Opinion
Civil Action No: SA-02-CA-1046-XR
May 10, 2004
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this date, the Court considered the Motions for Summary Judgment and briefs in support filed by Defendant Hector Cantu and Defendant Frio County, filed April 7, 2004. Plaintiff has not filed a response to either motion, though the response deadline has passed and trial is set for June 7, just over one month from now. Although the failure to respond would allow this Court to treat the motion as unopposed, the Court will proceed to examine the merits of the motions. After careful consideration, the Court GRANTS both motions for summary judgment (docket nos. 47 48).
I. Facts
Plaintiff Noralisa Maldonado filed suit against Frio County, Texas, her former employer, and Frio County Tax Assessor-Collector Hector Cantu in his individual and official capacities. Plaintiff asserted violations of Title VII (including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and several common-law claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In September 2000, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Hector Cantu to work in the Tax Assessor Collector's office as a part-time tax clerk. In July 2001, she was transferred to a full-time position. Her immediate supervisor was Edward Garza. According to her deposition testimony, Plaintiff's job duties included helping with voter registration, tax payments, tax questions, motor vehicle registration, and vehicle title transfers. On March 29, 2002, Plaintiff informed Cantu that she would be delivering her baby by Cesarean Section on May 21, 2002 and requested leave beginning May 1, 2002. Cantu granted her leave request. However, on April 5, 2002, Cantu terminated Plaintiff's employment, citing customer complaints.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC in April 2002, and the EEOC issued a right to sue letter in August 2002. After Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted, Plaintiff's complaint was filed on January 10, 2003. Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on April 21, 2003, and that is her live pleading. In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for relief against Frio County based on alleged violations of Title VII (for gender and pregnancy discrimination) and against Frio County and Hector Cantu for alleged violations of the FMLA. Plaintiff also alleged claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision against Frio County and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Frio County and Hector Cantu. On July 2, 2003, this Court's predecessor granted Frio County's motion to dismiss in part and dismissed the negligence claims against Frio County. See docket no. 34. On July 9, 2003, this Court's predecessor granted Cantu's motion to dismiss in part and dismissed Plaintiff's Title VII claims insofar as they were asserted against Cantu. Thus, Plaintiff's Title VII claims remain pending against Frio County, as does the claim for violations of the FMLA and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Further, Plaintiff's claim for violation of the FMLA and for intentional infliction of emotional distress remain pending against Cantu. Defendants now move for summary judgment on these remaining claims.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A summary judgment movant must show by affidavit or other evidence that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the movant must either submit evidence that negates the existence of some material element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense, or, if the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or defense. Lavespere v. Niagra Machine Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993). Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. See Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991).
Summary judgment is required if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. In order for a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 4 (1986). In making this determination, the court should review all the evidence in the record, giving credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as the "evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses" and disregarding the evidence favorable to the nonmovant that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152(2000).
III. Analysis A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff asserts a claim for IIED against both Defendants, and both Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that there is no evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999). To be extreme and outrageous, conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. To properly manage its business, an employer must be able to supervise, review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees. See id (citing Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 34 (5th Cir. 1992)). Although many of these acts are necessarily unpleasant for the employee, an employer must have latitude to exercise these rights in a permissible way, even though emotional distress results. Id. Under Texas law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not lie for ordinary employment disputes. Id. Thus, to establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace, an employee must prove the existence of some conduct that brings the dispute outside the scope of an ordinary employment dispute and into the realm of extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at 613.
The Court has before it no evidence to conclude that this dispute is anything but an ordinary employment dispute, and the Court finds that Defendants' conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted with regard to Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Violations of the FMLA
The FMLA mandates that employers have a prescriptive obligation under the FMLA — they must grant employees substantive rights guaranteed by the FMLA — and they have a proscriptive obligation — they may not penalize employees for exercising these rights. Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges that Frio County and Hector Cantu "violated the provisions of the FMLA when they denied her, as an eligible employee, FMLA leave because of the birth of her child and the subsequent care of her newborn. More specifically, [Defendants] terminated [her] though [sic] an intentional and willful misapplication of the provisions of the FMLA, including, but not limited to:
* Intentionally and willfully refused to permit Plaintiff to exercise her rights and privileges under the FMLA, including her right and privilege to twelve-weeks of unpaid leave; and
* Intentionally and willfully discharging and terminating Plaintiff in violation of the FMLA.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint thus alleges a violation of the prescriptive, substantive rights provisions as well as a violation of the proscriptive provisions.
1. Violation of FMLA's Proscriptive Provisions (Frio County)
Plaintiff's complaint alleges a violation of the proscriptive obligation — namely, that she was fired for exercising her right to request FMLA leave. The Fifth Circuit has held that such a claim should be analyzed under the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Thus, "when direct evidence of discrimination is lacking, the McDonnell Douglas organizational framework applies to claims that an employee was penalized for exercising rights guaranteed by the FMLA." Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319. The three-part burden shifting scheme places the onus on the plaintiff alleging retaliatory discharge to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer discharged her; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the discharge. Id. Once the plaintiff makes this preliminary showing, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination. Id. at 319-20. If the employer carries this burden, the presumption is rebutted and drops from the case. Id. at 320. The plaintiff then has "the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate . . . that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1993). "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. at 507.
Plaintiff offers no direct evidence that she was fired due to her FMLA leave request. Thus, she must rely on circumstantial evidence. Even assuming Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, she cannot survive summary judgment because she has failed to offer any evidence rebutting Frio County's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff received a written warning from Cantu on March 20, 2001 for poor performance regarding escrow accounts. On February 27, 2002, Cantu received a telephone call from a customer complaining about service he had received from Plaintiff. On Sunday, March 3, 2002, Plaintiff was scheduled to work with a new employee on a weekend during contested elections. However, Plaintiff failed to appear for work or to call in to report that she would be absent. She received a written reprimand for her failure to appear or call on March 5. That same day, Plaintiff was given a written warning for the February 27 customer complaint. On April 5, 2002, Eric Cortez received three separate customer complaints regarding Plaintiff. One of these customers sent a letter to Cantu stating that Plaintiff was "not giving the service" to the customer that was required. Cortez reported the complaints to Cantu, who terminated Plaintiff that same day. Plaintiff's own EEOC affidavit states that she had been given three written disciplinary actions for customer complaints, not showing up to work, was demoted from escrow responsibilities, and was given a verbal counseling on the day she was discharged. There is no summary judgment evidence that demonstrates that Plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated employees, nor is there any other evidence tending to rebut Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. In addition, there is no other evidence of a causal connection between her request and her termination. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for Frio County on the FMLA retaliation claim.
2. Violation of FMLA's Substantive Prescriptive Provisions (Frio County)
The Fifth Circuit has not applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to claims brought under the prescriptive, substantive rights provisions of the FMLA. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The statute provides two distinct causes of action, to which courts apply different analyses."); Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319 ("Our holding does not extend to alleged deprivations of substantive rights under the FMLA."). In Chaffin, the Fifth Circuit cited Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997), in regard to the proper test for deprivations of substantive rights claims. In Diaz, the Seventh Circuit concluded that utilizing the McDonnell Douglas approach to substantive claims under the FMLA would misdirect attention from the proper inquiry — whether the employer respected the employee's entitlements. Id. at 713. Thus, the analysis for a substantive rights claim is straight-forward: whether the plaintiff has established that she is entitled to the benefit she claims. The employer's intent is irrelevant in the analysis.
Although Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint states a claim for a violation of her substantive rights under the FMLA, Defendant Frio County has not moved for summary judgment on this claim. Accordingly, this claim survives Defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, because it appears that summary judgment would be proper on this claim based on the undisputed facts before the Court, the Court hereby puts Plaintiff on notice that it intends to consider summary judgment on this claim sua sponte. "[I]t is well-settled that a district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the losing party has ten days notice to come forward with all of its evidence in opposition to summary judgment." Love v. Nat'l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Plaintiff has ten days from the date of this order to come forward with evidence or argument to oppose such a motion.
3. Qualified Immunity (Hector Cantu)
Defendant Cantu moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FMLA claim against him on the basis of qualified immunity. When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden "to rebut this defense by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). The first inquiry for the Court is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant's actions violated clearly established law. Id. at 306. Only after the plaintiff has met this burden does the Court examine the objective reasonableness of the defendant official's conduct. Id. The plaintiff's showing of a violation of a clearly established constitutional right is a `prerequisite' to overcoming the qualified immunity defense; failure to do so obviates the need to address the second step of the analysis." Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2003), citing Martinez v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2002). The qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991), citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986).
Defendant Cantu argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact that his conduct was objectively reasonable in light of Plaintiff's FMLA rights in April 2002. He contends that "[t]here is simply no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant Cantu's action in discharging Plaintiff for customer complaints on April 5, 2002 was objectively reasonable even in light of the fact that Plaintiff had previously requested FMLA leave at the end of March 2002." As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to show that Cantu violated her rights under the FMLA sufficient to survive summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation (proscriptive) claims because she has failed to demonstrate that her termination was causally related to her FMLA request. Accordingly, the Court need not consider whether Cantu's conduct was objectively reasonable. The Court grants Cantu's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity with regard to the FMLA proscriptive claim.
Cantu's motion for summary judgment does not expressly encompass the substantive rights claim, although it may be sufficient to put Plaintiff on notice that she should come forward with evidence to support her claim. Cantu states that "It is not in dispute whether Plaintiff was denied an entitlement or benefit under the FMLA in this case. Plaintiff admits that she requested and was granted FMLA leave by Hector Cantu at the end of March 2002. Therefore, this is not a claim regarding the first provision of the Act as Plaintiff was granted time off but claims apparently that she was discharged for requesting that time off." Thus, although Cantu does not move for summary judgment on this claim, his motion suggests that Plaintiff has no viable claim for a violation of her substantive rights. However, to ensure that Plaintiff has adequate notice, the Court informs Plaintiff that it intends to consider summary judgment on this claim in addition to the claim against Frio County, and will allow Plaintiff ten days from the date of this order to come forward with evidence or arguments relating to her FMLA substantive rights claim against Cantu.
C. Title VII/Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's sex. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as an amendment to Title VII: "[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
A claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Title VII is analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas framework discussed above. For the same reasons stated in the Court's analysis of the FMLA retaliation claim, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Frio County on Plaintiff's Title VII/Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim.
III. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Frio County's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 47) and dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for violations of Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the FMLA's prescriptive provisions, and Plaintiff's IIED claim against Frio County. The Court further GRANTS Hector Cantu's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 48) and dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's claim for violations of the FMLA's proscriptive provisions and for IIED against Cantu. Further, Plaintiff is ORDERED to come forward with evidence or arguments relating to her substantive, prescriptive rights FMLA claim against Frio County and Cantu (the only remaining claims) within ten days of this order.
Defendant Hector Cantu's Motion to Enter Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 55) and Defendant Frio County's Motion to Enter Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 56) are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
Defendants have also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Response to Show Cause Order or in the alternative Reply to Plaintiff's Response (docket no. 54). The motion to strike is DENIED. The filing will be accepted as a reply to Plaintiff's response to the show cause order.