Opinion
06 Civ. 2155 (SAS).
November 9, 2007
Plaintiff (Pro Se): Dalsa Mambru, Bronx, New York.
For Defendants: Laurence Jay Lebowitz, Esq., Klein, Zelman, Rothermel Dichter LLP, New York, New York.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Dalsa Mambru, proceeding pro se, is suing Inwood Community Services, Inc. ("ICS"); Charles Corliss, the Executive Director of ICS; and Andrea Edwards, her supervisor, alleging gender discrimination as the reason for her termination, in violation of federal and state law. Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that Mambru cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and even if the Court finds that Mambru met her initial burden, she has not provided any evidence that defendants' professed legitimate reasons for her termination were pretextual. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and this case is dismissed.
See Complaint ("Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 29 (alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296 et seq.).
See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def. Mem".) at 1-3.
II. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are not in dispute. ICS is a not-for-profit community-based organization that provides mental health services, substance abuse programs, literacy classes, and various youth services to the surrounding community. Over ninety-five percent of ICS's funding is provided through various government contracts. Corliss is ICS's Executive Director and has held that position since ICS opened in 1979. Edwards is ICS's Director of Information Technology and since 1999 has been supervisor to the front desk employees. In 1999, Edwards became Mambru's supervisor.
A court may assume that the facts identified by the moving party are admitted due to plaintiff's failure to submit a Disputed Material Facts statement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(c), which states that "each numbered paragraph in the statement of material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of the motion unless specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the statement required to be served by the opposing party." See also Avery v. City of W. Haven, 33 F. App'x 21 (2d Cir. 2002). Even if this Court considered Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as her response to Defendants' 56.1 Statement, the motion would still be granted because plaintiff fails to dispute any of the material facts identified by defendants.
See Def. Mem. at 4.
See Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Submitted Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) ("Def. 56.1") ¶ 4.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Mambru began working part time at the front desk of ICS in February, 1997. Her responsibilities included answering the phone, greeting clients, and assisting the staff. Mambru became a full-time employee of ICS in 1998. At an employee evaluation of Mambru in 1998 and at other times, she was advised to be more assertive and responsive to feedback. In an evaluation on July 27, 2000, Mambru was described as exhibiting "non-cooperative tendencies" and at times exhibiting careless work habits. On January 22, 2001, Mambru was placed on a three-month probationary period by Edwards for repeated infractions regarding her responsibilities as Senior Receptionist/Support Staff Person. Edwards received numerous complaints about the receptionists during the time that Mambru served as Senior Receptionist, as well as complaints specifically concerning Mambru's performance. One of the most recent complaints directed at Mambru was submitted by one of the substance abuse counselors at ICS on July 10, 2003, expressing discontent at the "rude treatment" she received from Mambru.
See 5/21/07 Deposition of Dalsa Mambru ("Mambru Dep."), Ex. C to 8/10/07 Affidavit of Defendants' Attorney Laurence J. Lebowitz in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Lebowitz Aff."), at 9.
See Def. Mem. at 4.
See id.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 17.
See 07/27/00 Annual Evaluation for Receptionist/Support Staff, Ex. C5 to Lebowitz Aff.
See 01/22/01 Employee Warning Notice, Ex. C6 to Lebowitz Aff.
See Def. Mem. at 6-8.
See id. at 7. See also 7/10/03 Written Complaint, Ex. C12 to Lebowitz Aff.
In the Fall of 2004, ICS faced a cut in funding. As a result of the decreased funding, four staff positions were eliminated, including Mambru's. One month before Mambru was terminated, all the ICS staff were informed that there would be staff cutbacks made by October 2004 because of the reduced funding. On October 1, 2004, Mambru was advised that she was being terminated, and on October 13, 2004, she received a letter from Corliss confirming her termination. Mambru's position has not been filled since her termination.
See 10/4/07 Reply Affidavit of Charles Corliss in Further Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Corliss Aff.") ¶¶ 7-9. See also Exs. A-C to Corliss Aff. (indicating the various cuts in funding and revisions of grant awards).
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 9.
See id. ¶ 10.
See Affidavit of Andrea Edwards in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 13.
See id. ¶ 14.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." An issue of fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" "It is the movant's burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists."
Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Stuart v. American Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Bouboulis v. Transport Workers Union, 442 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
In turn, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must raise a genuine issue of material fact. To do so, it must do more than show that there is "`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,'" and it "`may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.'" However, "`all that is required [from a non-moving party] is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'"
McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2002)).
McClellan, 439 F.3d at 144 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. However, "[i]t is a settled rule that `[c]redibility assessments, choices between conflicting versions of the events, and the weighing of evidence are matters for the jury, not for the court on a motion for summary judgment.'" Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate "if there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party."
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997)).
McClellan, 439 F.3d at 144 (quoting Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997)). Accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2000)).
"[T]he salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to . . . other areas of litigation." "`It is now beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases.'" However, a "trial court must be especially cautious in deciding whether to grant this drastic provisional remedy in a discrimination case, because the employer's intent is often at issue and careful scrutiny may reveal circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination."
Abdu Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001) (ellipses in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accord Figueroa v. New York Health and Hosps. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d. 224, 227-28 (2007).
Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Abdu Brisson, 239 F.3d at 466).
Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1999). Accord Briggs v. Mercedes-Benz Manhattan, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7094, 2006 WL 2789927, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006).
Further, where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her pleadings must be considered under a more lenient standard than that accorded to "formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," and her pleadings must be "interpret[ed] . . . to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." However, a pro se plaintiff must still meet the usual requirements of summary judgment; a pro se party's "failure to allege either specific facts or particular laws that have been violated renders her attempt to oppose defendants' motion [for summary judgment] ineffectual." B. Sex Discrimination Claim
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Accord Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).
Burgos, 14 F.3d at 790.
See Maalouf v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4470, 2004 WL 2008848, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) ("`Proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant from the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's `bald assertion,' unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.'") (quoting Cole v. Artuz, No. 93 Civ. 5981, 1999 WL 983876, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1999)).
Kadosh v. TRW, No. 91 Civ. 5080, 1994 WL 681763, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1994). Accord Jermosen v. Mann, 18 F. App'x 31 (2d Cir. 2001).
"Discrimination claims under the NYSHRL . . . are analyzed using the same standards as those that apply to Title VII . . . claims." Darrell v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8130, 2004 WL 1117889, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2004) (citing Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000)). See also Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Plaintiffs' claims of discrimination under the Human Rights Laws of New York City and New York State are evaluated using the same analytic framework used in Title VII actions.").
Under Title VII, it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." "To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a discrimination plaintiff must withstand the three-part burden-shifting laid out by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." "[T]he initial burden rests with the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination." A plaintiff meets this burden by showing that "(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] is competent to perform the job or is performing [her] duties satisfactorily; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on [her] membership in the protected class." The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed that the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case is "`minimal,'" noting that "`it requires no evidence of discrimination.'" "It is satisfied by a showing of membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action, and preference for a person not of the protected class."
McPherson v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Accord Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to race discrimination claim).
Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2005).
Dawson v. Bumble Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Mario v. P C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Joseph, 465 F.3d at 90 (quoting James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Id.
Plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case "gives rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination that shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must proffer a `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the challenged employment action." "If the defendant articulates such a reason, `the presumption of discrimination drops out,' and the plaintiff must `prove that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" At this final stage of analysis, courts must "examin[e] the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy [her] `ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" In other words, plaintiff has the burden of proving that gender was the actual reason for any adverse employment actions.
Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2001)) (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Mambru's Prima Facie Case
The record demonstrates that Mambru has not satisfied the elements of a prima facie case for sex discrimination. Mambru has only satisfied two of the four elements necessary under Title VII. She claims membership in a protected class because she alleges she was terminated for being pregnant, and she has also suffered an adverse employment decision. There are no facts on the record, however, that show she performed her work satisfactorily, or that ICS preferred a non-protected member for her position. Mambru was not only terminated, but her position was eliminated and no one was hired to replace her. While the prima facie case for discrimination is "minimal," it still requires that the plaintiff show a preference on the part of the defendant for someone not in a protected class. In addition, even if she had satisfied all the above elements, she has not offered any evidence to rebut the defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination, as required under the McDonnell Douglas test.
See Joseph, 465 F.3d at 90.
B. ICS Defendants' Non-Discriminatory Reasons
Defendants have proffered two non-discriminatory reasons for Mambru's termination. First, defendants argue that Mambru was not satisfactorily performing her job. Defendants have produced seven separate written complaints submitted by ICS staff and clients regarding the conduct of the receptionists. During the time the complaints were submitted, Mambru was the senior ranking receptionist. Further, four of these complaints specifically name Mambru and question her performance. On January 22, 2001 Mambru was placed on a three month probationary period for poor performance as the Senior Receptionist/Senior Staff employee. Second, the defendants offer evidence that in the Fall of 2004 they suffered a loss of funding that resulted in the elimination of four staff positions, including Mambru's. The facts on the record include an excerpt from the minutes of the ICS Board of Directors meeting on June 21, 2004, discussing the cuts in government funding and the resulting elimination of staff positions. Defendants have also produced documents from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services demonstrating the changes in the funding contracts.
See Def. Mem. at 2-3.
See Exs. C7-C13 to Lebowitz Aff.
See Def. Mem. at 5.
See Exs. 7, 9, 11, 12 to Lebowitz Aff.
See Ex. 6 to Lebowitz Aff. See also Def. 56.1 ¶ 20.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 9. See also Corliss Aff. ¶¶ 7-9.
See Corliss Aff. ¶ 8. See also Ex. B to Corliss Aff. (the minutes from the board meeting that the ICS Defendants refer to as Ex. B is actually Ex. A to the Corliss Aff.).
See Exs. A, C to Corliss Aff.
According to the McDonell Douglas framework, once the defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff must offer evidence to prove that she was the victim of unlawful discrimination. Mambru has only restated her discrimination claims in a conclusory fashion and has not proffered any further evidence of discrimination. She relies on the fact that she was employed for eight years by ICS as evidence that she was competently performing her job. Mambru states that based on defendants' papers, a jury could determine that she was terminated because she was pregnant. However, Mambru has not offered any such proof — only speculation. On June 19, 2007, Mambru deposed Edwards, but she has not submitted any evidence gleaned from that deposition. Though courts take a liberal approach to pro se claimants, Mambru has not produced any evidence of discrimination to rebut defendants' non-discriminatory and legitimate reasons for her termination.
See Woodman, 411 F.3d at 76.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion at 4.
See id.
See id. at 6.
See Lebowitz Aff. ¶ 10.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. Mambru has not satisfied the elements of a prima facie case for gender discrimination under Title VII and has not provided any evidence to overcome defendants' non-discriminatory, legitimate reasons for her termination. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close defendants' motion for summary judgment [Document No. 12] and close this case.
SO ORDERED: