Summary
Holding that attorney's fees may be awarded to a legal services provider for the indigent
Summary of this case from Baker v. RudolphOpinion
October 31, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts.
Ordered that the order of the Appellate Term is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the judgment of the District Court granting the tenant the sum of $350 as attorneys' fees is reinstated.
Real Property Law § 234 provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]henever a lease of residential property shall provide that in any action or summary proceeding the landlord may recover attorneys' fees * * * there shall be implied in such lease a covenant by the landlord to pay to the tenant the reasonable attorneys' fees and/or expenses incurred by the tenant * * * in the successful defense of any action or summary proceeding" (emphasis added). In this summary proceeding, the District Court dismissed the landlord's petition, and made an award of attorneys' fees to the tenant pursuant to this statute. On an appeal by the landlord, the Appellate Term vacated the award of attorneys' fees because the tenant had been represented by "a publicly funded legal services organization and was not required to pay for the legal services rendered" (Maplewood Mgt. v Best, 133 Misc.2d 769, 770). The Appellate Term concluded, as a matter of law, that since the tenant had no obligation to pay for the legal services rendered, she had not "incurred" attorneys' fees within the meaning of the statute.
We do not believe that the language of the relevant portion of Real Property Law § 234 is so unambiguous as to render consideration of its legislative history improper. We find that in enacting this provision into law, the Legislature's primary intent was to deter landlords from engaging in what was perceived to be the undesirable practice of bringing meritless eviction proceedings against indigent tenants, in the expectation that these tenants would be unable to obtain the legal assistance necessary in order to defend themselves in such proceedings (see, College Props. v Bruce, 122 Misc.2d 766, 768; McMahon v Schwartz, 109 Misc.2d 80, 82). It would significantly thwart the accomplishment of the Legislature's intent in this respect if the courts were to hold that the statute requires those landlords who have brought meritless eviction proceedings to pay for their tenants' attorneys' fees only when the tenant himself is of sufficient financial ability to be able to afford his own attorney. Such a holding would essentially negate the deterrent effect of the statute with respect to the very class of persons which the statute is designed most to protect, i.e, the indigent who are eligible for public legal assistance.
We also note that other statutes, with similar wording, have been interpreted so as to authorize an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing litigant who, either because he represented himself or because he obtained free legal assistance, did not become legally obligated to pay the fees (see, e.g., Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 N.Y.2d 454; Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 A.D.2d 294 [interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988]; Matter of Greenpoint Hosp. Community Bd. v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 114 A.D.2d 1028, 1032 [interpreting Judiciary Law § 753]; Holly v Acree, 72 FRD 115, affd sub nom. Holly v Chasen, 569 F.2d 160; Crooker v U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49, n 1; Cunningham v Federal Bur. of Investigation, 664 F.2d 383, 384-385 [interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (E)]; Ceglia v Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118; San Filippo v Secretary of Health Human Servs., 564 F. Supp. 173 [interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1) (A)]). We are persuaded that this interpretation comports with the Legislature's intent in enacting Real Property Law § 234 into law. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.