Opinion
No. CV-07-5002620S
June 10, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
I. BACKGROUND AND ALLEGED FACTS
The plaintiff, Mark Majowski, filed his original complaint in this matter on October 15, 2007, alleging that the defendant, Cumberland Farms, Inc. ("Cumberland Farms"), discharged him without cause and as a pretext for his efforts to form a union. On November 16, 2007, Cumberland Farms filed a motion to strike the original complaint based on Majowski's failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court (Gilligan, J.) granted that motion on February 4, 2008. Majowski filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2008. The amended complaint did not cure the defects that originally led the court to dismiss count two of the complaint, which the plaintiff acknowledged in his brief. On May 20, 2008, the court granted Cumberland Farms' motion to strike count two and ordered oral argument on the motion to strike count one, which was thereafter heard by the court on June 2, 2008.
For the purpose of this motion, the court relies upon the following factual allegations made in the amended complaint. Majowski was employed by Cumberland Farms as a fuel delivery driver from May 2006, through November 2006, and passed his probationary period of employment. Cumberland Farms terminated his employment for insubordination on November 18, 2006, for posting a note following a directive prohibiting the posting of notes. Majowski claims he was accused of violating the directive without evidence and denies posting the note. Cumberland Farms has a disciplinary policy that states that it may immediately terminate employees for a violation of its work rules, or may impose a lesser discipline. Cumberland Farms has complete discretion in the imposition of discipline and chose to terminate Majowski's employment for cause.
II. DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 10-39 provides in relevant part: "(a) Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[C]onsequently, [it] requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). In ruling on a motion to strike, "[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
A. Contract Necessary for Right to Just Cause Termination
Majowski claims several reasons as the basis for his right to a termination only for cause in this case. First, he contends that the conclusion of his probationary period ended his status as an at-will employee and gave rise to his right to be terminated only for cause. Second, he contends that Cumberland Farms waived its employment at-will relationship by alleging cause in terminating his employment. In addition to these reasons, he alleges that it violates public policy for an employer to terminate an employee for cause when that cause is based upon a false accusation. In making these claims, Majowski cites a written "Notice to all Drivers," in which Cumberland Farms retains the unilateral right to suspend or terminate an employee immediately, or to impose discipline at its discretion, followed by a list of work-related rules of conduct. Unfortunately, the law does not support the plaintiff's claims in this case.
Connecticut is an employment-at-will state. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). Therefore, as a general rule, an employer is free to terminate an at-will employee's employment without cause. Campbell v. Plymouth, 74 Conn.App. 67, 74, 811 A.2d 243 (2002). The Connecticut Supreme Court noted long ago in Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 736, 118 A.2d 316 (1955), that "[i]n the absence of a consideration in addition to the rendering of services incident to the employment, an agreement for a permanent employment is no more than an indefinite general hiring, terminable at the will of either party without liability to the other."
The defendant maintains, and the court agrees, that it had the unilateral right to choose progressive discipline or to terminate an employee at its discretion. Although the defendant chose to terminate the plaintiff's employment for insubordination, that choice does not give rise to a contractual obligation to terminate only for cause.
The choice of an employer to terminate employment for cause may have serious implications regarding the employee's right to unemployment compensation; however, this issue has already been addressed in another forum. In this case, the plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing on this motion that he had successfully obtained unemployment compensation, despite the defendant's claim of a justifiable termination. In addition, a claim of a false accusation may also give rise to a cause of action for defamation. See Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 27, 662 A.2d 89 (1995) ("[t]o find that the defendants were liable for defamation . . . the [court] was required to find that the defendants published false statements that harmed the [plaintiff], and that the defendants were not privileged to do so").
An implied contract may give rise to an employee's right to termination for cause; however, the allegations of fact in this case are insufficient to support an implied contract. In Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 662 A.2d 89 (1995), the court found that an implied contractual right to termination for cause existed, because the employee handbook contained this specific right at the time the plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer of employment. "Because of representations made to the plaintiff in his pre-employment interviews and in an employee manual given to the plaintiff on his first day of work, there was an implied contract between the parties that the plaintiff's employment could be terminated only for cause." Id., 3. No such representations are alleged in this case.
Generally, "[a] contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement . . . Accordingly, to prevail on . . . the alleged existence of an implied agreement between the parties, the plaintiff had the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] had agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake [some] form of actual contract commitment to him under which he could not be terminated without just cause." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 208 Conn. 106, 111-12, 544 A.2d 170 (1988). In Coelho, the employer had made numerous assurances of future employment and job security to the plaintiff, upon which the plaintiff relied. No comparable allegations of fact are made in this case.
Viewing the facts alleged in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, a general allegation of the completion of a probationary period, the "Notice to all Drivers" of company rules and the fact that Cumberland Farms chose to terminate Majowski based upon a claim of cause, individually or in combination, do not give rise to an implied contract that an employer may only terminate for just cause.
B. Public Policy Exception
A public policy exception to at-will employment was recognized in Connecticut in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 471. In that case, the court found a violation of public policy where the plaintiff was terminated after exposing his employer's violations of the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id. Since that decision, Connecticut courts have very narrowly construed the public policy exception, requiring that an employee prove that a termination was the result of "some important violation of public policy." Id., 475. Employers are therefore permitted to make personnel decisions without incurring civil liability, and a cause of action only exists where the employee is able to identify a public policy that is specifically applicable and has been violated. See Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679, 513 A.2d 66 (1986).
In the present case, the plaintiff claims that it is a violation of public policy to permit the termination of an employee based upon a false and unsubstantiated allegation of misconduct. This claim, however, has been rejected in Connecticut. For example, "[a] false but negligently made accusation of criminal conduct as a basis for dismissal is not a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal and is not derived from some important violation of public policy . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 680. Other Connecticut courts have similarly reasoned that false allegations of misconduct used to support a termination do not qualify under the public policy exception to at-will employment. See Padula v. Weston Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 06 4014462 (October 16, 2006, Arnold, J.); see also Buccini v. Eastern Equipment Sales, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0451176 (August 8, 2002, Fracasse, J.) (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 750). The court therefore concludes that an unsubstantiated and false allegation of misconduct does not form the basis for a public policy exception to the general policy of at-will employment in Connecticut.
III. CONCLUSION
The motion to strike count one is granted. The court having struck count two previously, the plaintiff may replead pursuant to the rules of practice.