Opinion
23-CV-00037-DC-RCG
10-05-2023
BELINDA MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MIDLAND, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RONALD C. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT are Defendants the City of Midland and John Does Nos. 1-3's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and Plaintiff Belinda Maldonado's Response in Opposition (Doc. 8). This case is before the Court through a Standing Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 7).
All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.
I. Background
On March 1, 2023, Plaintiff Belinda Maldonado (“Plaintiff Maldonado”) filed her Original Complaint against City of Midland and John Doe Nos. 1-3. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff Maldonado assert causes of action for sexual harassment and sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Doc. 5 at 2).
Plaintiff Maldonado worked as a heavy equipment operator at the City of Midland's Sprayberry Farms. Id. In her Complaint, she alleges that she was the only female working at Sprayberry Farms. Id. Further, her supervisor encouraged her to obtain her Texas Commercial Driver's License (“CDL”) and represented to her that she would be reimbursed for the CDL course-this did not happen. Id. Additionally, according to Plaintiff Maldonado, Defendant City of Midland had a practice of giving male employees a partner when jobs were assigned, but Plaintiff Maldonado's supervisor would assign her jobs by herself, without a partner. Id. at 2-3. Defendant also “provided assistance to male employees in spraying weeds, doing water samples, soil and crop samples”; however, when Plaintiff Maldonado requested the same assistance as provided to male employees, her supervisor saw it as her wanting “special treatment.” (Doc. 5 at 3).
Further, in January 2021, Defendant began scheduling Plaintiff Maldonado to work 40 hours per week, with no overtime, while male employees were given overtime. Id. at 3. Ultimately, Plaintiff Maldonado asserts she “was terminated as a result of a supervisor disputing a work vehicle being brought into Midland's garage for repair of the vehicle's air conditioning.” Id. Based on these facts, Maldonado ultimately alleges she was “subjected to sex-base [sic] harassment and sex discrimination by one or more employees of Midland and had been disparate treatment [sic] based on her sex and against her when she would come into the work area the conduct of the co-workers and the acquiescence of the Defendant created hostile work [sic] environment.” Id.
In her Complaint, Maldonado provides that she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 7, 2021, and received her “Notice of Rights” on or about January 7, 2023. Id. at 2.
On June 19, 2023, Defendants City of Midland and John Does Nos. 1-3 (collectively, “Defendants”) filed the instant Motion to Dismiss arguing that Plaintiff Maldonado fails to state a claim for gender discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff Maldonado filed her Response in Opposition on June 30, 2023, and on July 7, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply. (Docs. 8, 9). Consequently, this matter is ready for disposition.
II. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must “accept the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need not include detailed facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. However, a plaintiff must do more than recite the formulaic elements of a cause of action. See id. at 556-57. Additionally, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation in the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, although all reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. Discussion
Here, Defendants advance three arguments for dismissing Plaintiff Maldonado's claims: (1) She fails to state a claim for sexual harassment; (2) She fails to state a claim for gender discrimination; and (3) She failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to her sexual harassment claim. (Doc. 7 at 4-10). The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments below.
A. Does Plaintiff State a Claim for Sexual Harassment?
Defendants first argue Plaintiff failed to state a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII. (Doc. 7 at 4-7). Under Title VII, there are two broad categories of sexual harassment: hostile work environment and quid pro quo. Giddens v. Cmty. Educ. Cntrs, Inc., 540 Fed.Appx. 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2013). Because Plaintiff Maldonado did not plead any facts alleging a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment (Doc. 5), the Court will construe her claim for sexual harassment under a hostile work environment theory of liability.
Plaintiff Maldonado's Response supports this, as it states, “[s]he alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment and disparate treatment based on her gender. This, in turn, created a hostile work environment.” (Doc. 8 of at 2.)
To establish a hostile work environment claim, an employee must establish a prima facie case, demonstrating that: “(1) that the employee belongs to a protected class; (2) that the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on [sex]; and (4) that the harassment affected a ‘term, condition, or privilege' of employment.” Arredondo v. Schlumberger Ltd., 583 F.Supp.3d 783, 798 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (quoting Guadalajara v. HoneywellInt'l, Inc., 224 F.Supp.3d 488, 497 (W.D. Tex. 2016)). “A defendant may raise the affirmative defense that it ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior' and ‘that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.' ” Id. (quoting Guadalajara, 224 F.Supp.3d at 497).
Defendants argue dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff Maldonado fails to plead elements two through four. (Doc. 7 at 6). Further, “[t]his Court cannot even attempt to assess the frequency and severity of any alleged conduct, the degree to which the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating or interfered with Plaintiff's work performance because Plaintiff failed to plead any conduct even took place.” Id.
The Court agrees with Defendants here. Plaintiff Maldonado's Complaint is clearly missing element two: that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment. Despite Plaintiff Maldonado's repeated use of the phrase “sexual harassment” in her Complaint, the Complaint itself is devoid of facts showing any unwelcome sexual advances. Additionally, Plaintiff Maldonado's Complaint does not plead any “conduct of a sexual nature,” nor any sexually derogatory comments. See Puleo v. Texana MHMR Ctr., 187 F.Supp.3d 769, 780 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F.Supp.2d 691, 699 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“ ‘[U]nwelcome sexual harassment' is defined, in this circuit, as ‘conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome in the sense that it is unsolicited or unincited and is undesirable or offensive to the employee.' ”) (citing Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986)).
As such, Plaintiff Maldonado fails to state a claim for hostile work environment based on sexual harassment. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff Maldonado's hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment. (Doc. 7).
B. Does Plaintiff State a Claim for Gender Discrimination?
Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff Maldonado failed to state a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII. (Doc. 7 at 7-8).
Title VII outlaws gender discrimination by employers against employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Unlawful sex discrimination can take the form of either a quid pro quo or a nonquid pro quo. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). A non-quid pro quo gender discrimination claim is a claim for a hostile work environment. Id. Again, as above, because Plaintiff Maldonado did not plead any facts alleging a claim for quid pro quo gender discrimination (Doc. 5), thus the Court will construe her claim for gender discrimination under a hostile work environment theory of liability.
Plaintiff Maldonado's Response supports this, as it states, “[s]he alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment and disparate treatment based on her gender. This, in turn, created a hostile work environment.” (Doc. 8 of at 2.)
At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013). Instead, a plaintiff's pleading for gender discrimination under a hostile work environment theory must contain the two “ultimate elements”: 1) an adverse employment action, 2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status. See Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019). In addition, courts must not improperly raise the pleading standard by subjecting plaintiff's complaint to a “rigorous factual or evidentiary analysis” under the heightened pleading standard. Id.
Here, Defendants argue Plaintiff Maldonado's Complaint is insufficient because “Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that any alleged adverse employment action was taken against Plaintiff because of her protected status.” (Doc. 7 at 7). Instead, “Plaintiff offers only a naked conclusion that she was terminated because she made a complaint of sexual harassment.” Id. Defendants argue “the veracity of this claim is not supported by Plaintiff's own statements regarding her termination found in her Charge and elsewhere in her Complaint.” Id. at 7-8. However, Plaintiff Maldonado's Complaint clearly alleges that “Maldonado was terminated as a result of a supervisor disputing a work vehicle being brought into Midland's garage for repair of the vehicle's air conditioning. The Plaintiff's sex was the factor or a factor in the termination and was the product a pattern and practice of discriminating against her to precipitate a termination or constructive termination.” (Doc. 5 at 3).
Based on the allegations put forth in her Complaint, Plaintiff Maldonado meets her burden at this stage of litigation. Plaintiff Maldonado pleaded multiple, tangible instances where she was treated differently than men. (See Doc. 5 at 2-3). Ultimately, Plaintiff Maldonado pleaded that she was terminated over a dispute, but her “sex was the factor or a factor in the termination and was the product a pattern and practice of discriminating against her to precipitate a termination.” Id. Thus, in essence she pleaded that her employment was terminated because she is a woman. At a motion to dismiss, subjecting Plaintiff Maldonado's factual claims to more extensive analysis is improper. See Cicalese, 924 F.3d 762 at 767. In addition, the Court is still bound to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff Maldonado's favor at this stage of litigation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim based on gender discrimination. (Doc. 7).
C. Did Plaintiff Maldonado Exhaust her Administrative Remedies under Title VII for Sexual Harassment?
The Court now alternatively examines whether Plaintiff Maldonado exhausted her administrative remedies as to her sexual harassment claim.
In order to bring a claim under Title VII an employee must exhaust their administrative remedies. See McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008); Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2006). “[E]mployees must satisfy this requirement by filing an administrative charge with the EEOC.” McClain, 519 F.3d at 273 (citing Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788 n.6). An EEOC charge “enables the EEOC to investigate and, if appropriate, negotiate a resolution with an employer.” McClain, 519 F.3d at 273. “Nevertheless, competing policies underlie judicial interpretation of the exhaustion requirement.” Id. (citing Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788-89). “On the one hand, because ‘the provisions of Title VII were not designed for the sophisticated,' and because most complaints are initiated pro se, the scope of an EEOC complaint should be construed liberally.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir. 1970)). “On the other hand, a primary purpose of Title VII is to trigger the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC, in an attempt to achieve non-judicial resolution of employment discrimination claims.” Id. (citing Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466).
To reconcile these two competing policies, Fifth Circuit precedent instructs courts to construe EEOC complaints “broadly, not solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself, but by the scope of the EEOC investigation and that which ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.' ” Id. at 789 (quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466). A Title VII lawsuit may include claims “like or related to allegations] contained in the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission.” McClain, 519 F.3d at 273 (citing Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466). Thus, courts engage in a “ ‘factintensive analysis' of the administrative charge that looks beyond the four corners of the document to its substance.” Id. (citing Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466).
Even though Plaintiff Maldonado's EEOC charge is a matter outside of the Complaint, the Court may consider it when ruling on the instant Motion. “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011). This includes “documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff Maldonado's EEOC charge falls squarely within these parameters, as it is referenced by her Complaint and the type of document which the Court may take judicial notice of at the 12(b)(6) stage. See Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record.”) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir.1994)). Therefore, the Court will consider the substance of Plaintiff Maldonado's EEOC charge while ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
The Court also notes the authenticity of Defendants' provided copy of Plaintiff Prince's EEOC charge is 11.
Defendants attack Plaintiff Maldonado's exhaustion of administrative remedies as to her sexual harassment claim because her EEOC charge “did not allege any facts that speak to sexual harassment.” (Doc. 7 at 9). Additionally, “she fails to describe any allegations in the narrative section that would amount to sexual harassment. Sex-based discrimination and sexual harassment claims are distinct claims.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Clark v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 18 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1994); Weaver v. Basic Energy Servs, L.P., No. MO-13-CV-022, 2014 WL 12513180, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan 8, 2014), aff'd 578 Fed.Appx. 449 (5th Cir. 2014)). Defendants also argue that “a sexual harassment claim could not reasonably be expected to grow out of the Charge. Plaintiff's Charge contains only allegations of unfair treatment,” and that the allegations in Plaintiff Maldonado's EEOC charge “do not place the City on notice of a sexual harassment claim.” Id. at 9-10.
Plaintiff Maldonado does not directly address this argument in her Response. Instead, she argues her EEOC filing was timely. (Doc. 8 at 4-5). However, that is not the relevant issue. The relevant issue is if, via a liberal interpretation, Plaintiff Maldonado's EEOC charge sufficiently raises the issue of sexual harassment. It is clear it does not. Plaintiff's EEOC charge is devoid of any allegations related to unwelcome sexual advances, sexual harassment, or derogatory sexual comments. (Doc. 7-1). Plaintiff Maldonado's statements in her EEOC charge are insufficient for the Court to reasonably expect a sexual harassment investigation to grow from them.
The Court finds Plaintiff Maldonado failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her sexual harassment claim. This is fatal to that cause of action. Accordingly, the Court alternatively RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff Maldonado's hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment. (Doc. 7). The Court further RECOMMENDS that cause of action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
“When a district court dismisses a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the dismissal is without prejudice to the claimant's right to return to court after it has exhausted its administrative remedies.” Martin K. Eby Const. Co., Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 n.5 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. U.S. Treasury Dep't, 127 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Tex. Army Nat'l Guard, 794 F.2d 1034, 1035, 1037 (5th Cir. 1986)).
D. Futility of Amendment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Although Plaintiff Maldonado asks the Court for leave to amend in her Response, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Maldonado leave to amend her Complaint at this time. Courts deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile, and courts have previously “denied plaintiffs leave to amend on grounds of futility due to the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies by properly filing a charge of discrimination.” Ridgle v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:04-CV-1650-D, 2005 WL 8158192, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2005) (collecting cases that show same). Accordingly, allowing amendment is futile in the case at hand because Plaintiff Maldonado's EEOC charge does not include statements allowing her sexual harassment claim to have reasonably been expected to grow out of the EEOC's investigation. See id. (“[Plaintiffs] claim is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Allowing amendment would therefore be futile . . . ”) (citing Buenrostro v. Flight Safety Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. A. SA-99-CA0819FB, 2001 WL 674171, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2001)).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 7). The Court further DENIES Plaintiff Maldonado leave to amend her Complaint at this time.
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Appeal/Object
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party's failure to file such objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).