Opinion
No. 91-1745
Submitted December 11, 1991 —
Decided February 5, 1992.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 90-62.
Respondent Lawrence V. Cregan is an attorney who has practiced in the Youngstown area for over thirty years. In recent times, he has suffered from a variety of physical and emotional maladies which have affected his ability to practice law.
On November 19, 1990, relator Mahoning County Bar Association filed a complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court ("the board"), alleging that respondent had engaged in a course of conduct which constituted a violation of DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law), 1-102(A)(1) (violating a Disciplinary Rule), and 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
Specifically, respondent was alleged to have used inappropriate and demeaning phrases based on race in referring to two other attorneys, to have made insulting remarks based on race in addressing a counselor who appeared at court to assist a mentally handicapped individual whom respondent had been appointed to represent on a criminal matter, and to have made a barrage of harassing and threatening telephone calls to employees of the Parkview Counseling Center which had been assisting the same mentally handicapped client. While the precise details of respondent's vocabulary and phraseology as later established at hearing are not amenable to full exposition in an opinion of this court, suffice it to say that he would have been challenged to find more offensive language or to have found more ways to utilize in his discourses a well-known adjective which refers to sexual intercourse.
Respondent did not limit his expression of outrage to words. Over three months later and after the criminal case was dismissed, he caused a subpoena to be issued to the counselor, purportedly in connection with the criminal case, requiring her appearance at the offices of a court reporter for a deposition. No legitimate reason for this subpoena was proffered, leading to the conclusion that its sole purpose was to harass the counselor.
A panel of the board ultimately conducted a hearing on these allegations against respondent and concluded in its report that respondent had in fact engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). The panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio. The panel also recommended that, prior to applying for reinstatement, respondent be required to show that he had undertaken a substantial program of therapy under the supervision of a psychiatrist. The board adopted the panel's findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation.
Roth, Stephens, Blair, Roberts Co., L.P.A., and Richard B. Blair; Comstock, Springer Wilson and David Comstock, Jr., for relator.
Charles W. Kettlewell and Mark H. Aultman, for respondent.
The record demonstrates that, at times, respondent is completely out of control, apparently secondary to his often-diagnosed condition of bipolar affective disorder (commonly known as "manic-depressive" illness). His condition has been further complicated by a series of strokes, leaving respondent with the apparent inability to realize the full seriousness of his problems and to treat the problems with a consistent regimen of medication. As a result, the record clearly shows that respondent is not able to practice law at this time.
While this matter could have been handled via a mental illness suspension under Gov.Bar R. V(12)(b), the seriousness of respondent's misconduct warrants disciplinary action as pursued here. We agree that respondent is guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(5) as found by the board.
However, given our earlier rulings in Bar Assn. of Greater Cleveland v. Milano (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 86, 9 OBR 315, 459 N.E.2d 496, and Columbus Bar Assn. v. Riebel (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 290, 23 O.O.3d 279, 432 N.E.2d 165, we believe that an indefinite suspension from the practice of law is inappropriate. Instead, we order a one-year suspension from the practice of law, but we will not consider respondent's reinstatement to the practice of law in Ohio except upon the following conditions:
1. Respondent must show that he has undertaken a substantial program of therapy under the supervision of a psychiatrist;
2. Respondent must not terminate his participation in such a program until he has demonstrated to the satisfaction of this court that he is no longer in need of such therapy;
3. Respondent must demonstrate an ability and a willingness to take and continue taking such medications as are deemed appropriate by his treating psychiatrist; and,
4. Respondent must serve an additional one-year period of probation commencing with the date of his reinstatement, during which year his compliance with the above conditions and with the Disciplinary Rules in general will be closely monitored as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(23).
Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for a period of one year, with reinstatement subject to the above conditions. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
SWEENEY, Acting C.J., HOLMES, DOUGLAS, YOUNG, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.
G. GARY TYACK, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for MOYER, C.J.
WILLIAM W. YOUNG, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, J.