Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-5656 (MLC).
June 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons stated, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. The motion will be granted insofar as it seeks the dismissal of the requests for injunctive relief by plaintiff Anthony Mahan ("Mahan"). It, however, will be denied as to Mahan's excessive force claims against defendants Lt. Froman ("Froman"), Sgt. Schaffer ("Schaffer"), SCO Burnett ("Burnett"), SCO Causey ("Causey"), and SCO Verdier ("Verdier") as well as his request for punitive damages against these Correctional Officer Defendants.
The Court refers to these five defendants as the "Correctional Officer Defendants."
BACKGROUND
Mahan is a state prisoner in the custody of the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC"). (Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. received 10-25-01 ("Defs.' Br.") at 6.) On January 26, 1998, Mahan was confined at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey. (Id.) Mahan is currently incarcerated at Northern State Prison in Newark, New Jersey (Letter from Anthony Mahan filed 12-5-01 ("12-5-01 Letter")), and, at the time of his Complaint, he was imprisoned at East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey. (Verified Compl. ¶ 2a.) Mahan alleges that on January 26, 1998, while on his way to the recreation yard, Burnett punched him in the face and knocked him down a flight of stairs. (Id. ¶ 3.) Causey, Verdier, Schaffer, and Froman allegedly joined in the assault against Mahan while he was down and began punching, kicking, and "stumping" him for no apparent reason. (Id.) Mahan claims he sustained multiple injuries from this attack, including the following: (1) a "busted forehead;" (2) a laceration on the inside of his mouth; (3) bruises to both shoulders; and (4) a bruise to the lower-middle part of his back. (Id.) Mahan was then taken to the hospital for medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 4.)Mahan was placed in detention following this medical treatment and served with a disciplinary charge for assaulting Burnett and disrupting the orderly running of the prison. (Id. ¶ 5.) The disciplinary charge and supporting documentation state that Mahan struck Burnett in the chest and shoulder areas with a closed fist as they were descending the stairs and that both Mahan and Burnett fell down the stairs while Burnett was attempting to restrain Mahan. (Aff. of Katherine M. Brooks filed 10-24-01 ("10-24-01 Brooks Aff."), Aff. of Jan Troy dated 6-8-00 ("Troy Aff.") Ex. C: Disciplinary Report dated 1-27-98; Adjudication dated 1-30-98 ("1-30-98 Adjudication"); Pl.'s Appeals of Disciplinary Decision dated 1-30-98 2-15-98 ("Appeals"); Dispositions of Disciplinary Appeals dated 2-3-98 2-9-98 ("Appeal Dispositions").) Mahan denied the charges against him, arguing that Burnett attacked him. (See generally Troy Aff. Ex C; Verified Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5.) On January 30, 1998, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Oszvart found Mahan guilty of assaulting Burnett. (1-30-98 Adjudication.) Mahan was sanctioned to 15 days detention, 180 days administrative segregation, and 180 days loss of commutation time. (Id.; Verified Compl. ¶ 6.) Mahan filed an administrative appeal of this determination, but Donald Mee ("Mee"), Assistant Superintendent of New Jersey State Prison, upheld the finding of guilt and the corresponding sanctions. (Appeals; Appeal Dispositions.) Mahan alleges that he "filed written complaints to the New Jersey Attorney General (then headed by Peter Verniero), the Mercer County Prosecutor, and to Department of Corrections Officials, to no avail, to cover-up the illegal acts of the guards directly involved in the beating of Plaintiff." (Verified Compl. ¶ 7.)
The Court received Mahan's two-count Verified Complaint, with an affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, on December 6, 1999. The Verified Complaint named as defendants: (1) John Farmer ("Farmer"), then-Attorney General of the State of New Jersey; (2) Daniel G. Gianquinto ("Gianquinto"), Mercer County Prosecutor; (3) Jack Terhune, then-NJDOC Commissioner ("Terhune"); (4) Debbe E. Faunce ("Faunce"), Internal Affairs Administrator for the NJDOC; (5) Roy Hendricks ("Hendricks"), Administrator of New Jersey State Prison; (6) Froman; (7) Schaffer; (8) Burnett; (9) Causey; and (10) Verdier. (See generally id.) Mahan seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages from Farmer and Gianquinto, and punitive damages from Terhune, Faunce, Hendricks, Froman, Schaffer, Burnett, Causey, and Verdier. (Id. ¶¶ 15-22.) The Court entered an Order on April 5, 2000, which,inter alia, allowed Mahan to proceed in forma pauperis, directed the Clerk to file the Verified Complaint, and ordered that the claims asserted against Gianquinto and the conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) be dismissed without prejudice. (Order filed 4-5-00 at 2-3.)
Defendants moved for summary judgment as to the remaining claims on July 7, 2000 (Notice of Mot. filed 7-7-00.) They asserted that: (1) the force used against Mahan was at most de minimis and thus not actionable; (2) Mahan failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act; (3) Farmer, Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce are entitled to summary judgment because Mahan's claims against them do not allege personal conduct sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"); (4) Farmer, Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce are entitled to summary judgment because they were not deliberately indifferent to any known risk of harm to Mahan; and (5) Mahan's claims against Farmer, Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce in their official capacities cannot be sustained because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. received 7-6-00 ("Defs.' Initial Mot. Br.") at 7-23.) The Court filed a Memorandum and Order on January 26, 2001 granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion ("1-26-01 Memorandum and Order"). (Mem. Order filed 1-26-01 at 1, 22-24.) The Court granted defendants' motion as to: (1) all claims for damages against Farmer and (2) any claims for damages against Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce to the extent these three defendants are named in their official capacities. (Id. at 22-23.) The Court denied defendants' motion as to: (1) all claims against Froman, Schaffer, Burnett, Causey, and Verdier; (2) any claims for damages against Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce insofar as they are named in their individual capacities; and (3) any claims for injunctive relief against Farmer, Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce. (Id. at 22-24.)
Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on June 15, 2001 (Notice of Mot. filed 6-15-01), arguing that: (1) Mahan's excessive force claims against Froman, Schaffer, Burnett, Causey, and Verdier should be dismissed because (a) the Court cannot consider any evidence that would be inconsistent with the disciplinary decision of the prison hearing officer rendered in connection with the January 26, 1998 occurrence, and (b) Mahan fails to adduce evidence of injuries that would support a reliable inference of the wanton infliction of pain; (2) Mahan's disciplinary due process claim should be dismissed because he was afforded all the process due him in his prison disciplinary hearing; (3) Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce are entitled to summary judgment because Mahan's claims against them do not allege personal conduct sufficient to state a claim under section 1983; and (4) Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce are entitled to summary judgment because they were not deliberately indifferent to any known risk of harm to Mahan. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. received 6-15-01 ("Defs.' Second Mot. Br.") at 12-30.) The Court granted this motion in part and denied it in part in a Memorandum and Order filed on August 31, 2001 ("8-31-01 Memorandum and Order"). (Mem. Order filed 8-31-01 at 18-19.) The Court granted the motion as to all claims for damages against Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce in their individual capacities. (Id. at 19.) The motion was denied as to: (1) all claims against Froman, Schaffer, Burnett, Causey, and Verdier; and (2) any injunctive relief claims against Farmer, Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce. (Id.)
Defendants filed this third summary judgment motion on October 24, 2001. (Notice of Mot. filed 10-24-01.) Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). (Pl.'s Br. at 12-19.) They further argue that: (1) the excessive force claims against the Correctional Officer Defendants must be dismissed because Mahan fails to prove that these particular defendants acted with the necessarily culpable state of mind, as well as that he suffered sufficiently serious injuries; (2) Mahan's requests for injunctive relief must be dismissed due to his failure to meet the prerequisites for injunctive relief; and (3) the requests for punitive damages are inappropriate because of the lack of any evidence that defendants acted with the requisite state of mind for the recovery of punitive damages. (Id. at 19-28.)
Mahan sought an extension of time to respond to this third summary judgment motion. (Letter from Anthony Mahan filed 11-28-01.) An Order was filed on December 12, 2001 granting Mahan's request, setting briefing schedules, and adjourning the motion to January 22, 2002. (Order filed 12-12-01.) Mahan never filed any opposition to this motion.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the non-moving party must present evidence that establishes that a genuine issue of material fact exists, making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial. Id. at 324;Jersey Cent. Power Light Co. v. Lacey Township, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). A non-moving party may not rely on mere allegations; it must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Verified pleadings, in addition to such submissions as affidavits, may be considered on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., 11 James Wm. Moore et al.,Federal Practice and Procedure § 56.14[1][a] nn. 3-4 (3d. ed. 2002).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The role of the judge at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "By its very terms, the standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 247-48. Material facts are only those facts that might affect the outcome of the action under governing law. Id. at 248; Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 1991). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
In order to state a valid civil rights claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or the laws of the United States. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)); Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). Defendants do not deny that the operation of a state prison constitutes state action under section 1983. Therefore, the Court now examines the arguments raised by the defendants in their moving brief.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
I. Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force
The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials performing discretionary functions from damages claims when their conduct "`does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.'" Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 377 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity shields officials from the burdens of litigation and not merely from liability itself. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (citingMitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). A court therefore should resolve the question of qualified immunity at the "`earliest possible stage in litigation.'" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)); see also, e.g., Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136.
A court must analyze qualified immunity claims under a two-step process. The Supreme Court's recent discussion of qualified immunity in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) stressed the importance of following the correct method in examining such claims, id. at 200-09. The Saucier decision, emphasized by defendants (Pls.' Br. at 12-19), applied the qualified immunity doctrine to a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, id.
First, "the court must determine whether the facts, taken in the light must favorable to the plaintiff, show a constitutional violation." Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136; see also, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 ("Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." (citingSiegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). The court must not merely "assum[e] without deciding, this preliminary issue" of whether the plaintiff presents a cognizable constitutional claim.Donahue, 280 F.3d at 378 (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232);see also, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Because the law develops "from case to case," the refinement of legal principles may be hindered if the court does not examine whether the plaintiff sufficiently asserts a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
The second step constitutes the focus of the qualified immunity inquiry. If the evidence is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, it must be ascertained whether the relevant constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02; Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136-37; McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1543 (2002). The court must conduct a particularized inquiry, focusing on the understanding of the reasonable government official. See, e.g., Saucier, 553 U.S. at 201-02. A right was clearly established if "it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)); see also, e.g., Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136-37; McLaughlin, 271 F.3d at 571 (quoting Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)). When the issue of qualified immunity is raised by the defendant through a summary judgment motion, the court must ascertain the reasonable official's understanding "in the factual scenario established by the plaintiff." Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136. The defendant may challenge the plaintiff's factual account, but any such factual disputes must be resolved at trial. Id. at 137.
Defendants do not expressly frame their arguments in terms of this two-step analysis. (Defs.' Br. at 12-19.) They, however, contend, without any specific reference to the qualified immunity doctrine, that Mahan fails to produce sufficient evidence that the Correctional Officer Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the use of excessive force. (Id. at 19-24.) They further assert that the Correctional Officer Defendants' actions did not violate any clearly established rights. (Id. at 12-19.) The Court considers these arguments in turn, starting, as we must, with whether Mahan's excessive force claim sufficiently states an Eighth Amendment violation for purposes of this motion for summary judgment.
Defendants also argue that Farmer, Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.' Br. at 18-19.) The Court, however, has already dismissed all claims for damages against these four defendants, whether sued in their individual or official capacities. ((1-26-01 Mem. Order at 22-23; 1-26-01 Mem. Order at 18-19.) We therefore need not address whether they are also entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force
This Court has previously discussed the law governing Eighth Amendment excessive force claims in its 8-31-01 Memorandum and Order (8-31-01 Mem. Order at 8-13) and 1-26-01 Memorandum and Order (1-26-01 Mem. Order at 7-10). Defendants do not challenge the correctness of this law, and the Court therefore continues to apply the same legal principles.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the state's imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. This prohibition draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). "After conviction, the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive protection in cases where an inmate challenges a prison official's use of force as excessive and unjustified." Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000). An inmate must satisfy both a subjective and an objective component under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Concepcion v. Morton, 125 F. Supp. 2d 111, 121-23 (D.N.J. 2000) (Wolfson, M.J.).
The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides as follows:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
A plaintiff meets the subjective prong by showing that the officials "applied force `maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,' or . . . that officials used force with `a knowing willingness that [harm] occur.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994) (citations omitted). The central question therefore is "`whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Id. (quotingHudson, 503 U.S. at 7). A court should consider five non-exclusive factors in determining whether a prison official has acted in good faith or with a malicious and sadistic intention:
(1) "the need for the application of force"; (2) "the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used"; (3) "the extent of injury inflicted"; (4) "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them"; and (5) "any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response."Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)); see also, e.g., Concepcion, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 122. The objective prong requires a plaintiff to show that the officials' conduct do not, given the particular context, satisfy "`contemporary standards of decency.'" Hudson, 403 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)); see also, e.g., Concepcion, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23.
Defendants argue that, according to the record, the Correctional Officer Defendants acted in good faith in their encounter with Mahan. (Defs.' Br. at 24.) They assert that Mahan fails to show that the Correctional Officer Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and that his injuries were sufficiently serious. (Id.) Defendants, however, merely reiterate arguments made in their two previous summary judgment motions. (Defs.' Second Mot. Br. at 12-22; Defs.' First Mot. Br. at 7-12.) They do so while presenting the affidavits and other documentation they submitted in support of their second summary judgment motion. (See Troy Aff. Exs.; 10-24-01 Brooks Aff. Exs: Aff. of SCO C. Burnett dated 6-8-01 ("Burnett Aff."), Aff. of SCO T. Causey dated 5-22-01 ("Causey Aff."), Aff. of Debbe E. Faunce dated 5-4-01, Aff. of Lt. E. Froman dated 5-22-01 ("Froman Aff."), Aff. of Sgt. G. Shafer dated 5-22-01 ("Shafer Aff."), Aff. of Jack Terhune dated 6-8-01, Aff. of SCO J. Verdier dated 5-22-01 ("Verdier Aff.").) The Court, in its 8-31-01 Memorandum and Order and 1-26-01 Memorandum and Order, refused to grant summary judgment on the basis of this record and these arguments. (8-31-01 Mem. Order at 8-13; 1-26-01 Mem. Order at 7-10.) Relying on these previous rulings (8-31-01 Mem. Order at 8-13; 1-26-01 Mem. Order at 7-10.), the Court again rejects defendants' arguments and finds that summary judgment in their favor is inappropriate.
Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the allegedly culpable state of mind of Mahan's alleged attackers. "Summary judgment in support of a defendant is not appropriate if `it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to a plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.'" Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106 (quotingWhitley, 475 U.S. at 322). Burnett, Causey, Schaffer, and Verdier do aver that Mahan assaulted Burnett without provocation and that they responded by using no more force than was reasonably necessary to restrain the inmate. (Burnett Aff. ¶¶ 5-10; Causey Aff. ¶¶ 5-10; Schafer Aff. ¶¶ 4-9; Verdier Aff. ¶¶ 5-10.) But Mahan clearly alleges in his Verified Complaint that the Correctional Officer Defendants attacked him for no apparent reason. (Verified Compl. ¶ 3.) Burnett allegedly knocked him down a flight of stairs, and, while he was still on the floor, Causey, Verdier, Schaffer, and Froman allegedly punched, kicked, and stomped on him. (Id.) Mahan alleges he suffered various injuries, requiring medical treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Mahan's medical records, submitted by defendants, provide additional evidence of non-superficial injuries. (See Troy Aff. Ex. D: Medical Progress Notes ("Progress Notes"), Emergency Medical Incident Report ("Incident Report").) A reasonable trier-of-fact could find that Froman, Schaffer, Burnett, Causey, and Verdier acted not merely in good faith to maintain discipline but rather out of malice for the very purpose of causing harm. See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 109. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mahan, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the guards acted in a non-malicious fashion.
The Court also rejects defendants' argument based on the alleged insufficiency of Mahan's injuries. A showing of "significant" or "serious" injury is not necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Id. at 107 (citingHudson, 503 U.S. at 7). "Where the force is `repugnant to the conscience of mankind,' even a de minimis use of force could be constitutionally significant" because contemporary standards of decency are always violated "when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm." Id. at 107-08 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). The Verified Complaint and the submissions of the defendants raise genuine issues of material fact over whether the alleged unprovoked attack by the Correctional Officer Defendants on Mahan was contrary to the conscience of mankind. Even if such an alleged assault did not infringe fundamental principles of decent behavior, the evidence at least indicates a dispute over whether Mahan's alleged injuries were actually de minimis. Mahan received medical treatment following the alleged incident. (Verified Compl. ¶ 4; Progress Notes; Incident Report.) He allegedly sustained: (1) a "busted" forehead; (2) a laceration in his mouth; (3) shoulder bruises; and (4) a bruise on his back. (Verified Compl. ¶ 3.) The medical records confirm that Mahan suffered various injuries, including lacerations to his head, requiring five stitches, and to his gums. (Progress Notes; Incident Report.)
The Court must deny defendants' motion insofar as it is based on the alleged insufficiency of Mahan's excessive force claims against the Correctional Officer Defendants. Because genuine issues of material fact prevent the Court from dismissing these claims based on substantive Eighth Amendment law, Mahan satisfies the first step of the qualified immunity analysis.
B. Clearly Established Rights
The Court must ascertain whether the specific Eighth Amendment right was clearly established at the time of its alleged violation by the Correctional Officer Defendants. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. Defendants apparently argue that the standard governing the level of force permitted in order to defend against and restrain an attacking prisoner has yet to be clearly defined. (Defs.' Br. at 16-19.) Their argument is essentially based on the Court accepting their own account of the January 26, 1998 incident in which the Correctional Officer Defendants responded appropriately to Mahan's unjustified assault. (Id.)
This Court cannot merely accept defendants' account of the incident. The Court must base its clearly established rights inquiry, at least in the summary judgment context, on "the factual scenario established by the plaintiff." Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136. Mahan alleges that Burnett punched and knocked him down the stairs and the subsequent attacks by the Correctional Officer Defendants occurred "for no apparent reason." (Verified Compl. ¶ 3.) The Court therefore rejects, for purposes of this motion, the defendants' assertion that Mahan "has not come forward with any proof that his injuries were caused by an unprovoked `attack' upon him by the defendants." (Defs.' Br. at 16.)
Defendants' assertion appears based, at least in part, on a mistaken understanding of the preclusive effect of the disciplinary decision against Mahan under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Id. at 17-18.) Purporting to rely on the Court's 8-30-01 Memorandum and Opinion (id.), they contend that the hearing officer's finding that Mahan committed assault prevents Mahan from claiming that the Correctional Officer Defendants "were doing anything other than defending themselves from [his assault]" (id. at 18). The Court, however, actually rejected this understanding of the Heck doctrine in the 8-31-01 Memorandum Opinion. (8-31-01 Mem. Order at 10-12.) The appropriate inquiry under Heck is not an examination of whether the alleged facts are inconsistent with the disciplinary proceeding's factual findings, but a comparison between the elements of the disciplinary offense with the elements of the section 1983 claim. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jasurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1997). This Court, based on the apparent elements of the disciplinary assault charge, concluded that disciplinary adjudication does not estop Mahan from pursuing his excessive force claim. (8-30-01 Mem. Order at 11-12.) Mahan may, without impermissibly calling into question the hearing officer's assault determination, attempt to show that the Correctional Officer Defendants were the initial aggressors or that, while he committed the initial attack, the Correctional Officer Defendants responded with unlawful force. (Id. at 11-12.) His verified allegation that Burnett assaulted Mahan, apparently without provocation, is therefore not precluded.
The Correctional Officer Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity given Mahan's account of the incident. The Court acknowledges that the excessive force standards, discussed above, are contextual and fact-specific. Decisions adopting standards to govern the use of force, however, predate the alleged occurrence on January 26, 1998. For instance, the Supreme Court clarified the subjective-objective approach and discussed the issue of de minimis injury in its 1992 decision of Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). Applying these well-established principles, the Court concludes that a reasonable correctional officer would understand the illegality of pushing an inmate down a flight of stairs and then punching, kicking, and stomping on him. Even if the inmate attacked first or responded to the officer's attack with illegal force, a reasonable officer would be aware that the Federal Constitution places certain restrictions on his or her own use of force. The Court cannot agree with defendants' expansive statement that "[r]easonable officers in defendants Burnett, Causey, Verdier, [Schaffer] and Froman's position could have believed that any force utilized when protecting themselves from Mahan's assault were within the bounds of appropriate responses." (Defs.' Br. at 16.) Such an approach would seemingly immunize any resort to force, even if grossly and unreasonably disproportionate under the circumstances. Because the right to be free from excessive force was clearly established, the Court will deny defendants' motion insofar as it is based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
II. Injunctive Relief
Mahan seeks relief enjoining: (1) "The United States Attorney and the Federal Bureau of Investigations to conduct a criminal investigation of all the inmates beatings and deaths of inmates in the New Jersey Department of Corrections as a result of such beatings, particularly of African American inmates, since the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] went into effect;" and (2) "defendants and/or other guards from inflicting any further beating of [Mahan] as retaliation for this lawsuit." (Verified Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Defendants move for the dismissal of Mahan's request for injunctive relief on the grounds that he cannot establish the minimal requirements of irreparable harm and likelihood of success. (Defs.' Br. at 25.)
Injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited circumstances." Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988). Under well-established law governing the granting of preliminary injunctive relief, the Court must consider whether: (1) the party seeking a preliminary injunction has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) the party will be irreparably injured by the denial of the relief; (3) granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citations and quotation omitted). The standard for the award of a permanent injunction appears identical to that for the granting of a preliminary injunction, except that actual success on the merits must be shown rather than a mere likelihood. See, e.g., N.J. Payphone Assoc. v. Town of W.N.Y., 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640 (D.N.J. 2001); Harlem Wizards Entm't Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Church Dwight Co. v. S.C. Johnson Son, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 893, 903 (D.N.J. 1994); Fechter v. HMW Indus., Inc., 879 F.2d 1111, 1116 (3d Cir. 1989)); Guntal Co. v. Steinberg, 843 F. Supp. 1, 9 n. 11 (D.N.J. 1994).
The Third Circuit has made seemingly inconsistent statements regarding the necessity of a showing of irreparable harm in order to obtain a permanent injunction. See, e.g., N.J. Payphone Assoc. v. Town of W.N.Y., 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640-41 (D.N.J. 2001); Cheyenne Sales, Ltd. v. W. Union Fin. Servs. Int'l, 8 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 n. 6 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The Third Circuit noted this apparent conflict in Temple University v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 213-14 nn. 18-19 (3d Cir. 1991), but it found that a three-judge panel could not resolve this problem and that any such resolution was unnecessary under the particular circumstances of the case, id. The Third Circuit has not expressly resolved this conflict since White. See, e.g., N.J. Payphone Assoc., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41. This Court, however, will treat irreparable injury as an essential component of the permanent injunction inquiry. Both the New Jersey district court and the Third Circuit have included irreparable injury among the considerations for permanent relief without even referring to any apparent conflict in the case law. See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (citingBlack Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d at 1477 nn. 2-3));Harlem Wizards Entm't Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (D.N.J. 1997); Guntal Co. v. Steinberg, 843 F. Supp. 1, 9 n. 11 (D.N.J. 1994). As Judge Wolin has indicated, N.J. Payphone Assoc., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41;Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Massaro, No. CIV. A. 97-2022, 2000 WL 1176541, at *17 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2000), the requirement of irreparable injury also implements the general principle that equitable relief is unavailable when legal remedies, such as damages, are sufficient. Without a required showing of irreparable harm, it appears that injunctive relief would become less than an extraordinary remedy.
Mahan does not satisfy the requirements for this extraordinary remedy, even with resolving any genuine issues of material fact in his favor. Mahan cannot obtain injunctive relief against either the United States Attorney or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Neither the United States Attorney nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been named as parties in this matter. Any injunctive relief against the actual defendants is inappropriate because Mahan no longer faces the prospect of irreparable injury absent injunctive relief. The alleged assault occurred at New Jersey State Prison. (See generally Verified Compl.) Mahan, however, was incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison at the time of the submission of his Verified Complaint (id. ¶ 2(a)), and he is currently housed at Northern State Prison (12-5-01 Letter). Because Mahan is no longer located at the scene of the alleged constitutional violation and no additional facts have been alleged, the Court cannot conclude that injunctive relief is necessary to protect him from any imminent harm in the future. The Court therefore will grant defendants' motion as to the issue of injunctive relief and any request for such relief will be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Punitive Damages
The plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was "motivated by evil motive or intent, or . . . [that] it involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others" in order to recover punitive damages in a section 1983 action. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); see also, e.g., Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 470 (3d Cir. 1992). Because the Court has previously granted summary judgment as to any claims for damages against Terhune, Hendricks, and Faunce (1-26-01 Mem. Order at 22-23; 1-26-01 Mem. Order at 18-19), the Court need only consider Mahan's request for $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages from the Correctional Officer Defendants (Verified Compl. ¶ 22). Defendants contend that the record lacks any evidence indicating that the Correctional Officer Defendants acted with the requisite state of mind. (Defs.' Br. at 27-28.) This record, however, reveals genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether the Correctional Officer Defendants were motivated by an evil intent or acted with a reckless or callous indifference to Mahan's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. For instance, the Court has already noted that the Verified Complaint and the materials submitted by defendants indicate that Mahan suffered quite significant injuries as a result of the alleged assault. (Verified Compl. ¶ 4; Progress Notes; Incident Report.) The Court therefore will deny defendants' motion as to Mahan's request for punitive damages from the Correctional Officer Defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Court will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and will deny it in part. It will be granted as to Mahan's requests for injunctive relief, and all such requests therefore will be dismissed with prejudice. The motion will be denied as to Mahan's excessive force claims and request for punitive damages against the Correctional Officer Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE, on this 27th day of June, 2002 ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (no. 53-1 on the docket) be and hereby is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
GRANTED as to all requests for injunctive relief by plaintiff Anthony Mahan;
DENIED as to plaintiff Anthony Mahan's excessive force claims and requests for punitive damages against defendants Lt. Froman, Sgt. Schaffer, SCO Burnett, SCO Causey, and SCO Verdier; andIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Anthony Mahan's requests for injunctive relief be and hereby are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.