Opinion
02 Civ. 1234 (WHP), 02 Civ. 1367 (WHP), 02 Civ. 6537 (WHP).
November 20, 2006
ORDER
These federal civil rights actions have been consolidated for purposes of trial. At a conference with the Court on November 8, 2006 and in letter submissions dated November 10, 2006, Plaintiffs moved to bifurcate the trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs seek to bifurcate the issue of liability from the amount of individual damages. Defendants do not clearly delineate the scope of their disagreement with Plaintiffs. However, it appears from Defendants' submissions that they oppose bifurcation because they wish to offer evidence during the liability phase of the trial to show that New York City followed a policy with discretionary elements pursuant to which police officers had wide latitude to grant or deny summonses or desk appearance tickets ("DATs") to arrestees at demonstrations. Defendants argue that in light of this evidence, even if there was an unconstitutional policy of denying "speedy processing" to arrestees at demonstrations, Plaintiffs cannot prove that the policy caused them actual injury and thus cannot establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants further argue that the discretionary nature of the speedy processing policy renders discussion of individual damages inherently speculative.DISCUSSION
I. Standard for Bifurcation
Rule 42(b) provides, in relevant part: "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue. . . ." The decision on whether to bifurcate is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
II. Plaintiffs' First Amendment Claim
Defendants argue that bifurcation would be improper because, to establish liability, each Plaintiff must show that he would have been granted a DAT or summons absent the existence of a municipal policy. This argument is without merit. To establish municipal liability on their First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Second Circuit requires Plaintiffs to prove (1) "the existence of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused [their] injuries;" and (2) "a causal connection — an affirmative link between the policy and the deprivation of [Plaintiffs'] constitutional rights." Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985). However, as this Court has previously noted:
Deprivations of civil rights may lead to damages for a nominal sum of money, even without proof of actual injury. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed. It is well established that individuals . . . whose First Amendment rights are violated are entitled to nominal damages.United Yellow Cab Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Safir, No. 98 Civ. 3670 (WHP), 2002 WL 461595, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (awarding nominal damages to § 1983 plaintiff); Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11 (1986) ("nominal damages . . . are the appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury"); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1999) ("While the main purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries for caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.");LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 431 (2d Cir. 1995) (awarding nominal damages for claim of conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights where liability was proven but no evidence of damages was presented). Thus, to establish liability sufficient to give rise to nominal damages Plaintiffs must prove only (1) the existence of an unconstitutional policy of denying DATs; and (2) the application of that policy to the Plaintiffs.
In light of the foregoing, defendants' second argument — that individualized damages in this case are inherently speculative because of the discretionary nature of the City's speedy processing policies — is irrelevant to the bifurcation issue. Moreover, the argument requires a factual determination regarding the nature of the policies in question. Because Defendants will have ample opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the City's speedy processing policies during the liability phase even if the trial is bifurcated, there is no risk that they will be prejudiced by delaying consideration of their argument until the close of the liability phase.
This Court finds that bifurcation of the trial into two phases — one on liability and a second on individual damages — is warranted. Bifurcation would save significant time by simplifying the issues to be tried and focusing the parties' trial preparation. In the event Defendants are found not liable in the first phase, a significant investment of time, cost and effort in trying issues related to individual damages may be avoided. Accordingly, the trial of the liability and individual damages components of these actions shall be bifurcated. Trial of the liability phase shall commence on November 27, 2006 at 9:45 a.m. The individual damages phase shall be scheduled for a later date, if necessary.
It should be emphasized that, subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Defendants remain free during the liability phase of the trial to introduce any material they wish regarding New York City's speedy processing policies, including evidence on whether such policies were discretionary. However, as noted, the possibility that a policy had discretionary components is not a reason to deny Plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and individual damages phases.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial of these actions shall be bifurcated. The first phase, addressing liability, shall commence on November 27, 2006 at 9:45 a.m. The second phase, addressing the amount of individual damages, shall be held at a future date, if necessary.