Opinion
Docket No. 158005
11-21-2019
Jeffrey S. MANIACI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas DIROFF and Mandy Diroff, Defendants-Appellees, and Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Living Trust Dated April 3, 2013, Appellee.
Outside Legal Counsel PLC, Hemlock (by Philip L. Ellison ) for Jeffrey S. Maniaci. Bommarito Law Offices, PLLC (by Alexander D. Bommarito, Saginaw) for the Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated April 3, 2013.
Outside Legal Counsel PLC, Hemlock (by Philip L. Ellison ) for Jeffrey S. Maniaci.
Bommarito Law Offices, PLLC (by Alexander D. Bommarito, Saginaw) for the Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated April 3, 2013.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Per Curiam. This case involves the scope of an easement to traverse a piece of property (Parcel B) that separates a road (Vonda Lane) from the Tittabawassee River, also known at this location as Secord Lake. Pursuant to a June 18, 2015 consent judgment, the defendants conveyed an easement across Parcel B for ingress and egress access to and from the Tittabawassee River to the plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Maniaci, and others. The consent judgment specified that the easement "may also be used for the temporary mooring and launching of watercraft, including by boat trailer, but may not be used for non-temporary mooring, docks, and/or wharfs."
In June 2016, the defendants-appellees Thomas and Mandy Diroff conveyed Parcel B to Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler. In July 2016, the Silers then conveyed Parcel B by quitclaim deed to appellee, the Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated April 3, 2013. This opinion uses "the defendants" to refer to the Diroffs and "the appellee" to refer to the Siler Trust.
To decide this case, we must answer two questions. First, does the scope of the easement include backing a boat trailer all the way to the water’s edge? Second, is it necessary for effective use of the easement to regrade the shoreline to allow such access by boat trailer?
We answer both of those questions yes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate in part the July 11, 2016 order of the Gladwin Circuit Court, and remand this case to the Gladwin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Michigan law on easements is well established. In Blackhawk Dev. Corp. v. Village of Dexter , 473 Mich. 33, 41, 700 N.W.2d 364 (2005), quoting Little v. Kin , 468 Mich. 699, 701, 664 N.W.2d 749 (2003), this Court reaffirmed "[a] fundamental principle of easement law": the easement holder cannot "make improvements to the servient estate if such improvements are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably burden the servient tenement." (Quotation marks omitted.) The Court also quoted Unverzagt v. Miller , 306 Mich. 260, 265, 10 N.W.2d 849 (1943), for the related proposition that "the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all such rights as are incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement." (Quotation marks and citation omitted.)
Applying these legal principles, we have little trouble concluding that the unambiguous terms of the easement provide an express right to back a boat trailer to the water’s edge. The consent judgment defines the easement as extending from the end of Vonda Road to the water’s edge and states that the easement may be used for the "launching of watercraft, including by boat trailer ...." See ¶ 1 of the consent judgment (defining Parcel B, in part, as "to the water’s edge of the Tittabawassee River"); see also ¶ 2 (granting the plaintiff "an appurtenant non-recreational easement for ingress and egress access to and from the Tittabawassee River (a/k/a Secord Lake) across Parcel B to and from Vonda Lane ") (emphasis added). Thus, the easement expressly includes the right to bring a boat trailer onto the property and to use the trailer to "launch" watercraft into the water. A lay dictionary includes as its first definition of the word "launch" "to set (a boat or ship) in the water." Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2003); see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) (defining "launch" as "to set (a boat or ship) afloat"). Because in order to "set a watercraft in the water, including by boat trailer," one must be able to bring a boat trailer at least to the water’s edge, the scope of the easement must include the ability to do so. We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion that "just because it is not feasible to back a boat trailer all the way to the water’s edge does not prevent the easement from being used to launch boats, including with the use of a boat trailer." Maniaci v. Diroff, 2018 WL 2222697, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2018 (Docket No. 333952), p. 5.
The Court of Appeals erred by going beyond the language of the consent judgment to determine the scope of the easement. The Court concluded that regrading the shoreline was outside the scope of the easement, in part, because of evidence that the shoreline remained unchanged from the commencement of this litigation and evidence demonstrating that the issue of regrading the shoreline did not arise until long after entry of the consent judgment. Reference to extrinsic evidence is not appropriate because the language of the easement is unambiguous. Little , 468 Mich. at 700 & n. 2, 664 N.W.2d 749.
We similarly have little difficulty concluding that the plaintiff’s request to regrade the shoreline of Parcel B is "necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement." Unverzagt , 306 Mich. at 265, 10 N.W.2d 849 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The appellee’s counsel conceded at oral argument that it is currently not possible to set a boat in the water by boat trailer on Parcel B. The current slope of Parcel B therefore both prevents a boat trailer from being backed to the water’s edge, a permitted use within the scope of the easement, and generally inhibits water access by making it difficult to get boats of any kind into the water.
The appellee makes nothing more than a conclusory statement that the regrading of the shoreline will unreasonably burden its estate. We consider a challenge under that part of the Blackhawk test to be abandoned because the appellee failed to present any supporting argument.
The plaintiff has an easement to launch boats, including by boat trailer, on Parcel B. He seeks to do just that by improving the land to facilitate easy access to the water by regrading the shoreline. This the law gives him the right to do. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the portion of the Gladwin Circuit Court’s July 11, 2016 order denying the plaintiff’s request to adjust the grade or slope of Parcel B, and remand to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We reject the appellee’s contention that regrading the shoreline amounts to "damage to the surface of the Easement," thereby implicating ¶ 4 of the consent judgment (placing responsibility "for restoring the Easement to its pre-damaged state" on those who created such damage). Rather, we agree with the Court of Appeals that "[g]rading the parcel to alter the slope sufficiently to launch a boat from a boat trailer" is an improvement. Maniaci , unpub. op. at 4.
We decide only that the plaintiff is entitled to make some alteration to the shoreline to facilitate the launching of boats by boat trailer and leave it for the trial court to address any additional issues on remand that are beyond the scope of that narrow holding.
McCormack, C.J., and Markman, Zahra, Viviano, Bernstein, Clement, and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred.