Opinion
Civil No. JFM-01-104
July 23, 2001
OPINION
Bryan Maidy claims that he had a romantic relationship with a student intern involved in his mental health treatment, and that when he brought this relationship to the attention of her supervisors, the intern stalked and harassed him while repeatedly and falsely accusing him of stalking and harassing her. Maidy further claims that due to the intern's false accusations, the police twice filed charges against him, and her supervisors had him committed to a mental hospital without adequate investigation. He brings a variety of state common-law and federal claims against Suzanne Guerzon, the intern, against Dr. Francoise Reynolds and Dr. Joyce Derby, the supervisors, and against the State of Maryland as the employer of all three individual defendants. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to that motion, in part, by seeking leave to file an amended complaint that deletes several claims, adds several claims, and alters several other claims. I will grant defendant's motion in part and deny it in part. I will also grant plaintiff's motion in part and deny it in part. The net effect of these rulings will be to dismiss all of the claims against the State of Maryland and Reynolds and Derby, and to dismiss some of the claims against Guerzon.
I. Background
A "complaint . . . should not be dismissed summarily unless "it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.""" Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. 477 U.S. at 255. Where there is a complete failure of proof on one of the elements of the cause of action, all other material questions of fact become immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After Maidy was charged with nine misdemeanors in three months in summer 1997, including harassment, telephone misuse, and malicious destruction of property, he spent a month in the Howard County Detention Center. While still awaiting trial, Maidy was then hospitalized from August 7 to October 17, 1997, at the Springfield Hospital Center, where he had been a patient five times before. He was diagnosed as bipolar, manic, with psychotic features. His medical history indicated that he "had developed inappropriately intense relationships with female staff members in the past." Mot. Ex. 1 at ¶ 8. During the course of Maidy's hospitalization at Springfield, he slapped a visitor, physically assaulted a staff member, was placed in seclusion eight times for dangerous behavior, and was forcibly medicated after refusing to take medication. Guerzon, Derby, and Reynolds were all members of Maidy's treatment team at Springfield; Guerzon was also serving as an intern at the Riverwood Treatment Center, an outpatient clinic.
This statement of facts incorporates allegations included in both the original and the proposed amended complaint as well as evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion to dismiss the original complaint.
When Maidy was discharged from Springfield, he was incarcerated for a short period in the Howard County Detention Center. On release, Maidy entered outpatient care at Riverwood. Team members believed that Maidy benefitted from Guerzon's care, and had suggested that he continue to work with her at Riverwood on discharge from Springfield. According to Springfield personnel, Maidy did not follow through with his care at Riverwood, and Guerzon was authorized to phone him to encourage him to follow through with continued therapy.
Maidy says that he spoke to Guerzon on October 23, 1997, and that she suggested a meeting that day at McDonald's, asking Maidy to pick up a copy of the Columbia Flyer newspaper because she planned to move to Columbia. He says that the two met in a McDonald's parking lot and talked next to Guerzon's Volvo station wagon, Guerzon telling Maidy about another patient. According to Maidy, Guerzon drew closer to him, suggested that they sit in the car, and kissed and touched him while in the car. Maidy says he spoke to Guerzon by telephone on October 24, 1997, and hand-delivered a letter to Riverwood saying that he would rather date her than be her patient in future. Later on October 24, 1997, Maidy says that Guerzon persuaded him, by telephone, to enter treatment at Riverwood.
On October 28, 1997, Maidy says he had an intake interview at Riverwood. Maidy claims that Guerzon phoned him at home that evening at around 6 PM, and told him she was outside his apartment in her car. He says he rushed downstairs, climbed into her red Audi, and sat in the car with her for some time. He says he kissed and held her, and that they discussed her marriage and her education. He also says that Guerzon told him she would deny having had any romantic relationship with him if need be, to save her career.
Maidy was seen by Guerzon at Riverwood on October 30. He says that during the therapy session he removed his shirt and Guerzon rubbed his arm. Guerzon's notes for the session describe him as "highly agitated and manic." Opp'n Ex. H. On October 31, 1997, he says, Guerzon called him from her car and told him that she "liked" and "cared for" him. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 16. Maidy canceled a scheduled appointment for psychiatric evaluation at Riverwood on November 3, 1997.
Guerzon's phone records reflect that she phoned him on October 28 for one minute and on October 31 for eleven minutes. She affirms that both calls were for the purpose of encouraging Maidy to continue his outpatient treatment, and says that she made both calls from her cell phone because she often used it for business calls while commuting between Riverwood and her parents' home in Northern Virginia.
One day in November 1997, Maidy phoned Guerzon at her parents' home, explaining that he had found the number on the Internet. Guerzon says he repeatedly phoned back, and she filed a report of telephone harassment with the police. Guerzon told the hospital that she told him that night that he had crossed boundaries and that she considered their professional relationship to be terminated. Opp'n Ex. O. Maidy says that he called her twice and that she did not want to talk to him.
On November 5, 1997, Maidy phoned Reynolds five times, discussing his desire to talk with Guerzon, his love for her and desire to marry her, and his belief that she was in love with him and wanted to marry him. Maidy told Reynolds he had discovered the location of Guerzon's house by searching maps in the public library, and that on November 3, 1997, he had driven to her home and called her on her cell phone. Reynolds believed that Maidy was "hypertalkative and grandiose" during these calls, and referred him to his outpatient psychiatrist. Mot. Ex. 1 at ¶ 6.
On November 6, 1997, according to the treatment notes of Dr. David Storch, Maidy phoned Storch, who asked him to come to the clinic for a face-to-face meeting. Maidy discussed his feelings for Guerzon at length and also said that a "similar situation" had occurred before, when he had had a romantic relationship, including living together for a month, with a psychiatric nurse. Opp'n Ex. I.
On November 7, 1997, Maidy appeared at the clinic and met with Derby and two other psychiatrists for an evaluation. He says he told the doctors in detail about the encounters with Guerzon described above, that he was being evicted, and that he had no support system. Derby says he was given a list of three other sources of outpatient care in the county. On November 17, 1997, Maidy arrived at the clinic without an appointment, "agitated and demanding," and was again given a list of other sources of outpatient care. Mot. Ex. 2 at ¶ 8.
According to Maidy, this meeting occurred on November 6, 1997; the discrepancy is not material.
From November 23, 1997, to January 6, 1998, Maidy was incarcerated for trespassing at a community center. He says he wrote Guerzon numerous letters from jail expressing his love and speculating about his future with her. In late November he called his uncle, a dentist in California, asking him to call Guerzon to ask her to check on Maidy's vehicles while he was in jail. His uncle says Guerzon refused to help with the cars, was friendly, and did not express hostility or other negative sentiments toward Maidy. Opp'n Ex. K. Maidy says that as of January 6, 1998, Guerzon had not indicated to him that private and discreet contacts with him were unwelcome to her. Guerzon says that she told both Maidy and his uncle that Maidy's attentions were unwelcome and that their professional relationship could not continue. Opp'n Ex. O.
Over forty pages of letters from Maidy to Guerzon are in the record. Opp'n Ex. O.
On January 7, 1998, Maidy says he wrote Reynolds a letter expressing his frustration and listing information he says he could only have learned from Guerzon. Opp'n Ex. L. On January 8 and 9, 1998, Riverwood received numerous phone calls from a phone number associated with the address last given for Maidy. The caller gave different names and requested information about clinic therapists and their schedules.
Between November 5, 1997, and January 14, 1998, Derby and Reynolds held many conversations and meetings to discuss Maidy's behavior. See Mot. Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 7-9, 11-13; Mot. Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 7, 14; Opp'n Ex. M. They advised Guerzon to petition the court for an emergency psychiatric evaluation of Maidy, but she rejected this suggestion more than once, expressing fear for her own safety. Members of the Springfield staff and Springfield patients received repeated telephone calls from Maidy or from a man they believed to be Maidy, all seeking to discuss his alleged relationship with Guerzon. Derby and Reynolds discussed Maidy's condition with his outpatient psychiatrist.
On January 13, 1998, Derby, Reynolds, and a Dr. Hannon of Springfield learned that Maidy had called a former therapist throughout the night, resulting in her calling the police. They also learned that on January 13, 1998, Maidy had visited the offices of the Howard County Health department, identified himself as the Health Officer's relative, and then admitted his identity when the Health Officer arrived. Derby and Reynolds went to the Howard County District Court, where they petitioned to have Maidy involuntarily committed. On the same day, Maidy was evaluated at the Howard County General Hospital emergency room by two physicians, who certified him for involuntary commitment to Spring Grove Hospital Center.
Reynolds says both were psychiatrists, Mot. Ex. 1 at ¶ 16, but Derby says only that they were physicians. Mot. Ex. 2 at ¶ 17. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Maidy, I will assume that they were physicians but not psychiatrists.
At the time of a hearing shortly after Maidy's commitment, Maidy's psychiatrist, Dr. Claudia Howard, warned Guerzon in front of witnesses that Howard believed Maidy posed a threat to Guerzon's safety based on his "erotomanic attachment" to her.
Maidy was released from the hospital on January 22, 1998. He was incarcerated for trespassing from January 24 to January 31, 1998, in Montgomery County, where he says he had been attempting to contact friends.
On January 29, 1998, Maidy filed a formal grievance with Springfield Hospital, complaining about Guerzon's treatment of him. Opp'n Ex. N. Guerzon responded to the charge in March 1998, completely denying his account of a romantic relationship and secret meetings. Opp'n Ex. O. The hospital committee eventually found that the evidence was inconclusive. However, the committee expressed concern that Guerzon had neither made Maidy's letters to her part of his medical file nor recognized the seriousness of his transference with her, and that she had used her personal cell phone to call him. Opp'n Ex. D at 7-8.
Early in February 1998, Maidy says he "observed" Guerzon's address sitting on a desk at Springfield, and learned that she had moved to Columbia, Maryland. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 33. He then went to the land records office and learned the exact location of her new home. He says Guerzon had known from conversations with him that he regularly collected his mail, shopped, and socialized every day in a shopping center near her new home.
On February 12, 1998, Officer Michael Yetter of the Howard County police filed charges against Maidy for stalking and harassing Guerzon.
Maidy says he saw Guerzon at the grocery store once in May 1998 and once in July 1998, and that he reported the first encounter to the police and the second to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.
On October 27, 1998, Maidy was placed on probation in an unrelated criminal case in Howard County. One condition of his probation was that he have no adverse contact with Guerzon or a number of other people. Charges based on Guerzon's allegations against Maidy were dropped at this time, and the state prosecutor wrote Guerzon to explain that Maidy had complied with court-ordered probation for six months and that the prosecutor hoped Maidy would continue to control his behavior. Mot. Ex. 3, Attachment.
On November 22, 1998, Maidy says Guerzon followed him, both driving, to the last turn of a route approaching his apartment building. He says that when he turned in toward his apartment, she turned in after him, and then began to turn around to leave. He says that "[i]n an effort to document this incident of stalking, I maneuvered my vehicle in such a way as to block Ms. Guerzon's vehicle," and called the police. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 40. Maidy says Guerzon told the police that she had followed Maidy in order to bother him, and that a police officer so testified at Guerzon's trial following her arrest on charges related to this incident. Maidy was later charged as well in the incident.
Maidy says that from April 1998 on, he regularly visited J.K.'s Pub, located near his apartment. He says that after the November 22, 1998 incident, Guerzon regularly visited the pub and that she told other patrons there that Maidy had been her mental patient. He says that these communications led to him being called names such as "crazy," and that one pub patron, employed at Green Spring Health Services, accessed Maidy's medical files at the request of a friend of Guerzon's, and was fired for doing so. Eventually, according to Maidy, he was "drawn into a confrontation" with the pub owner and banned from the pub and from all properties managed by Columbia Management, Inc. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 44; Opp'n Ex. T.
On December 18, 1998, Maidy says that Guerzon parked for several hours across the street from his apartment building, where she could watch the entrance of his apartment building. He says that a friend of Guerzon's was also parked there, and that no one else was. Maidy says he asked his landlord to accompany him across the street, but does not say whether his landlord agreed. Maidy says that he took pictures of Guerzon and her friend parked there. Maidy filed charges in relation to this incident.
On May 10, 1999, Guerzon filed charges with the police against Maidy concerning the incidents of November 22, 1998 and December 18, 1998, as well as for repeated telephone harassment, questioning of pub patrons about Guerzon, and obtaining a copy of Guerzon's passport. Opp'n Ex. U. On May 12, 1999, Guerzon was to stand trial in Howard County based on Maidy's charges related to the two incidents. Opp'n Ex. P, R, S. Maidy says that he was arrested, based on Guerzon's charges, when he arrived for her trial. Guerzon has submitted the state's "nolle prosequi," entered on July 9, 1999, in a case called State v. Guerzon. Mot. Ex. 3, Attachment. Maidy says that when he "agreed to relocate from Howard County," the state entered a nolle prosequi on all charges filed by Guerzon. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 46.
In September 1999, Maidy moved to Alexandria, Virginia.
II. Original Complaint A. The State
With respect to counts 8 and 9, Maidy has conceded that Maryland's sovereign immunity bars negligence claims against the state of Maryland in federal court. Mot. for Order of Transfer at ¶ 2. Maidy says that he intends to dismiss these counts voluntarily if I deny his motion for order of transfer, but he lost that right when the state filed its motion for summary judgment. F. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Accordingly, the state is entitled to dismissal of these counts with prejudice.
Maidy moves that counts 8 and 9 be transferred back to the Health Claims Arbitration Office of the state of Maryland, but can point to no statutory authority for such a transfer. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Order of Transfer at ¶ 1. I lack statutory authorization for such a transfer, and the motion to transfer will be denied.
B. Reynolds and Derby
Reynolds and Derby are immune from Maidy's negligence claims (count 2, when construed as a common-law claim, and count 7) unless they acted with malice, with gross negligence, or outside the scope of their employment. Md. Code Ann., Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b); Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 12-101.The undisputed facts show that at the time they petitioned to have Maidy committed, Reynolds and Derby had held several meetings to discuss Maidy's case, worked with Maidy themselves, consulted with other treatment providers who had worked with him, learned of threats he had just made against a therapist other than Guerzon, and reviewed his case history. Mot. Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 13, 14; Mot. Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 7, 14; Opp'n Ex. M. Two other physicians confirmed the necessity of Maidy's commitment, which was further confirmed when, shortly after he was committed, Maidy's psychiatrist invoked her duty to warn Guerzon that Maidy posed a threat to Guerzon's safety. Mot. Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17. Finally, Reynolds and Derby deliberately chose a more cumbersome route toward psychiatric commitment, one that required a neutral magistrate to review their petition, thus forgoing their option to file a report that would itself have been a sufficient basis under Maryland law to have Maidy transported for evaluation. Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. § 10-622(b)(1), § 10-623(a).
Nothing in Maidy's allegations approaches gross negligence, malice, or action outside the scope of their employment on the part of Reynolds or Derby, and Maidy does not argue that additional discovery would enable him to raise a genuine dispute on these points. Accordingly, Reynolds and Derby are entitled to summary judgment on counts 2 and 7 under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56(e).
In addition, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment simply do not lie against Reynolds and Derby on the basis of Maidy's involuntary commitment in January 1998. Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 723, 664 A.2d 916, 927 (1995).
Sovereign immunity bars not only Maidy's direct claims against the state in counts 8 and 9 but also count 7 as framed in the original complaint, because the state would pay any mere negligence claims against state personnel for actions made within the scope of their employment. Md. Code Ann., State Gov't. § 12-104; Md. Code Ann., Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-522. This provides a second ground for dismissal of count 7.
Maidy has moved for transfer of count 7 back to the Health Claims Arbitration Office. For the reasons already given, see supra n. 5, the motion will be denied.
C. Guerzon
Maidy cannot maintain a negligence action against a state employee (count 1) in federal court, because Maryland would pay the judgment. See supra n. 8. Guerzon is entitled to summary judgment on count 1, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56(e).Maidy's claims against Guerzon in count 2 have been mooted as he does not reassert them against her in the proposed amended complaint. Accordingly the motion to dismiss count 2 is likewise moot.
Maidy's claims for invasion of privacy or breach of client confidentiality in the original complaint (count 3) are based on Guerzon's reports to her superiors and to police officers. He abandons these claims in the proposed amended complaint, in which he asserts similar claims based on different facts, an alleged disclosure to patrons of a pub in Columbia. Accordingly count 3 of the original complaint has been mooted and the motion to dismiss it is likewise moot.
To the extent that Maidy brings his claims of malicious prosecution (counts 4 and 5) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are mooted by his failure to reassert them in the proposed amended complaint, and the motion to dismiss them is likewise moot.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution at common law (counts 4-5), Maidy must, inter alia, show that the prosecution in question terminated in his favor. "[T]ermination in favor of the accused, other than by acquittal, is not sufficient to meet the requirements of an action for malicious prosecution if the charge was withdrawn or the prosecution abandoned "pursuant to an agreement of compromise with the accused,". . . or because new proceedings have been instituted." State v. Meade, 101 Md. App.512, 531, 647 A.2d 830, 839 (1994) (citations omitted). By Maidy's own account, the state prosecutor issued a nolle prosequi on Guerzon's first case against Maidy because a condition of Maidy's probation recently imposed in other proceedings (a separate criminal case against him) required him to have no contact with Guerzon. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 39; Mot. Ex. 3, Attachment. The later charges against Maidy, also by his own account, were dismissed as part of a compromise in which he agreed to move out of Howard County. Opp'n Ex. A at ¶ 13. Under these circumstances, the prosecutions of which Maidy complains cannot be said to have terminated in his favor. Maidy submits nothing to raise a genuine dispute as to any of the relevant facts, and does not argue that he needs additional discovery in order to do so. Accordingly Guerzon is entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claims (counts 4 and 5).
Guerzon argues that Maidy's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 6) should be dismissed on the basis of state statutory immunity and because Maidy has failed to state a claim for the tort. Guerzon is not entitled to dismissal on the first basis, because Maidy has stated a claim that Guerzon was acting outside the scope of her employment. Md. Code Ann., Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b); Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 12-101. Maryland's test for "determining if an employee's tortious acts were within the scope of his employment is whether they were in furtherance of the employer's business and were `authorized' by the employer," in the sense that they were "incident to the performance of the duties entrusted" to the employee by the employer. Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 255, 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991) (citations omitted). According to Maidy, despite their therapist-patient relationship, Guerzon kissed and held him in her car outside his home and her home, and discussed the prospect of their marriage. After he had been ordered by the state court to avoid "adverse contact" with her as a condition of his probation, Mot. Ex. A at ¶ 39; Mot Ex. 3, Attachment, he says she followed him toward his home to bother him and sat outside his home in a car, watching it. Finally, he says she disclosed his former status as her patient for mental-health treatment to patrons of a bar.
Because of this finding, I need not reach Maidy's claim that Guerzon acted with malice in the statutory sense. Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 163, 725 A.2d 549, 559 (1999).
The alleged conduct does not fall within the scope of Guerzon's employment. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1352 (4th Cir. 1995) (ruling that the location and timing of an employer's sexual assaults on an employee, in the workplace and on working hours, placed the assaults within the scope of his employment); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that a therapist acted outside the scope of his federal government employment when he seduced a patient) (applying South Carolina law); Doe v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (D.S.C. 1984) (same); Doe v. Swift, 570 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Ala. 1990) (reviewing cases and ruling that therapist-patient sex is outside the scope of the former's employment); cf. Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 72, 729 A.2d 376, 383 (1999) (finding that workplace location and work-hours timing were key factors in determining whether sexual harassment by a doctor was "in the practice of medicine" for purposes of statute governing removal of medical license). See also Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. at 254, 587 A.2d at 470 (noting that the Maryland Tort Claims Act, in a prior form, incorporates the common-law concept of the scope of one's employment). But see, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that therapist-patient sex was within the scope of the therapist's employment under the Federal Tort Claims Act) (applying Washington law). Accordingly Guerzon is not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of immunity.
Guerzon also argues that Maidy has failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To do so, Maidy must show that Guerzon's conduct was intentional or reckless, that it was extreme and outrageous, that Maidy suffered severe emotional distress, and that the emotional distress and outrageous conduct were causally connected. Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 733, 602 A.2d 1191, 1216 (1992). For present purposes I will assume without deciding that Guerzon's alleged conduct, of a therapist to a patient with severe mental illness, satisfies the first two elements. Cf. Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 652-56, 584 A.2d 69, 72-76 (1991) (ruling that allegations of sexual relations between a marriage counselor and a patient were sufficient to state a claim on these elements); Homer v. Long, 90 Md. App. 1, 3, 12-13, 599 A.2d 1193, 1193-94, 1198 (1992). I have serious doubts that Maidy can state a claim on the latter two elements. In general his own account of events shows little evidence of severe emotional distress; he claims that his commitment in January 1998 was not necessary and was procured only by Guerzon's dishonesty. If I accept, on the other hand, that the commitment was necessary, he can establish a prima facie case on the element of severe emotional distress. However, Maidy had long-term mental illness, which had required weeks of in-patient psychiatric treatment only a few months before. He has shown little to support the claim of a causal link between his commitment and the alleged conduct by Guerzon. However, as discovery will be proceeding on other claims, I will permit the claim to proceed for the present.
Guerzon's only defense on Maidy's battery claim (count 10) is statutory immunity. For the reasons given in discussing count 6, I will deny the motion to dismiss this claim. However, I deem the claim to be superseded by the amended complaint.
The defendants have moved to dismiss Maidy's defamation claim under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state common law. Mot. at ¶¶ 4, 12. Maidy claims that Guerzon defamed him in communications to her professional supervisors and to the police, the latest of which, under either complaint, occurred in May 1999. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Maidy's defamation claim fails as a matter of law. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Construed as a common-law claim for defamation, Maidy's original complaint was filed well after Maryland's one-year statute of limitations had passed, Md. Code Ann., Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-105, and so it too fails as a matter of law. Accordingly Guerzon is entitled to dismissal with prejudice of count 11 of the original complaint.
Maidy's claims that Guerzon also defamed him in communications to pub patrons in Columbia were introduced only in the proposed amended complaint, and I will address them in Part III.
III. Amended Complaint A. The State
I have dismissed counts 8 and 9 of the original complaint, against the state, with prejudice, and Maidy will not be permitted to assert them in the amended complaint.
B. Reynolds and Derby
I have likewise dismissed both count 2, as it sounds in negligence against Reynolds and Derby, and count 7, with prejudice. Maidy will not be permitted to assert them again in his amended complaint.
For actions arising out of their treatment of Maidy in a state hospital while he was a prisoner, Reynolds and Derby are entitled to claim qualified immunity from Maidy's federal claim (count 13). See Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1115 (4th Cir. 1996) (treating psychiatrist who treated prisoners in a mental health facility as a government official with qualified immunity); see also Greenwood v. State of New York, 163 F.3d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that psychiatrists at a state hospital had qualified immunity from § 1983 claims). Maidy's efforts to overcome this barrier are unavailing, as the proposed amended complaint simply does not add any facts to support the claim that either Reynolds or Derby did anything wrong. Maidy did have a clearly established constitutional right to be free from seizure without "some demonstration of overtly dangerous behavior." Ransom v. Baltimore County, 111 F. Supp.2d 704, 709 (D.Md. 2000) (citation omitted). However, the reasonableness of their reliance on multiple sources of information in forming the belief that Maidy was dangerous entitles Reynolds and Derby to qualified immunity from Maidy's § 1983 claim (count 13). See Hogan, 85 F.3d at 1115 n. 2 (ruling that a state psychiatrist was entitled to rely on the uncontradicted information available to him). Cf. S. P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 265-68 (4th Cir. 1998); Ransom, 111 F. Supp.2d at 709; cf. also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (""[T]he Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised."" (citation omitted)). Finally, in the absence of new facts to support a finding that Derby and Reynolds erred, simply recasting theories of relief and adding claims under the Maryland Declaration of Rights is unavailing. Accordingly Maidy will not be permitted to reassert these claims (counts 2, 7, 13, and 15) in the amended complaint.
C. Guerzon
The proposed amended complaint does not introduce new allegations that could cure the fundamental legal defects of Maidy's malicious-prosecution claims (counts 4 and 5). Therefore, his motion for leave to amend will be denied as to counts 4 and 5 on the grounds of futility. The motion for leave to amend will be granted as to Maidy's other claims against Guerzon (counts 1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 14), and Guerzon will be directed to submit a response to the amended complaint within fourteen days.
I have reviewed the new factual allegations in the proposed amended complaint. Most are simply amplifications of claims of which the defendants were fairly on notice. See Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1497. However, Maidy will not be permitted to maintain any new claims based on his alleged arrest and detention in February 1998, as those claims are time-barred and the defendants were not on notice of them. Maidy will accordingly be denied leave to amend his complaint by adding paragraph 58 of the proposed amended complaint.
A separate order implementing these rulings is being entered herewith.
ORDER
In accordance with the preceding opinion, it is this 23rd day of July 2001, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ordered that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Transfer (Docket # 14) is denied;
2. As to the original complaint (Docket #1), Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 9) is granted as to counts 8, 9, and 11, denied without prejudice as to count 2 against Guerzon, counts 4 and 5 construed as claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and count 3, and denied with prejudice as to counts 6 and 10;
3. As to the original complaint (Docket #1), Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to count 1, count 2 against Reynolds and Derby, counts 4 and 5 construed as common-law claims, and count 7;
4. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Docket #14) is granted as to counts 1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 14, with the exception of ¶ 58 of the proposed amended complaint, and denied as to counts 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, and 15;
5. Plaintiff is ordered to file a revised amended complaint within one week of the date of this order; and
6. Defendant Guerzon has fourteen days from the date of this order to respond to the amended complaint.