Opinion
1:01CV243
August 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Travis V. Mangum, acting pro se, initiated this action on March 6, 2001, against two of his managers, Nicholas Rinaldi and B.J. Thompson, and against the United States Postmaster General. Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on race, color, sex, and disability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff further claims, also under Title VII, that he was retaliated against because of his position in the American Postal Workers Union and his history of filing Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) grievances on behalf of himself and others.
This court previously granted an order substituting John S. Potter for William J. Henderson as Defendant Postmaster General.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part, and the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted to dispose of the remaining claims.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed as a distribution clerk for the United States Postal Service at the Greensboro Processing and Distribution Center in Greensboro, North Carolina. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. Ex. 1 at I.) On June 1, 2000, B.J. Thompson, the manager of daily operations, sent Plaintiff home without pay for wearing improper attire. Plaintiff alleges that other employees in similar clothing were not sent home, and that Mr. Thompson later changed the leave slip describing Plaintiff's absence to state that Plaintiff was absent without leave. (Id. Ex. 2 at 1). On June 28, 2000, Plaintiff again was sent home for wearing improper attire, and Mr. Thompson signed a letter of warning and designated his departure as an absence without leave. (Id. Ex. 3 at 1.) At the time of the incidents, Plaintiff served as a steward for the American Postal Workers Union, and he had filed prior EEO grievances on behalf of himself and others against Mr. Thompson. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Thompson retaliated against him for these activities, in addition to discriminating against him because of his race, color, sex, and disability. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 6; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. Exs. 2, 3.)
Plaintiff filed an informal complaint or discrimination with an EEO counselor on July 11, 2000 (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. Exs. 2, 3), and received written notice of his right to file a formal complaint with the agency by certified mail on October 4, 2000. (Id. Ex. 5 at 2.) The letter and enclosed documentation alerted Plaintiff that he had 15 days to file a formal administrative complaint. (Id. Ex. 5.) Plaintiff mailed a formal complaint on October 20, 2000, 16 days later. (Id. Ex. 6.) The formal complaint was dismissed on December 6, 2000, as untimely filed, and Plaintiff subsequently received notice of his right to seek judicial review of the agency's decision. (Id. Ex. 1.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 6, 2001.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must evaluate the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking factual assertions as true. Buser v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 556, 559 (M.D.N.C. 1999). The court should dismiss a claim only when "`it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.'" Rogers v. Jefferson-Pnot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969)).
When a court considers matters beyond the bare pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, "the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). A party has notice that a motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment when that motion is captioned "Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment." Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 1998).
Although conversion is not appropriate if it prejudices a party, the court has no obligation to notify parties of the obvious. Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998). The court takes seriously its duty to be "`especially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs'" and recognizes that this obligation "`must be heightened when a civil rights plaintiff appears pro se.'" Marshburn v. Postmaster General, 678 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (D. Md. 1988) (quoting Gordon V. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978)). Plaintiff here is not prejudiced, however, because "any discovery taken by Plaintiff could not alter the facts on the present record establishing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies" in this case. Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 191 F. Supp.2d 637, 639 n. 3 (D. Md. 2002)
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings and other evidence before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, could lead a reasonable juror to find for the nonmovant, a genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment is improper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). The court essentially must determine whether the evidence "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
B. Improper Party Defendants
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Mr. Rinaldi and Mr. Thompson as improper party defendants. The Postmaster General is the only appropriate defendant in Title VII actions filed against the Postal Service. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 16(c); Mahoney v. United States Postal Serv., 884 F.2d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1989); Marshburn v. Postmaster General, 678 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (D. Md. 1988). When Plaintiff's claims arose, Mr. Thompson served as the manager of daily operations, and Mr. Rinaldi was the plant manager. Because neither Mr. Thompson nor Mr. Rinaldi is the head of the Postal Service, the claims against them will be dismissed.
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants have also moved for dismissal or summary judgment of Plaintiff's claims against the Postmaster General on grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit.
It is well established that a plaintiff must adhere to administrative complaint resolution procedures before filing an employment discrimination action in federal court. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967 (1976); Young v. National Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1987); Zografov v. V.A. Medical Ctr., 779 F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1985); Baker v. Runyon, 951 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D.N.C. 1996), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1438 (1996). To comply with the governing regulations, Postal Service employees seeking redress for discrimination must first file an informal complaint with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the alleged discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (a)(1). If the complaint cannot be resolved informally, the EEO counselor conducts a final interview and informs the complainant of his right to file a formal complaint "within 15 days of receipt of the notice" by the employee. Id. § 1614.105(d). The regulations empower the agency to dismiss a formal complaint filed after this 15-day period. Id. § 1614.107(a)(2). Courts have repeatedly dismissed claims by plaintiffs who failed to comply with this administrative filing requirement. See Miller v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 386, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 162, 169 (D. Md. 2000); Baker, 951 F. Supp. at 91.
Here, Plaintiff surmounted the first administrative hurdle by ailing an informal complaint within 45 days of the alleged incidents. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. Exs. 2, 3.) The EEO counselor acknowledged that informal action would not resolve the dispute and alerted Plaintiff to his right to lodge a formal complaint within 15 days. Accompanying this letter was a document entitled "Notice of Right to File Individual Complaint," which reiterated the 15-day deadline. (Id. Ex. 5 at 3.) Plaintiff received this notice on October 4, triggering a filing deadline of October 19, 2000. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff mailed his administrative complaint on October 20, 2000, after the 15-day period had expired. In accordance with established precedent, this lack of diligence constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Adams, 197 F.R.D. at 166-67; Blount v. Shalala, 32 F. Supp.2d 339, 341 (D. Md. 1999); Baker, 951 F. Supp. at 91.
Plaintiff offers three reasons for missing the deadline. First, Plaintiff speculates that he mailed the formal complaint at the post office "moments before" it closed or used a mail station that stayed open until 9:00 p.m. (Pl.'s Resp. at 3.) Second, Plaintiff suggests that symptoms of "stress" or "anxiety state" could have "contributed to any delay in my ability to respond" within the filing period. (Id. at 4, 5.) Finally, Plaintiff observes that because his brother signed the certified mail receipt for the letter notifying Plaintiff of the 15-day deadline, Plaintiff "did not physically get that information until at least a day later, maybe more." (Id. at 3.)
Administrative deadlines in Title VII cases may be tolled "when equity so requires." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1135 (1982). Equitable tolling principles do not apply, however, to garden variety claims of excusable neglect. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 458 (1990). For a court to toll an administrative deadline, the plaintiff must prove that he was unaware of the deadline, or that his employer actively engaged in affirmative misconduct intended to deceive or mislead him into missing the deadline. See Weick v. O'Keefe, 26 F.3d 467, 470 (4th Cir. 1994) (tolling the 15-day deadline where the plaintiff's employer and EEO officer made false statements that deliberately lulled the plaintiff into inaction); Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 589 (4th Cir. 1992) (tolling a limitations period where the plaintiff reasonably believed her employer would abide by an initial EEOC decision in her favor).
Plaintiff alleges no affirmative misconduct by the Postal Service that prevented him from filing a formal complaint within 15 days. Similarly, Plaintiff had adequate notice of the deadline from the EEC counselor's letter and its enclosed "Notice of Right to File Individual Complaint," both of which called attention to the 15-day filing period. Plaintiff also acknowledges familiarity with administrative procedures for pursuing discrimination claims; he had filed "nearly 20 EEO complaints" in the past, so many that "[i]t got to the point where they knew me very well in the EEO offices." (Pl.'s Resp. at 2, 3.)
In addition, a plaintiff need not have actual, physical receipt of notice to trigger the limitations period in Title VII cases. See Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep't, 813 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit has held that delivery of adequate notice by mail signals the beginning of the filing period. See Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Crisis 7 F.3d 40, 42 (4th Cir. 1993). As noted above, Plaintiff's brother signed the certified mail receipt on October 4, triggering a filing deadline of October 19, 2000. After receiving this notice, Plaintiff mailed his formal complaint on October 20, after the deadline had expired.
"One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence." Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 1726 (1984). Accordingly, the court declines to toll the administrative deadline and will award summary judgment to Defendant Postmaster General due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Mr. Rinaldi and Mr. Thompson as improper party defendants. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies against the Postmaster General.
A judgment in accordance with this be filed contemporaneously herewith.