Opinion
No. 1252 C.D. 2013
04-07-2014
Dr. David L. Mainor and Karen R. Mainor, J.D. v. The Philadelphia Parking Authority, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge (P.)
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
The Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) appeals from a judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) in favor of siblings Dr. David L. Mainor (Dr. Mainor) and Karen R. Mainor, J.D. (Ms. Mainor) (collectively, the Mainors), and against the PPA. Specifically, following a bench trial on January 28, 2013, the trial court ordered the PPA to pay restitution to the Mainors in the amount of $1,553.50 and "to mark all pending tickets issued to either plaintiff prior to May 21, 2007 'dismissed.'" The trial court thereafter denied the PPA's motion for post-trial relief and, after the PPA filed its appeal to this Court, issued an opinion in support of its decision pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rule 1925(a) Opinion). We now reverse the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the Mainors and against the PPA.
BACKGROUND
A. The Plaintiffs
The Mainors share a residence on Cambridge Street in the City of Philadelphia (City). The Mainors do not have dedicated off-street parking at their residence. On-street parking is permitted on Cambridge Street, but only on the side of the street opposite the Mainors' home. The Mainors suffer from medical conditions that limit their mobility generally and their ability to walk long distances specifically. Many times, mostly in the evening, there are no on-street parking spaces available near the Mainors' home.
Because of their medical conditions and concerns about their safety should they park too far away from their home in the evenings, the Mainors occasionally chose to park their vehicle on the sidewalk in front of their home. When they did, they would place a handicap placard in their windshield. They would also place a note on their vehicle addressed to the "Philadelphia Police." The note would indicate the reasons that they parked on the sidewalk and a request that, instead of ticketing them, the police knock on the Mainors' door and ask them to move their vehicle. The Mainors maintain that as handicapped persons, they are entitled to park on the sidewalk outside of their home so long as they display their placard and their neighbors' rights are not adversely affected. They rely on a safety exception in the Philadelphia ordinance that generally bars parking on sidewalks (Parking Ordinance):
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or to protect the safety of any person or vehicle or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall:
(a) Stop, stand or park a vehicle:
. . .
Phila. Code § 12-913(1)(a)(ii) (emphasis added).(ii) On a sidewalk except that a bicycle may be parked as provided in Section 12-807.
B. The PPA & Parking Regulation in the City
The PPA is a body politic and corporate established by the City of Philadelphia under authority conferred by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 5503, 5504. The PPA is not an instrumentality of the City. Id. § 5505(a)(3). Among the powers that the PPA may exercise are the following:
(21) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, if authorized by resolution or ordinance of the legislative body of the parent municipality, to administer, supervise and enforce an efficient system of on-street parking regulation. This paragraph includes the power:
(i) to conduct research and maintain data related to on-street parking activities;
(ii) to issue parking tickets for illegally parked vehicles;
(iii) to collect on behalf of a municipality rates and other charges, including fines and penalties, for uncontested on-street parking violations;
(iv) to boot or tow a vehicle which is illegally parked or the owner of which is delinquent in payment of previously issued parking tickets; and
(v) to own or lease personal property used in connection with the exercise of any power provided in this paragraph.
. . .Id. § 5505(d) (emphasis added). Parking authorities like the PPA, however, are prohibited from, inter alia, pledging the credit or taxing power of a political subdivision (the City). Id. § 5505(e). Moreover, obligations of the parking authority may not be deemed to be obligations of the political subdivision. Id.
(22) In cities of the first class, to serve as the exclusive impoundment official, exclusive impounding agent or exclusive towing agent for the enforcement of impoundment orders pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to enforcement) and to authorize towing and storage of vehicles and combinations by private towing agents for such purpose as necessary.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the City of Philadelphia, by ordinance (Traffic Code), has delegated certain authority to the PPA "relating to the administration, supervision and enforcement of on-street parking regulations and the collection on behalf of the City of fines and penalties imposed in connection with the violation of parking regulations." Phila. Code § 12-2801(4). With respect to the administrative adjudication of parking violations, the Traffic Code vests with the PPA certain clerical functions:
In addition to such other functions, powers and duties as have been delegated to the Philadelphia Parking Authority . . . by statute or ordinance, or by other provisions of this Chapter, the Parking Authority shall have the following functions, powers and duties in connection with the administrative adjudication system established by this Chapter:
Id. § 12-2803. Authorized employees of the PPA, like police officers, are also permitted under the Traffic Code to issue parking tickets. Id. § 12-2804(1).(1) To receive and process answers to charges of alleged violations and to refer contested answers to the Finance Director's Office for hearing and determination;
(2) To provide administrative, cashiering and data processing support to the Finance Director's Office and to compile and maintain complete and accurate records relating to all charges, dispositions made and payments received by the Finance Director's Office; and
(3) To send notices, as required, on behalf of the Finance Director's Office, of orders determining liability, notices to appear, decisions and other actions of the Finance Director's Office.
Although the PPA serves in a clerical role with respect to adjudicatory proceedings, it does not serve as the adjudicator. That duty and authority lies with the City's Director of Finance. Id. § 12-2802. Under Article III of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the Director of Finance is an appointed position within the Executive and Administrative Branch of the City government. The Director of Finance is empowered, by regulation,
to provide by regulation for the hearing and determination of cases involving alleged violations of provisions of this Title 12 ("Traffic Code") relating to parking, for the imposition of civil penalties, costs and additional fees for such violations, and for the acceptance of payment for such penalties, costs and additional fees, including installment payments with installment payment fees and payments by credit cards, all in accordance with all provisions of this Chapter.Id. § 2802(1). The Director of Finance's regulations must also provide for the manner by which a parking violation can be contested. Id. § 12-2806(2).
To implement the foregoing, the Director of Finance, by regulation, created within the Office of the Director of Finance a Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA), which exercises the powers and duties conferred on the Director of Finance under the Traffic Code. BAA Regulations § 2.01. The Director of Finance also appoints Parking Hearing Examiners within the BAA to decide disputed violations. To dispute a parking ticket and request a hearing, the cited person, or respondent, must answer and request a hearing through the BAA. Id. § 4.02. If the respondent does not answer or appear at a scheduled hearing, the Traffic Code authorizes the Parking Hearing Examiner to enter a default judgment. The default can be vacated if the respondent files a written application within one year of the entry of default and sets forth a sufficient defense on the merits and reasons why, due to excusable neglect, the respondent failed to answer timely or appear. Phila. Code § 12-2807(4).
Once a decision is issued by a BAA Parking Hearing Examiner, the Traffic Code and BAA Regulations provide for an administrative review before a Parking Appeals Panel constituted by the Director of Finance. This is the point in the process where the PPA gets involved, but again in only a clerical capacity. To appeal a Parking Hearing Examiner's determination, the respondent must serve on the PPA a notice of appeal within (30) days of the decision. Phila. Code § 12-2808(3); BAA Regulations § 6.02(a). The Parking Appeals Panel, however, hears and decides the administrative appeal, not the BAA. The decision of the Parking Appeals Panel is the final order of the BAA. From that decision, a respondent may appeal to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. See O'Neill v. City of Phila., 711 A.2d 544, 548-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), appeal denied, 556 Pa. 681, 727 A.2d 134 (1998).
C. The Dispute
Notwithstanding their interpretation of the Parking Ordinance, the Mainors were ticketed on several occasions for parking on the sidewalk in front of their home. On or about July 26, 2006, the PPA booted and towed (apparently for a second time) the Mainors' vehicle due to unpaid parking tickets. After the PPA impounded their vehicle, on or about July 31, 2006, the Mainors filed their civil action in the trial court, naming as defendants the PPA, the Philadelphia Police Department (Police) (July Term 2006 No. 003733), the City, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth). The Mainors generally contended in their pleading, which was twice amended, that they made repeated requests to the PPA for hearings on the unpaid parking tickets after the PPA impounded their vehicle the first time (in 2005), but that the PPA refused to grant them a hearing. They challenged the repeated ticketing of their vehicle in violation of the Parking Ordinance, the alleged refusal to afford them a hearing on the parking tickets, the repeated impoundment of their vehicle, and steps taken by the PPA after the Mainors initiated this lawsuit, including yet another impoundment of the vehicle on May 21, 2007, a request to the trial court to sell the vehicle at auction, and release of the impounded vehicle to Ford Motor Credit Corporation (Ford Credit) as lienholder. The latter challenge, involving Ford Credit, was the subject of a separate action in the trial court docketed at June Term 2007 No. 1851 (2007 Action). By Order dated July 25, 2007, the trial court consolidated the 2007 Action with the Mainors' 2006 action.
The PPA and Police initiated the 2007 Action by filing a Petition to Auction. The Petition to Auction sought to auction a group of vehicles under impoundment by the PPA and for which the owners had not paid fees associated with tickets, towing, and storage. The Mainors' vehicle was among the vehicles listed for auction. The trial court, through Judge Jones, initially granted the Petition to Auction. At the request of the Mainors', however, Judge Jones rescinded that order as to the Mainors' vehicle, and the PPA and Police removed the Mainors' vehicle from the auction list. Thereafter, however, the PPA informed the trial court that Ford Credit, as lienholder, took possession of the Mainors' vehicle from the PPA, making moot any requests that the trial court order the PPA to return the vehicle to the Mainors. In the now consolidated action, however, the Mainors continued to press for relief in the form of an order directing the PPA and Ford Credit to return the vehicle to the Mainors. By Order dated March 11, 2008, the trial court authorized Ford Credit to sell the vehicle. (Certified Record (C.R.) No. 32.) The Mainors filed an appeal of that decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which quashed the appeal as untimely. (C.R. No. 40.)
By Order dated December 31, 2009, the trial court, by the Honorable Gary F. Di Vito, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the Police and the City. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) 342a-43a.) He reasoned:
The Complaint avers a violation of Plaintiffs' due process rights in that 1) they were not afforded a hearing when they requested one following the impounding of their vehicle; 2) their vehicle was ticketed and impounded despite their use of a handicap "placard" and 3) the vehicle was subjected to a repossession action by Ford Motor Credit Co. while impounded.Id. 343a (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
. . .
Philadelphia Code and Charter . . . sets forth the law regarding parking regulations, fines and enforcement. Section 12-2807(4) sets forth the procedure to schedule a hearing in the case that a default judgment was entered for failure to respond: An order by default may be vacated within one year after its entry only upon written application setting forth 1) a sufficient defense and 2) excusable neglect as to the respondents [sic] failure to attend the hearing.
Defendant, City and Police Department filed for summary judgment on the grounds that the tort claims against the Parking Authority are barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. 8541 and that Plaintiffs have failed to prove exceptions to the immunity as set forth in section 8542. Here, it is apparent from the record that the City and police department did not engage in negligence that caused the vehicle to be repossessed - Plaintiffs' relationship with their creditor caused that loss of the vehicle.
Further, Plaintiffs at no point have suggested that they followed the proper procedure for scheduling a hearing regarding the ticketing and impoundment of their vehicle, nor have Plaintiffs suggested a valid defense for opening that default.
On or about May 5, 2010, the PPA moved for summary judgment, asserting the same arguments raised by the City and the Police in their successful motion for summary judgment. (Id. 344a-58a.) The Mainors opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court, this time by the Honorable Paul Panepinto, denied both motions on August 26, 2010 without setting forth the grounds for his decision. (Id. 359a.) On or about August 10, 2011, the PPA again moved for summary judgment. Again, the Mainors filed a cross-motion and, again, the trial court, through Judge Panepinto, denied the cross-motions without explanation. (Id. 412a.)
C. Trial Court Disposition
The case finally proceeded to a bench trial on January 28, 2013, over six years after the filing of the initial complaint, before the Honorable Mark I. Bernstein. By this time, the Mainors had secured counsel to represent their interests. Dr. Mainor and Ms. Mainor were the only witnesses to testify at the trial. A limited number of exhibits were introduced into the record without objection.
That same day, Judge Bernstein granted judgment in favor of the Mainors and against the PPA in the amount of $1,553.50 and directed the PPA to mark as "dismissed" all pending tickets issued to the Mainors prior to May 21, 2007, which was the date the PPA last impounded the Mainors' vehicle for unpaid parking tickets. The PPA filed a timely motion for post-trial relief, which the trial court denied by Order dated June 4, 2013.
On or about July 29, 2013, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) Opinion. In its opinion, the trial court includes the following findings:
Afraid for their safety late at night, [the Mainors] parked their car on the sidewalk in front of their home. They placed their handicap placard in the windshield. They even left a note in the rear windshield to ring their doorbell if the car needed to be moved. When they awoke the next morning, they found their car ticketed. PPA issued them tickets between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. This recurred dozens of times, and [the Mainors] received as many as 100 tickets. [The Mainors] requested, but never received, a review of the tickets. Their car was towed 3 times. They paid the tickets, amounting to $1,553.50, to
retrieve their car from storage after it was towed. PPA issued even more tickets that Plaintiffs have not paid.(Rule 1925(a) Op. at 3 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).) The trial court agreed with the Mainors' interpretation of the Parking Ordinance. Satisfied that the Mainors fell within the safety exception to the general prohibition against parking on sidewalks, the trial court held that "PPA wrongly ticketed Plaintiffs." (Id. at 5.) The trial court also rejected the PPA's immunity defense under Sections 8541 through 8564 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8541-64, often referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act).
D. The Parties' Contentions
On appeal, the PPA argues that the trial court's decision must be set aside because the PPA cannot comply with it. In this regard, the PPA contends that the trial court failed to recognize that the PPA is a governmental entity separate and distinct from the City and the Police. The PPA also contends that the trial court ignored certain undisputed facts, attributing to the PPA conduct of employees and agents of the Police and the City. The PPA argues that the trial court failed to recognize its prior decisions (by other judges) authorizing Ford Credit to sell the Mainors' vehicle and dismissing the City and the Police from the lawsuit. Finally, the PPA contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Mainors' claims against the PPA were not barred by the Tort Claims Act.
"Our standard of review of a non-jury trial is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and whether an error of law was committed." Swift v. Dep't of Tramp., 937 A.2d 1162, 1167 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
The PPA, in its statement of issues, presents this argument as one involving res judicata. In its written argument, however, it merely incorporates the trial court's prior rulings to support its main contention that the trial court held the wrong party liable to the Mainors.
In response, the Mainors argue that the PPA waived the issue of whether it can comply with the trial court's order by not raising it below. They contend that the PPA should have presented evidence at trial to support its contention that it is separate and distinct from the City and the Police, particularly because the Mainors presented testimony/evidence that the BAA is a branch of the PPA and not the City. In addition, they cite statutory authority, cited above, which enables delegation by the City to the PPA certain administrative functions with respect to on-street parking, including the ability to collect finds, issue tickets, and impound vehicles. 53 Pa. C.S. § 5505(d). Accordingly, the Mainors contend that the PPA is the correct party against which it is entitled to the relief afforded by the trial court.
On the issue of immunity, the Mainors contend that, as a Commonwealth entity, the PPA is not protected by the Tort Claims Act. Rather, the PPA's immunity from suit is a question of sovereign immunity. The Mainors contend that their claims against the PPA fall within the exception to sovereign immunity set forth in Section 8522(b)(3) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(3), relating to the care, custody, or control of personal property, in this case the Mainors' vehicle. Moreover, they contend that their claims against the PPA involved negligent and intentional conduct that deprived them of their property without due process of law. They claim that immunity does not shield the PPA from a claim that the PPA intentionally violated the Mainors' constitutional right to be free from the seizure of their property without due process of law. In essence, they cast their claims against the PPA as either negligent or intentional violations of the Mainors' constitutional rights under either the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions. The Mainors also contend that because they alleged and proved willful misconduct by the PPA, their claim was actionable under Section 8550 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550.
Section 8550 provides:
In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to official liability generally), 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity), 8548 (relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitation on damages) shall not apply.42 Pa. C.S. § 8550.
Finally, they argue that the trial court appropriately fashioned a remedy under an "unjust enrichment" theory. They contend that the PPA improperly proceeded with an effort to dispose of the Mainors' vehicle by auction in the 2007 Action while the Mainors' had a pending motion relating to the return of their vehicle in their lawsuit. The Mainors argue that the PPA perpetrated a fraud on the court, by failing to give them proper notice of the 2007 Action and failing to advise the judge in the 2007 Action (Judge Jones) about the pending request for relief in the Mainors' lawsuit. In other words, the PPA engaged in "judge shopping" in an effort to get rid of the Mainors' vehicle. They contend that the PPA allowed Ford Credit to reclaim their vehicle, even though the PPA was aware that the Mainors lawsuit sought to challenge the validity of the unpaid parking tickets and return of the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis by describing the nature of the claims that the Mainors brought against the PPA in their complaint and that, we presume, the trial court decided in the Mainors' favor. In Count II (R.R. 122a-29a), the Mainors contended that their vehicle was improperly ticketed, towed, and impounded for unpaid parking tickets on several occasions. The Mainors do not challenge the "unpaid" status of those tickets. Moreover, they do not allege that the tickets were, in fact, not issued. Rather, the Mainors contend that the tickets should not have been issued because, in their view, the Parking Ordinance allowed them to park on the sidewalk in front of their home. They contend that the PPA either denied or ignored their repeated requests for a hearing on the tickets and the impoundments.
In Count IV (R.R. 130a-33a), the Mainors challenge certain events that occurred after they brought their suit in 2006. Specifically, they challenge the steps that the PPA took in the 2007 Action to sell the Mainors' vehicle at auction. They further challenge the PPA's release of the Mainors' vehicle from impoundment to Ford Credit as lienholder. They argue that the PPA failed to give proper notice of either action to the Mainors and also made misrepresentations to the trial court in the 2007 Action.
We first address the PPA's contention that the trial court erred in ordering it to afford relief that the PPA cannot provide. In essence, the PPA is contending that the Mainors have not made out a case against the PPA for liability. Our review of the trial court's 1925(a) Opinion and the record in this case compels us to conclude that the trial court committed several material errors in its factual findings and its ultimate legal conclusions. First, the trial court determined that "PPA issued [the Mainors] tickets between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. This recurred dozens of times, and Plaintiffs received as many as 100 tickets." (Rule 1925(a) Op. at 3.) There is, however, no record support for this finding. Indeed, the Mainors never contended in this lawsuit that the PPA issued tickets to the Mainors. They alleged, instead, that the Police improperly ticketed their vehicle. (R.R. 121a.) Dr. Mainor and Ms. Mainor both testified at trial that they believed that the Police, not the PPA, issued the parking violation tickets. (R.R. 451a, 478a.) Even in their brief on appeal, the Mainors' acknowledge that it was the Police, and not the PPA, that ticketed their vehicle: "The Philadelphia Police issued approximately 92-100 tickets on Appellees' auto for parking on the sidewalk." (Mainors' Br. at 10.) We, therefore, agree with the PPA that the trial court improperly held the PPA liable for issuing the tickets, which ultimately led to the impoundment and subsequent release of the Mainors' vehicle to Ford Credit as lienholder.
Second, the trial court held that the PPA erred in refusing to afford the Mainors' due process with respect to challenging the tickets issued by the Police and the subsequent impoundments of their vehicle. Although the record supports the trial court's findings that the Mainors made repeated requests for hearings after their vehicle was impounded for unpaid parking tickets (R.R. 456a), the Mainors, however, failed to establish by any evidence at trial that they followed the proper administrative procedures to challenge the parking tickets in a timely manner. Under the Code, the Police (again, not the PPA) are authorized to boot or impound a vehicle where there is an accumulation of three or more delinquent parking tickets. Phila. Code § 12-2405(1)(2). A delinquent ticket is a ticket where no answer to the ticket has been filed within the time prescribed by law. Id. § 12-2401(2). The Mainors did not allege or prove that they challenged any of the approximately 92 to 100 parking tickets that they received by filing a timely answer to each ticket and requesting a hearing before a Parking Hearing Officer within the BAA. To the contrary, only after their car was booted and towed did they go to the PPA, and not the BAA, and ask for a hearing, which, at least under the Traffic Code, suggests that their requests were both out-of-time and out-of-place. The Mainors provided no evidence at trial to the contrary.
In fact, Dr. Mainor admitted during the trial that he did not pay each individual ticket as they were received and acknowledged that he knew that he had a limited time period to pay or contest each ticket. (R.R. 458a.)
Moreover, if we accept as true the allegations in the Mainors' complaint, the BAA did afford the Mainors a hearing before a Parking Hearing Officer after the Mainors' vehicle was impounded on July 26, 2006. On the same day they initiated this action in the trial court, the Mainors appeared before a Parking Hearing Officer with respect to 22 unpaid parking tickets. (R.R. at 160a.) The Parking Hearing Officer, after hearing evidence and argument, granted the Mainors some relief but refused to discharge all of the unpaid tickets. The Parking Hearing Officer ordered Dr. Mainor to pay $350.00, plus costs of towing and storage, in order to retrieve his vehicle. (Id.) After making a payment ($581.50), the Mainors allege that they went to the impoundment lot to retrieve the vehicle. A PPA employee, however, refused to release the vehicle due to a question over the identity of Dr. Mainor's insurance carrier. Dr. Mainor retrieved proof of insurance, paid an additional storage fee of one day, and retrieved his vehicle. (Id. at 161a.)
It appears, however, that the Mainors continued to ignore parking tickets because, they allege, on September 13, 2006, the vehicle again was booted and towed due to 12 unpaid parking tickets. The Mainors allege that the next day, Dr. Mainor received notice from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PaDOT) that the vehicle registration had been suspended, because the PPA notified PaDOT of the unpaid parking tickets. On September 21, 2006, Dr. Mainor requested a hearing before the BAA to challenge the Parking Hearing Examiner's July 31, 2006 decision with respect to the 22 parking tickets. (R.R. 151a (Second Amended Compl. Ex. G).) On October 10, 2006, the BAA rejected Dr. Mainor's administrative appeal of the Parking Hearing Examiner's decision as untimely. (Id. at 126a, 174a.) There is no indication in the record that the Mainors exercised their right to appeal the BAA's October 10, 2006 final order to the trial court.
Under the BAA Regulations, an appeal from a Parking Hearing Officer's decision must be taken within 30 days of the entry of the decision. BAA Regulation § 6.02.
Though the Mainors complain that the PPA failed to afford them due process, they ignored the administrative process set forth the Traffic Code and the BAA Regulations to challenge parking tickets and to obtain the return of an impounded or immobilized vehicle. See Phila. Code Chs. §§ 12-2400 (relating to towing and immobilizing of parked or abandoned vehicles), 12-2800 (relating to administrative adjudication of parking violations). Moreover, the duty to afford a hearing, if timely requested, falls on the City's Director of Finance, through the BAA, and not the PPA. We see nothing in the record upon which we can conclude that the Mainors' availed themselves of their administrative remedies according to the local procedures. And, even if they had, to the extent they did not receive a hearing to which they were entitled under local law, liability for that failure lies at the feet of the City's Director of Finance and the BAA, not the PPA.
We specifically reject the Mainors' contention on appeal that whether the PPA is an entity separate and apart from the City and whether the BAA is part of the PPA or the City are questions of fact. To the contrary, the law, as recounted above, establishes the roles of these entities and offices. The City and the PPA are related but separate governmental entities. In addition, the BAA, as a matter of law, is a bureau created within the Office of the City's Director of Finance.
The trial court, by Judge Di Vito, concluded as much when, in his December 31, 2009 Order, he granted the summary judgment motions of the Police and the City:
Further, Plaintiffs at no point have suggested that they followed the proper procedure for scheduling a hearing regarding the ticketing and impoundment of their vehicle, nor have Plaintiffs suggested a valid defense for opening that default.(R.R. 343a.) But years later, when this matter finally came to trial before Judge Bernstein, the Mainors again failed to address, let alone prove, that they had followed the proper procedures under the Traffic Code and the BAA Regulations regarding challenges to the ticketing and impoundment of their vehicle. In its 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court repeatedly notes how the Mainors requested hearings from the PPA after their vehicle was impounded. At no point, however, does the trial court address the very important follow-up question of whether the Mainors were entitled under the Traffic Code and BAA Regulations to a hearing at the time, or times, that they requested a hearing from the PPA. This inquiry would have required the trial court to consider whether the Mainors complied with the established procedures to challenge the tickets and the impoundments. There is nothing in the record to prove that they did. Indeed, as noted above, the record suggests that they did not.
This Court has repeatedly, and recently, held that an individual may not seek redress for local government actions from the courts where they fail to avail themselves of their administrative remedies to challenge those actions. See O'Neill, 711 A.2d at 548-49; In re: Phila. Parking Auth., (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 94 C.D. 2013, filed Oct. 21, 2013); Mundy v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1984 C.D. 2012, filed Apr. 5, 2013); see also Cmwlth. Ct. Internal Operating Procedure 414(a) (regarding citation to unreported panel decisions as persuasive authority).
Regardless, then, of how the Mainors and the trial court characterize the Mainors' claim under Count II of the Complaint—i.e., negligence, unjust enrichment, due process, etc., the Mainors failed to establish as a matter of fact and of law that the PPA improperly ticketed their vehicle or improperly impounded their vehicle. Moreover, the Mainors failed to establish at trial that the PPA had any obligation to afford them a hearing under the Philadelphia Code and BAA Regulations. The judgment of the trial court, therefore, must be reversed as to Count II.
The Mainors contend that the PPA waived the issue of whether the PPA is capable of complying with the trial court's order. We disagree. Our review of the record shows that the PPA was consistent below in its position that with respect to responsibility over the adjudication of parking ticket violations, the BAA, not the PPA, has authority and jurisdiction. At the trial, counsel for the PPA specifically advised the trial court as follows: "I don't know how many ways I can say it: The [Bureau of Administrative Adjudications] is a separate and distinct local agency from the [PPA]. Any issue that [the Mainors] have with the process and procedures employed by the [Bureau of Administrative Adjudications], they need to be addressed through the City of Philadelphia, not the [PPA]." (R.R. at 490a.) Thus, the PPA did raise and preserve below its argument that the Mainors' claims and requests for relief arose by virtue of allegations that really pertained to wrongdoing by the BAA, not the PPA. --------
In reviewing the trial court's Rule 1925(a) Opinion, it does not appear that the trial court afforded any relief to the Mainors on account of Count IV of the complaint. The allegations of wrongdoing in Count IV relate to the 2007 Action, in which the PPA attempted to sell the Mainors' vehicle at auction. On March 11, 2008, however, the trial court issued an order granting Ford Credit's motion for permission to sell the Mainor' vehicle, effectively rejecting the Mainors' claims that the PPA acted unlawfully in releasing their vehicle to Ford Credit. (C.R. No. 32.) The Mainors appealed the trial court's March 11, 2008 order to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on April 14, 2008. By Order dated July 15, 2008, the Superior Court quashed the appeal as untimely. (C.R. No. 40.) In light of the foregoing, we reject the Mainors' argument that Count IV of their complaint can serve as a basis to affirm the trial court's order entering judgment in their favor and against the PPA.
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court's order. Because we agree with the PPA that the record does not support the trial court's order entering judgment against the PPA, we need not address the PPA's remaining issues, including its claim that the Mainors' claims against it are barred by the Tort Claims Act.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of April, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is REVERSED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge