Opinion
CV166009606S
04-20-2017
William Maggipinto v. Ulbrich Stainless Steels & Special Metals, Inc
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE #103
John F. Cronan, Judge.
In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff, William Maggipinto, alleges that the defendant, Ulbrich Stainless Steels & Special Metals, Inc., wrongfully discharged him from his employment in violation of the safe workplace public policy that is embodied in General Statutes § 31-49. Section 31-49 provides in relevant part: " It shall be the duty of the master to exercise reasonable care to provide for his servant a reasonably safe place in which to work . . . and fit and competent persons as his colaborers . . ." This section " [reflects] a broad legislative concern for the physical welfare and safety of Connecticut employees." Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 80, 700 A.2d 655 (1997). Consequently, " [i]n Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 243 Conn. at 80, 700 A.2d 655, [our Supreme Court] specifically held that § 31-49 provides a cause of action to an employee who is discharged for refusing to work under conditions that pose a substantial risk of death, disease or serious physical harm and that are not contemplated within the scope of the employee's duties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 808, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). In assessing a Parsons claim, " [t]he only relevant inquiry is whether the employer directed the employee to work in a place or condition that poses an objectively substantial risk of death, disease or serious bodily injury to the employee." Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 82.
Several trial court decisions have directly addressed this inquiry. Specifically, in Anderson v. United Way, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6017085-S (December 27, 2011, Gold, J.) (53 Conn.L.Rptr. 334, 336-37, ) (African-American employee found " hate letter" at employer's workplace and letter conveyed race-based threats of violence while providing a basis to believe that the author could access the workplace), Wells v. Town of Plainfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-02-0068211-S, (March 24, 2003, Foley, J.) (police officers were forced to wear " blood-soaked" uniforms and work with inoperable radios or no radios at all while on duty), and Lopez v. Burris Logistics Co., 952 F.Supp.2d 396, 411-15 (D.Conn. 2013) (employees were forced to remove ice from floor of employer's refrigerated warehouse where they lacked proper footwear and tools), each court determined that the workplace conditions at issue posed a substantial risk of death, disease, or serious bodily injury. See also Moreno v. ABM Sec., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6029357-S, (June 18, 2013, Nazzaro, J.) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether work arrangement posed a substantial risk of harm where employee was a victim of domestic violence and was forced to work with the alleged perpetrator).
By contrast, in Drauss v. Revera Health Sys. Mgmt., LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6006945-S, (May 29, 2015, Fischer, J.) (employee was assaulted by supervisor but was not exposed to any " lingering threats" after the supervisor was terminated), Gonzalez v. Lecoq Cuisine Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-13-6037490-S (April 8, 2015, Sommer, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 208, 209-11, ) (employer's chief executive officer " intimidated, bullied, and humiliated" employee but such conduct posed no physical harm), and Ferrer v. T.L. Cannon Mgmt. Corp., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:08CV1040 (RNC), (D.Conn. March 6, 2009) (coworker unsuccessfully tried to punch employee once and attempted to assault another employee a year prior), each court concluded that the workplace conditions at issue did not pose a substantial risk of death, disease, or serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the relevant case law indicates that whether a workplace condition poses an objectively substantial risk of death, disease or serious bodily harm depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Nevertheless, in Ferrer v. T.L. Cannon Management Corp., supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:08CV1040 (RNC), Judge Chatigny addressed whether the alleged workplace situation that is at issue in the present case could satisfy the Parsons inquiry. At the outset, the court recognized that " [n]o Connecticut case has been cited or found that discusses the issue whether the cause of action recognized in Parsons is available to an employee who is discharged after complaining about a physically threatening co-worker." Id. Moreover, the court went on to reason that " [t]he danger posed to an employee by an unstable co-worker may be sufficiently serious in exceptional cases to satisfy the objective standard established in Parsons ." Id. In so doing, the court concluded that " it is reasonable to assume that the Connecticut Supreme Court would extend the cause of action recognized in Parsons to cases in which an employee is fired after complaining about having to work with such a co-worker." Id. Although the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff had insufficiently alleged a Parsons cause of action, it noted that the plaintiff's " claim would be adequately pleaded if he alleged that the co-worker had a known propensity for violence and specifically threatened him with serious bodily harm." Id. These factors, plus more, are present here.
Although Anderson v. United Way, Inc., supra, 53 Conn.L.Rptr. 334-37, which was decided after Ferrer, addresses this issue to some extent, the factual context of Anderson did not involve a coworker who was making threats of violence against an employee while both were physically present on the premises of the employer's workplace.
In this regard, the plaintiff alleges that Mike Blake solicited to exchange fisticuffs with him, shoved him, and forcefully snatched objects from his grip. Moreover, the defendant's supervisor, Byron Walker, witnessed such conduct. To bolster, Blake's behavior occurred in an occupational context--viz., working on machinery at a metal production facility--that was potentially hazardous in its own right. Lastly, the plaintiff was captive to Blake's conduct because he worked with Blake all day, every day, and--because Blake did not alter his behavior, contrary to his previous promises to the plaintiff--there was an indication that Blake's conduct would persist. " Under these circumstances, common sense and human experience dictate that the plaintiff's assignment . . . could pose a significant threat to the plaintiff's safety and welfare." Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 243 Conn. 85. Thus, the workplace situation that is at issue in the present case could pose an objectively substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The motion to strike count two is denied .
In count three of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently supervised its " employee, " and such negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and a loss of compensation. " Under Connecticut law, an employer may be held liable for the negligent supervision of employees." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 207 n.12, 9 A.3d 347 (2010). " [I]n [a] negligent supervision action, [the] plaintiff must plead and prove that she suffered an injury due to the defendant's failure to supervise an employee whom the defendant had [a] duty to supervise . . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " While no Connecticut case appears to spell out the elements of a claim for negligent supervision, it appears that such a claim must allege an injury in tort. A defendant does not owe a duty of care to protect a plaintiff from another employee's tortious acts unless the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the employee's propensity to engage in that type of conduct . . . Indeed, in order to determine whether a defendant is liable for negligent supervision, courts look to whether a plaintiff can prove the four elements of a standard claim for negligence." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deguzman v. Kramer, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:04CV2064 (JCH), (D.Conn. August 23, 2005).
In count three, the plaintiff does not specify that the employee to which he is referring is, in fact, Blake. Nevertheless, " [t]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties . . . [The] reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 778, 905 A.2d 623 (2006). Here, count three reasonably could be construed to allege that the defendant negligently supervised Blake.
" The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 406, 54 A.3d 553 (2012). With respect to the fourth element, " [h]istorically, emotional distress was not compensated at common law in the absence of physical injury or a risk of harm from physical impact . . . It was not until 1978 that the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978). In Montinieri, and consistently ever since, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that, in order to assert a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff has the burden of pleading that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that the distress, if it was caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miner v. Cheshire, 126 F.Supp.2d 184, 197 (D.Conn. 2000); see also Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 684, 513 A.2d 66 (1986) (concluding that a plaintiff insufficiently alleged an unintentional infliction of emotional distress claim because he failed to allege that his emotional distress exposed him to a risk of illness or bodily harm). By extension, " any allegation of negligent supervision must be accompanied by allegations satisfying the requirements of Morris and Montinieri whenever the only injuries alleged to have resulted from such negligent supervision are emotional rather than physical." Surowiec v. Security Forces, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-95-0547875-S, (May 23, 1995, Sheldon, J.); see also Golnik v. Amato, 299 F.Supp.2d 8, 19 (D.Conn. 2003).
Thus, an allegation of physical injury--or emotional distress that creates a risk of serious physical harm or illness--is essential to a prima facie case of negligent supervision. Here, the plaintiff has failed to allege that he suffered a physical injury as a result of the defendant's alleged negligence. Rather, he merely alleges that he suffered emotional distress, and there is no allegation that such distress exposed him to serious physical harm or illness. Although the plaintiff also alleges that he lost wages and benefits in support of his negligent supervision claim, such pecuniary injuries are unavailing. Therefore, for purposes of his negligent supervision claim, the plaintiff has insufficiently alleged the element of damages. The motion to strike count three is granted .
" [T]he long established common law rule in this state is that in the absence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and [the] defendant, or of an injury to the plaintiff's person or property, a plaintiff may not recover in negligence for a purely economic loss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. O& G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 655-56, 126 A.3d 569 (2015). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that he was employed pursuant to the terms of contract. Rather, the plaintiff has merely alleged that he sustained pure economic losses.