Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9461.
October 14, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Dillingham, Donald D. Hopwood, Judge, Trial Court No. 3DI-04-539 CR.
Paul E. Malin, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Blair M. Christensen, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
In our earlier decision, Manrique v. State, 177 P.3d 1188 (Alaska App. 2008), we remanded this case to the superior court to determine whether a juror at Manrique's trial seriously violated her duty by knowingly or intentionally withholding critical information during jury selection. After the hearing, the superior court found that the juror in question had neither knowingly nor intentionally withheld pertinent information, and that Manrique was therefore not entitled to a new trial. We conclude that the evidence supports the superior court's findings, and we therefore affirm Manrique's convictions.
We discussed the facts of Manrique's case in our earlier opinion, but we will summarize the facts needed to resolve this remaining claim.
After a jury found Manrique guilty of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree burglary, he filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the juror in question was biased — as evidenced by the fact that she had failed to disclose her employment with Dillingham Safe and Fear-Free Environment (SAFE), an organization that provides services to the victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. Superior Court Judge Donald D. Hopwood denied Manrique's motion for a new trial, ruling that Manrique's attorney had a full and fair opportunity to question the juror and to discover any potential bias.
AS 11.41.410(a)(1).
AS 11.46.300(a)(1).
Manrique, 177 P.3d at 1190.
In our earlier decision, we concluded that Manrique would be entitled to relief if he could show that the juror in question knowingly withheld information about her employment — that is, if Manrique could show that the juror "understood the potential relevance of the information that she had worked with SAFE, and . . . that she consciously withheld that information in the face of questions and admonitions reasonably calling for its disclosure."
Id. at 1193.
At the evidentiary hearing, both Manrique's trial attorney and the juror in question testified. The attorney testified that, given the circumstances of Manrique's case and the charges against him, he was concerned about jurors being prejudiced against Manrique. Consequently, the trial attorney had questioned the panel during jury selection intending to learn which jurors "had any connection with [SAFE] in the past."
The trial attorney knew of SAFE and its purpose, and he did peremptorily challenge two potential jurors who worked there. At the same time, however, the attorney explained his belief that "a person's employment, or the contact they've had with a particular facility, you can't really in good conscience stereotype them as being negative to your client." As he put it, a person's employment at SAFE would have been "one of the constellation of things that would be taken into account as to a . . . potential juror."
The juror in question stated that she could not recall that SAFE was expressly mentioned by either attorney during jury selection. She did, however, testify that she would have revealed her previous employment and training at the SAFE program had she been asked.
With regard to the juror's employment at SAFE, the juror testified that she worked there from 1998 through 2003. (The jury selection in Manrique's case took place in 2005.) However, the juror clarified that she did not work as a sexual assault advocate; rather, she worked in the section of SAFE that provided emergency shelter for children who had been taken into state custody because they were in need of aid ("Anana's House").
The juror explained that the two separate SAFE programs — one for sexual assault victims, and one for children in need of aid — were housed in the same building, but they were located on different floors, and they had separate entrances. The juror acknowledged that she may have heard about sexual assaults from sources outside of work ("in a small town you hear lots"), but the juror "couldn't recall right off the top of [her] head" the identity of any sexual assault victims.
The juror also acknowledged that she received a week of sexual assault response team (SART) training shortly after she began working for SAFE in the fall of 1998. However, because the juror never did any work with sexual assault victims, she "never . . . used [this training]," and she did not even remember this training during jury selection in Manrique's case.
In addition, Judge Hopwood found that it was more likely than not that the juror in question was only present for the second day of jury selection — and that she therefore did not hear the attorneys questioning the other jurors about employment with SAFE. (Questioning that took place on the first day of jury selection.)
Judge Hopwood's finding is supported by the record. The juror's absence from the first day of jury selection can be inferred from the fact that she had served as a juror in another trial that was held the week before Manrique's trial, and from the additional fact that, when Judge Hopwood questioned the prospective jurors about previous jury service on the first day of jury selection, no prospective juror responded affirmatively to the judge's question. On the second day of jury selection, after more jurors were summoned, Judge Hopwood again asked about previous jury service, and at this point, two people responded affirmatively.
Not only did Judge Hopwood find that the juror in question probably never heard the attorneys' questions about past employment at SAFE, but he also found that the juror's previous employment at SAFE was not relevant to the sexual assault charge against Manrique because the juror had worked only with children in need of aid, and not with sexual assault victims. Because the juror's prior employment at SAFE was not particularly relevant to her service as a juror in Manrique's case, Judge Hopwood concluded that the juror had not acted knowingly when she failed to disclose that prior employment during jury selection.
Judge Hopwood did find that the juror was negligent in failing to disclose her SART training. Although the judge believed that this negligence was "barely over the line to make that finding," he reasoned that, because there was ample discussion to indicate that Manrique's case would involve sexual assault, the juror should have disclosed whatever specialized training she might have had relating to that topic. Again, however, Judge Hopwood found that the juror's failure to disclose this information was neither knowing nor intentional.
We uphold a trial court's factual findings unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Here, as we have explained, the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and the record of the jury selection at Manrique's trial provide substantial support for Judge Hopwood's findings. Accordingly, we uphold the judge's conclusion that the juror did not consciously withhold information about her prior employment with SAFE in the face of questions reasonably calling for disclosure of this information.
See Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168, 1178 (Alaska App. 1993) (stating that whether or not a juror engaged in alleged misconduct is a question of fact and reviewing the judge's determination under a clearly erroneous standard).
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we reject Manrique's claim that he is entitled to a new trial due to juror misconduct. Because this is Manrique's last remaining claim on appeal, and because we rejected Manrique's other claims in our earlier decision, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.