Opinion
06 Civ. 477 (DLC).
November 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Plaintiffs Milan and Olga Manik ("Milan" and "Olga," respectively) bring this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., to recover damages for Milan's mistreatment and eventual firing from his job as a porter and handyman at a building in New York City. Plaintiffs claim that these actions were taken because Milan is a Slovakian immigrant and because his former employer and the union that represented him perceived him to be disabled after he suffered a stroke. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims, and on October 13, 2006, an Opinion and Order was issued (the "Opinion") granting defendants' motions with respect to all claims against defendants Simon Avram, Frank Booth, and Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ (the "Union"). One basis for the dismissal was that Milan had named only one defendant — Rose Associates, Inc. — in his complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"); therefore, his administrative remedies were not exhausted with respect to the other defendants. Manik v. Avram, No. 06 Civ. 477 (DLC), 2006 WL 2942854, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2006). Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of the Opinion insofar as it dismissed the claims against the Union.
Local Civil Rule 6.3 reads in pertinent part as follows:
A notice of motion for reconsideration or reargument shall be served within ten (10) days after the docketing of the court's determination of the original motion. There shall be served with the notice a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked.
S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 6.3. In moving for reconsideration, the moving party "must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion." Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Here, plaintiffs claim that Milan filed an EEOC complaint against the Union, but that they were unable to submit this evidence to the Court when opposing defendants' motions to dismiss because Orders dated September 12 and 15 prohibited further submissions on the motions. Milan's complaint was filed with the EEOC on September 7, 2006, and he received a right-to-sue letter on September 20. Plaintiffs apparently attempted file it with the Court on or around September 27. This attempted submission was untimely, however, as briefing on defendants' motions to dismiss was to have been completed by August 11. Therefore, neither the letter nor the EEOC complaint were before the Court on the underlying motions and cannot provide the basis for reconsideration of the Opinion. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stroh Cos., 265 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs did not attach a copy of Milan's EEOC complaint against the Union to their motion for reconsideration. The Union, however, submitted a copy of the document with its opposition.
The letter noted that the EEOC file was being closed because Milan had already filed suit against the Union. It did not address the substance or timeliness of Milan's claims.
The date of plaintiffs' attempted filing is not clear from their motion papers. The Union, however, represents that it received a copy of plaintiffs' request to file the EEOC's right-to-sue letter on September 27.
Although the Court accepted certain filings made by plaintiffs after that date, and provided defendants with an opportunity to respond, the Orders of September 12 and 15 made clear that no additional filings would be permitted.
Even if this evidence had been properly presented, it would not entitle plaintiffs to have the claims against the Union reinstated. On its face, the EEOC complaint pertains to events that occurred between December 2003 and June 14, 2005. It was not filed until September 7, 2006 — approximately 450 days after the alleged discrimination took place. Plaintiffs in Title VII and ADA actions, however, are required to file complaints with the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory acts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Milan's EEOC complaint against the Union is therefore untimely, and those claims cannot be heard in federal court. See McPherson v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2006).
The time for such filings is extended to 300 days if the "person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Even if this longer window applied, Milan's complaint would not be timely.
Plaintiffs' other argument is similarly unavailing. They urge the Court to reconsider the Opinion because of the gravity of the injustice they believe Milan suffered at the hands of the Union. They contend that the Union did not help him pursue claims against his employer and misled him into signing a settlement agreement. Plaintiffs made these allegations in their opposition to the motions to dismiss, and they were addressed in the Opinion. Manik, 2006 WL 2942854, at *2. Therefore, the Opinion need not be reconsidered on this ground either. Conclusion
Plaintiffs are reminded that these motions deal solely with the question of whether Milan has met the legal requirements necessary to bring a case of this type in federal court. The fact that the Union has been dismissed from this action does not mean that the Court has concluded that Milan was treated well or represented fairly. Neither this Opinion nor the previous Opinion takes any view whatsoever with respect to the Union's actions.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED: