Opinion
No. 2054 C.D. 2014
04-20-2015
Michael Maier, Appellant v. Maggie Snow
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael Maier, pro se, appeals an August 5, 2014 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) which dismissed claims against Magisterial District Judge Maggie Snow (Judge Snow) and dismissed Maier's request for immediate restoration of his driver's license. On appeal, Maier contends that the trial court erred by not requiring Judge Snow to recuse herself from presiding over the summary traffic court proceeding (proceeding) and, as a result, Judge Snow's adjudication should be voided and Maier's driver license restored. Discerning no error, we affirm.
This matter stems from two traffic citations issued to Maier on July 3, 2013: one for operating a motor vehicle without required financial responsibility; and the other for operating a vehicle that is in an unsafe condition. (Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2; Summons for Summary Case Traffic, C.R. at Item 9.) Thereafter, Maier filed a civil rights action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania naming Judge Snow as a defendant. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3.) Maier's federal complaint alleged that Judge Snow violated Maier's civil rights by issuing a hearing date without conducting her own investigation into the basis of the traffic citations. (Maier's Federal Complaint at ¶ 12, R.R. at 37a.) A hearing on Maier's traffic citations was scheduled for April 10, 2014 before Judge Snow. On March 6, 2014, William Salmon, Esq. (Counsel), sent a letter addressed to Judge Snow, the President Judge of the trial court, and the minor court judiciary deputy court administrator. (Letter from William Salmon (March 6, 2014), R.R. at 30a-31a.) Therein, Counsel stated that Judge Snow withdrew her initial agreement to recuse herself from adjudicating Maier's traffic citations and presiding over the April 10, 2014 hearing; therefore, Counsel was "re-applying to Court Administration and President Judge . . . for the same recusal" and "requesting Court Administration and [the President Judge] to decide this." (Letter from William Salmon (March 6, 2014), R.R. at 30a-31a.) Counsel's request was based on his belief that Judge Snow could not be impartial because she was being sued by Maier in federal court. (Letter from William Salmon (March 6, 2014), R.R. at 30a-31a.) Maier's federal lawsuit against Judge Snow was subsequently dismissed with prejudice on March 26, 2014. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3.)
The traffic citations are not in the certified record, but were attached to the Reproduced Record. Although only facts contained in the certified record can be considered on appeal, Commonwealth v. Martz, 824 A.2d 403, 408 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Young, 317 A.2d 258, 264 (Pa. 1974)), we do note that it appears that one citation states that the violation was "no medical card as required for vehicles 17,000 lbs or greater," not a "vehicle in unsafe condition." However, since we do not reach the merits of the citations, the differences are not relevant to the outcome.
Maier's federal complaint was not included in the certified record received from the trial court; however, we may take judicial notice of court filings.
Maier further alleged in his federal complaint that Judge Snow violated his civil rights by extorting $50.00 from him to schedule a hearing and threatening to issue a bench warrant for his arrest if he does not pay the $50.00. (Maier's Federal Complaint at ¶ 18, R.R. at 40a.) Maier alleged that the taking of his "money to schedule a trial is willful and corrupt." (Maier's Federal Complaint at ¶ 18, R.R. at 40a.) We note that the two Summons for Summary Case Traffic (Summons) sent to Maier by Judge Snow advised Maier that, within 10 days of receipt of the Summons, he was required to take one of two actions if he wished to plead not guilty. (Summons, C.R. at Item 9.) First, he could notify Judge Snow in writing and forward an amount equal to the fine and costs due plus $8.00 or, if the amount of the fine and costs was not specified, he could forward $50.00 as collateral for his appearance at trial. Second, he could appear before Judge Snow and post collateral for his appearance in an amount determined by Judge Snow. Maier was further notified that, if he failed to respond to the Summons within 10 days, a warrant for his arrest would be issued.
On April 8, 2014, prior to the date of the hearing, Maier filed a pro se "Complaint and Petition & Request" with the trial court requesting that Judge Snow be disqualified from presiding over the April 10, 2014 proceeding. (Maier's April 8, 2014 Complaint, C.R. at Item 1.) Maier alleged that Judge Snow was interested in the matter due to the recently dismissed federal action and demanded her removal from his case. (Maier's April 8, 2014 Complaint.) Maier, however, failed to appear at the hearing on April 10, 2014, and was found guilty of the two traffic violations by Judge Snow. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3.)
The certificate of service attached to Maier's "Complaint and Petition & Request" shows that he only served the trial court with his complaint. The certificate of service does not indicate that Maier served Judge Snow.
The trial court states in its opinion that, as a consequence of his failure to appear, Maier's driver's license was suspended by the Department of Transportation (Department) pursuant to Section 1533 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1533(a). (Trial Ct. Op. at 17.) However, there is no support in the record for the trial court's statement and it is unclear from the sparse record in this matter under what provision of Section 1533(a) Maier's driver license was suspended. Section 1533(a) of the Vehicle Code provides:
The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person who has failed to respond to a citation or summons to appear before an issuing authority or a court of competent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth for any violation of this title, other than parking, or who has failed to pay any fine, costs or restitution imposed by an issuing authority or such courts for violation of this title, other than parking, upon being duly notified by an issuing authority or a court of this Commonwealth.75 Pa. C.S. § 1533(a).
Maier did not file a timely appeal from the two summary traffic convictions. Instead, over thirty days later, Maier filed a pro se "Demand for an Emergency Hearing" on May 14, 2014, seeking a hearing on the disqualification of Judge Snow so that his driver's license would be restored. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3.) The Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, on behalf of Judge Snow, filed Preliminary Objections (POs) to Maier's two pro se petitions on May 19, 2014; however, no scheduling praecipe was filed as required by local rule and Judge Snow's POs were not forwarded to disposition. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.)
The certificate of service attached to Maier's "Demand for an Emergency Hearing" shows that he only served the trial court with his demand. The certificate of service does not indicate that Maier served Judge Snow.
Over the course of the next two months, Maier filed a series of pro se motions: demanding an emergency hearing; requesting the trial court to issue a subpoena so that Counsel could question Judge Snow; and repeating Maier's demands that Judge Snow be recused and Maier's driver's license restored. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.) On July 22, 2014 Maier filed a "Motion & Complaint" sounding in mandamus demanding that the trial court either (1) vacate Judge Snow's order and reinstate his license because Judge Snow was interested in the subject of the litigation, or (2) hold an emergency hearing on the matter. (Maier's July 22, 2014 Motion & Complaint at 3; C.R. at Item 6.) Maier included a praecipe that moved the matter to disposition. (Trial Ct. Op. at 5; C.R. at Item 6.) In the "Motion & Complaint," Maier cited Article V, Section 17(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: "Justices and judges shall not engage in any activity prohibited by law and shall not violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court. Justices of the peace shall be governed by rules or canons which shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court." Pa. Const. art. V, § 17(b). Maier alleged that Judge Snow violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, and specifically the canon requiring judges to "disqualify themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned." (Maier's July 22, 2014 Motion & Complaint at 1.) Maier alleged that he was deprived of his right to a fair hearing by virtue of Judge Snow's failure to recuse herself. (Maier's July 22, 2014 Motion & Complaint at 2.)
The certified record shows that these filings were returned to Maier and not acted upon by the trial court due to certain deficiencies, including failing to allege authority for the relief sought, the motion did not comply with Pa. R.C.P. No. 208.2(a)(4) (requiring a certificate of service showing service on each party/counsel) and the filings were not directed to the assigned judge. (Letters from Court Administrator to Maier (June 24, 2014, July 28, 2014), C.R. at Items 4, 5, 7.)
The certificate of service attached to Maier's "Motion & Complaint" shows that he only served the trial court with this document. The certificate of service does not indicate that Maier served Judge Snow.
The trial court issued the Order on appeal to this Court on August 5, 2014 denying and dismissing Maier's claims against Judge Snow for lack of jurisdiction and denying and dismissing Maier's request for immediate restoration of his driver's license due to his failure to file an appeal of his summary convictions. This appeal followed.
Maier originally filed this appeal in the Superior Court. By its order of September 30, 2014, the Superior Court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Section 762(a)(7) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 762(a)(7).
On appeal, Maier raises two issues. First, Maier argues that Judge Snow erred when she failed to recuse herself from adjudicating his traffic violations. Second, Maier argues that the trial court erred by not removing Judge Snow from adjudicating Maier's traffic violations based on her failure to comply with various rules of judicial conduct. Based on these arguments, Maier requests that this Court vacate his summary traffic convictions, reinstate his driver's license, and remand this matter so that the traffic violations can be heard by another magisterial district judge.
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action is a question of law that can be raised by a court at any point in the course of a proceeding sua sponte. Office of Attorney General ex rel. Corbett v. Locust Township, 968 A.2d 1263, 1269 (Pa. 2009). Our review of all questions of law is plenary. Smith v. Manson, 806 A.2d 518, 519 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
Maier first argues that Judge Snow erred when she failed to recuse herself from adjudicating Maier's traffic violations because Maier had filed a federal civil rights complaint against Judge Snow. However, Maier did not proceed in a manner that allows for this Court to review Judge Snow's adjudication of Maier's traffic violations.
A party can petition a judge to recuse herself if a question of bias or impartiality is raised during the course of proceedings. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 912 A.2d 827, 833 (Pa. 2006); but see Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 489 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Pa. 1985) ("This does not mean that we will permit a party who is dissatisfied with the progress of the trial mid-stream to arbitrarily attempt to cause the disqualification of the presiding judge. Judge shopping has been universally condemned, and will not be tolerated at any stage of the proceedings."). If the petition is not frivolous, the party requesting the judge's disqualification bears the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate bias. Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 489 A.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (Pa. 1985) (citing In re Crawford's Estate, 160 A. 585, 587 (Pa. 1931)). Once that burden is met, the judge follows a two-step approach. First, the judge must "make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case before the court in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome." Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 370 (Pa. 1995). Whether or not the judge can make a decision free of bias is a "personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make." Id. Second, "the jurist must then consider whether or not continued involvement in the case would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary." Id. After making a determination, the judge must "state his or her reasons for granting or denying the motion" so that a record can be developed on the matter. Whitmore, 912 A.2d at 833. The party requesting the judge's disqualification must preserve the issue for appeal, which will only be reversed upon an abuse of discretion. Id.
Overruled on other grounds by, Drake v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, 601 A.2d 797, 801 (Pa. 1992).
In this case, although there is some evidence, as shown by Counsel's March 6, 2014 letter, that Maier raised the issue of disqualification/recusal with Judge Snow prior to the April 10, 2014 hearing, the fact remains that Maier did not appear before Judge Snow at the hearing and request her disqualification/recusal prior to being found guilty of the traffic violations. Had Maier made his recusal request directly to Judge Snow at the hearing, Judge Snow then would have had to make a determination and give her reasons on the record or in her adjudication for granting or denying the request. If she denied the request, Maier could then have appealed both her denial and his convictions to the trial court. However, Maier did not preserve the issue by directing his request to Judge Snow during the hearing, as required by Reilly. Therefore, this Court cannot review whether Judge Snow erred by failing to recuse herself.
It appears from Counsel's letter that all communication with Judge Snow was oral and that he did not file a formal motion with Judge Snow requesting that she recuse from adjudicating Maier's traffic violations. (Letter from William Salmon (March 6, 2014), R.R. at 30a-31a.)
As noted previously, it appears that Maier did not serve Judge Snow with his April 8, 2014 "Complaint and Petition & Request" filed with the trial court seeking Judge Snow's removal and the assignment of a different magisterial district judge.
Maier next contends that the trial court erred when it failed to schedule a hearing on Maier's "Complaint and Petition & Request" rather than deny his requests without a hearing. He also contends that his initial pleadings to the trial court on April 8, 2014 (prior to the hearing), and subsequent filings on May 14, 2014, had the effect of timely appealing his convictions. He alleges that the convictions were April 10, 2014, but "notice and notice of license suspension was later." (Maier's Br. at 6.) However, as previously discussed, Maier did not appear at the April 10, 2014 hearing and request Judge Snow to recuse and there is no record of her denial of the request or her reasoning. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing to schedule a hearing on Maier's Complaint. Maier's filings with the trial court before the hearing, and more than 30 days after entry of the summary traffic convictions, did not comply with Rule 460(A) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and thus, did not appeal the summary convictions. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether Judge Snow abused her discretion by refusing to recuse herself from adjudicating Maier's traffic citations and to order a reinstatement of Maier's driving license.
The "notice of license suspension" cited by Maier would have come from the Department pursuant to the Vehicle Code, not the trial court. Because any appeal of the Department's decision would need to be addressed, in the first instance, by the trial court, any notice and any proceedings on his license suspension are not part of the certified record in this appeal.
According to Rule of Criminal Procedure 460(A) governing summary proceedings:
When an appeal is authorized by law in a summary proceeding, including an appeal following a prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance that provides for imprisonment upon conviction or upon failure to pay a fine, an appeal shall be perfected by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the guilty plea, the conviction, or other final order from which the appeal is taken. The notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of courts.Pa. R. Crim. P. 460(A). Thus, in order to be timely in accordance with Rule 460(A), an appeal from the summary traffic convictions was required to be filed with the trial court by Monday, May 12, 2014. Thus, even if Maier's "Demand for Emergency Hearing" could be construed as an appeal from the April 10, 2014 summary traffic convictions, the appeal was still filed beyond the 30 day appeal period set forth in Rule 460(A). Moreover, Maier's April 8, 2014 "Complaint and Petition & Request" could not perfect an appeal of the April 10, 2014 convictions because he had not yet been convicted. --------
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of the trial court. PER CURIAM ORDER
NOW, April 20, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, entered in the above captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.