marcantel was on notice of Liberty County's claim that his pleadings sought only monetary damages for the County's alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Despite those warnings, Marcantel did not amend his pleadings, and instead chose to stand on the same allegations we had before us when we decided Marcantel I.
Under the circumstances, we hold Marcantel should not get another opportunity to amend his pleadings to see if, given another chance, he can file good-faith pleadings alleging claims that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. We overrule the first three issues in Marcantel's appeal.
See Sykes, 136 S.W.3d at 639.
In his last issue, Marcantel complains the trial court's ruling dismissing his suit violates the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Generally, the party that appeals must show it presented the complaint in the trial court before the appellate court will consider the complaint for the first time in an appeal. Even claims asserting violations of a party's constitutional rights are subject to the rules of error preservation. The Texas Supreme Court has held the general rules of error preservation apply to complaints alleging violations of the Open Courts provision. It follows that Marcantel's fourth issue, which asserts the trial court violated Article II, section 13 of the Texas Constitution, the Open Courts provision, is an issue he failed to preserve for our review.
Tex. Const. art. II, § 13 ("All courts shall be open [for] every person for an injury done him . . . .").
See Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001).
City of San Antonio v. Schautteet, 706 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (explaining that complaints alleging violations of the Open Courts provision must comply with the general rules of error preservation in the Rules of Appellate Procedure); Cruz v. Van Sickle, 452 S.W.3d 503, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (applying the rules of error preservation to the appellant's open courts argument and refusing to reach the appellant's arguments about the alleged violation of the provision in the appeal).
Conclusion
We hold that Marcantel's live pleadings fail to allege a claim over which the courts possess jurisdiction. As a result, the trial court's judgment is
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice Submitted on March 24, 2020
Opinion Delivered July 16, 2020 Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.