Opinion
Case No. 2019-00426JD
03-20-2020
KELLIE MADYDA, et al. Plaintiffs v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY Defendant
DECISION
{¶1} This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' request to certify their requested class. Plaintiffs are individuals who have identified themselves as a class of persons who from July 2, 2018 until July 2, 2019, paid a $1.50 lamination fee to Defendant for their issued driver's licenses or identification cards (ID cards) for a service that was not performed by Defendant. The Defendant is the Ohio Department of Public Safety which issues all driver's licenses and ID cards in the state of Ohio.
The named Plaintiffs in this case are Kellie Madyda, individually, and as legal representative for E.M., (a minor), David Cornelius, Aaron Hoyt, and Caitlin Rader.
{¶2} On January 24, 2020, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether class certification is appropriate. The Ohio Supreme Court in its seminal class action case, Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., held in its syllabus: "A trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis when determining whether to certify a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23 and may grant certification only after finding that all of the requirements of the rule are satisfied; the analysis requires the court to resolve factual disputes relative to each requirement and to find, based upon those determinations, other relevant facts, and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met." 137 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013-Ohio-4733, 999 N.E.2d 614, paragraph one of the syllabus. The party seeking class certification must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class meets each of the requirements of Civ.R. 23. Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus. Upon review of the evidence and relevant applicable law, the Court finds that class certification is appropriate.
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a reply brief that exceeds the Court's page limitation is DENIED.
Factual Background
{¶3} Prior to July 2, 2018, Deputy Registrars were authorized, pursuant to R.C. 4507.23 and R.C. 4507.50, to collect a $1.50 lamination fee to compensate them for the services of creating, printing, and laminating licenses or ID cards on-site. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) During that time, individuals would obtain their license or ID card at an office of the Deputy Registrar and upon meeting the necessary requirements, Deputy Registrars would create, print, and laminate the license or ID card on-site and provide it to the qualifying individual in-person. Id. at ¶ 11.
Pursuant to the Driver's License Law, Deputy Registrars, acting on behalf of the Registrar of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, are required to issue driver's licenses and other types of licenses which permit the holder to operate motor vehicles. See R.C. 4507.
{¶4} Beginning on July 2, 2018, the procedures used to administer licenses and ID cards changed, and Deputy Registrars stopped creating, printing, and laminating licenses and ID cards on-site. Id. at ¶ 13. Instead, a third-party vendor was hired to create and laminate the licenses and ID cards and mail them to the respective individuals within ten business days of purchase. Id. Although the procedures changed, the legislation in effect between July 2, 2018 and July 2, 2019 authorizing the collection of the lamination fee did not change, and Deputy Registrars continued to collect the $1.50, even though they were no longer performing those services on-site. Id. at ¶ 14.
On July 3, 2019, the legislature modified the statutory language authorizing the lamination fee. Therefore, the class period shall begin on July 2, 2018 (the date upon which the Deputy Registrars changed its procedures) and close on July 2, 2019.
{¶5} As a result, Plaintiffs allege they were improperly charged and paid the $1.50 lamination fee because Deputy Registrars no longer provided the services associated with the fee. Plaintiffs request the Court to find that they have met the necessary requirements to maintain a class action pursuant to Civ.R. 23.
Requirements for Class Certification
{¶6} A party seeking class certification must meet the following requirements before the action may be maintained as a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23: "(1) an identifiable class must exist and the definition of the class must be unambiguous; (2) the named representatives must be members of the class; (3) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (4) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class; (5) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; (6) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (7) one of the three Civ.R. 23(B) requirements must be met." Cullen, 137 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013-Ohio-4733, 999 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 11.
Identifiable Class
{¶7} "An identifiable class must exist before certification is permissible. The definition of the class must be unambiguous." Warner v. Waste Mgt., 36 Ohio St.3d 91, 521 N.E.2d 1091 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. "[T]he requirement that there be a class will not be deemed satisfied unless the description of it is sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member." Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 71-72, 69 N.E.2d 442 (1998) (citations omitted). The class definition "must be precise enough 'to permit identification within a reasonable effort.'" Id. at 72, quoting Warner at 96.
{¶8} Plaintiffs propose that the class be defined as "all those individuals who paid a lamination fee to a Deputy Registrar for the State of Ohio on or after July 2, 2018." However, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' proposed class definition does not account for the situation where the Ohio credential holder (credential holder) is not the payor of the lamination fee (e.g. parent pays the fee for the minor child). Defendant asserts that credential holders who were charged the lamination fee, but did not actually pay the fee, lack standing to be included as members of the class. The Court does not agree. All of the individuals who were issued a credential between July 2, 2018 and July 2, 2019 were required to pay the lamination fee to receive their credential, and simply put, were potentially overcharged $1.50.
{¶9} Alternatively, the Court proposed, at the hearing, that the class definition be modified to account for the situation described by Defendant. Plaintiffs had no objection to the Court's proposal. Accordingly, the Court will modify the definition of the class to account for those individuals who were charged a lamination fee, but the fee was paid for by someone else. The class shall be defined as follows: All individuals who were issued an Ohio credential and were charged a lamination fee that was paid by the Ohio credential holder or paid on the Ohio credential holder's behalf to a Deputy Registrar for the State of Ohio on or after July 2, 2018 until July 2, 2019.
{¶10} The Court finds that under the class definition, the identities of the class members are easily discernable through an inspection of Defendant's records. Barbra Hamilton, Defendant's Senior Financial Manager, testified that Deputy Registrars issued 3,423,315 Ohio credentials where a $1.50 lamination fee was collected. (Hamilton Aff., ¶ 8, ¶ 12-13.) According to Hamilton, when a Deputy Registrar collects payment for the fees associated with issuance of a credential, the recipient of the credential is issued a receipt which bears a transaction number. Id. at ¶ 9-10. That transaction number is stored in a database maintained by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). Id. Hamilton further testified that the BMV maintains records of the names and addresses of individuals who were issued a credential between July 2, 2018 and July 2, 2019, the period Plaintiffs allege the lamination fee was improperly collected. The Court finds that the names of those individuals who are potential members of the putative class can be reasonably identified by searching Defendant's records of the individuals who were issued a credential between July 2, 2018 and July 2, 2019. Accordingly, the Court finds that the class is reasonably identifiable.
Although Hamilton testified, as discussed at the hearing, Hamilton's affidavit accurately reflects her testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, the Court will reference it throughout this Decision.
Class Representatives and Membership
{¶11} In order to establish class membership, it is necessary to demonstrate that "the representative[s] have proper standing. In order to have standing to sue as a class representative, the plaintiff must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class that he or she seeks to represent." Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d at 74, 69 N.E.2d 442. As stated above, the Court finds that the named representatives are members of the class defined above, as they all were issued a credential between July 2, 2018 and July 2, 2019, charged the lamination fee, and either paid the lamination fee or the lamination fee was paid on their behalf.
Numerosity
{¶12} The Court notes that the parties do not dispute that this requirement has been met under Civ.R. 23. The evidence before the Court reveals that Deputy Registrars issued approximately 3,423,315 Ohio credentials between July 2, 2018 and July 2, 2019 where a lamination fee was collected. (Hamilton Aff., ¶ 8, ¶ 12-13.) Therefore, the Court finds that there are more than three million potential class members. Given that the number of potential class members is so large, the Court finds that joinder is impractical. Accordingly, the Court finds that the numerosity requirement has been established.
Commonality
{¶13} Pursuant to Civ.R. 23(A)(2), there must be the presence of "questions of law or fact common to the class." Courts have generally given a permissive application to this requirement. Warner, 36 Ohio St.3d at paragraph three of the syllabus, 521 N.E.2d 1091. It requires a "common nucleus of operative facts." Id. "However, it is not required that all questions of law or fact raised in the dispute be common to all parties." Hamilton at 77.
{¶14} Here, the basis for liability is whether the Deputy Registrars collected a fee for services they were not providing. The Court finds that this is a common factor for all 3,423,315 potential class members. Each class member was purportedly overcharged, and paid, approximately $1.50. Accordingly, the Court finds that the commonality requirement has been established.
Typicality
{¶15} "Under Civ.R. 23(A)(3), the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. The typicality requirement has been found to be satisfied where there is no express conflict between the representatives and the class." Warner, 36 Ohio St.3d at 97-98, 512 N.E.2d 442.
[A] plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory. When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 480, 485, 727 N.E.2d 1265 (2000).
{¶16} The Court finds that the claims of the named class representatives arise from the same course of conduct as the claims of all other class members and are based on the same theory that Deputy Registers collected a $1.50 lamination fee for services they never provided. The Court finds no evidence of a conflict between the class representatives and the members of the class. Accordingly, the Court finds that the typicality requirement has been established.
Fair and Adequate Representation
{¶17} Adequate representation requires the Court to examine: (1) the adequacy of the representative class members themselves; and (2) the adequacy of counsel for the representative class members. Warner at 98. "A representative is deemed adequate so long as his interest is not antagonistic to that of other class members." Marks v. C.P. Chemical Co., Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 203, 509 N.E.2d 1249 (1987), quoting 3B Moore's Federal Practice (1987) 23-188, paragraph 23.07[1]. Regarding the adequacy of counsel requirement,
[t]he issue of whether counsel is competent to handle the action can be the most difficult in the Rule 23 analysis. The fact that an attorney has been admitted to practice does not end the judicial inquiry. An attorney should be experienced in handling litigation of the type involved in the case before class certification is allowed. Close scrutiny should be given to the attorney's qualifications to handle the matter with which he is entrusted.Warner, 36 Ohio St.3d at 98, 521 N.E.2d 1091.
{¶18} The Court finds that there is no evidence that the named class representatives' interests are antagonistic to other class members' interests as everyone stands to potentially recover the same amount. The Court also finds that both DannLaw and Zimmerman Law Offices are adequate counsel. DannLaw is experienced in litigating consumer cases in Ohio. (Plaintiff's Exhibit B.) Zimmerman Law Offices also has extensive experience handling class actions. (Plaintiff's Exhibit C.) Thomas Zimmerman testified that he has over 20 years of experience maintaining class action litigation. Zimmerman also testified that he is willing and able to bear the costs associated with maintaining the class action. Accordingly, the Court finds that the adequate representation requirement has been met.
Civil Rule 23(B) Requirements
{¶19} In order for a class to be certified, it must meet one of the Civ.R. 23(B) requirements. Civ.R. 23(B)(3) requires the trial court to make the following findings: "[F]irst, 'that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members' and, second, 'that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.' This inquiry requires a court to balance questions common among class members with any dissimilarities between them, and if the court is satisfied that common questions predominate, it then should 'consider whether any alternative methods exist for resolving the controversy and whether the class action method is in fact superior.'" Cullen, 137 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013-Ohio-4733, 999 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 29 (citation omitted). "The purpose of Civ.R. 23(B)(3) was to bring within the fold of maintainable class actions cases in which the efficiency and economy of common adjudication outweigh the interests of individual autonomy." Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d at 80, 69 N.E.2d 442.
{¶20} The Court finds that the proposed class certification request meets the requirements of Civ.R. 12(B)(3). As previously discussed, the common question of law affecting every class member is whether Defendant was authorized to collect the $1.50 lamination fee. The validity of the $1.50 lamination fee is the common legal question to each class member. Thus, the Court finds that this common question of law predominates over any questions affecting only individual members.
{¶21} Given that Deputy Registrars issued over three million credentials during the class period, the Court finds that the volume of individual claims makes the class action method a superior means to adjudicate the controversy. Furthermore, each Plaintiff is potentially owed no more than $1.50. The low recovery in this case favors the class action method as the costs to maintain an individual action would likely exceed an individual's recovery. Furthermore, there is no evidence before the Court of any other pending litigation regarding this matter and the Ohio Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over this issue. Also, since Hamilton verified that Defendant maintains records identifying the class members, the Court does not find that this class presents any manageability concerns. Accordingly, the Court finds that the class action procedure is the superior method to adjudicate the claims. Therefore, the Court finds that the class meets the requirements of Civ.R. 23(B)(3).
Defendant cites In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litigation, 214 F.R.D. 614, 617-621 (W.D.Wash.2003) to support their assertion that "miniscule individual recoveries" are fatal to class certification. However, this Court finds that case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case, the court found that it would have been required to make an "extensive inquiry" for each class member to determine the precise amount of a prescription drug product remaining after a specific date. However, the case at bar involves an already ascertained amount of money paid for a specifically identified product. Furthermore, this Court finds that the potential for only a de minimus recovery for each class member does not justify denying certification in this case. See Jerman v. Carlisle, 271 F.R.D. 572, 575-577 (N.D.Ohio.2010). The United States Supreme Court has held that "[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry recoveries into something worth * * * an attorney's labor." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Additionally, the Northern District of Ohio court has noted that other federal courts, including courts in the Sixth Circuit, have previously determined that, when other certification requirements have been met, the class action device is not rendered inferior to individual lawsuits solely because there is a de minimus recovery for each class member. Jerman at 575-577, citing Hernandez v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 406 (N.D.Ill. 2006) (the Court rejected defendant's argument "that the approximate $8.00 per plaintiff recovery for the class versus the $1,000 statutory maximum for an individual plaintiff's action showed that class action was inferior to individual litigation."); see also Felix v. Ganley, 145 Ohio St.3d 329, 2015-Ohio-3430, 49 N.E.3d 1224 (the Court found that some damage by all class members is sufficient).
Appointment of Class Counsel and Class Representatives
{¶22} Plaintiffs seek appointment of DannLaw and Zimmerman Law Offices as class counsel for this case. As discussed above, the Court finds that both DannLaw and Zimmerman Law Offices can adequately represent the interests of the entire class. Accordingly, the Court appoints DannLaw and Zimmerman Law Offices as counsel for the class pursuant to Civ.R. 23(F). The Court also appoints the named Plaintiffs as class representatives.
The Court notes that whether attorney's fees are applicable in this case is an issue that will require briefing in the future. --------
Class Definition
{¶23} As discussed above, the Court herby certifies the class, which is defined as follows: All individuals who were issued an Ohio credential and were charged a lamination fee that was paid by the Ohio credential holder or paid on the Ohio credential holder's behalf to a Deputy Registrar for the State of Ohio on or after July 2, 2018 until July 2, 2019.
Conclusion
{¶24} For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that class certification is appropriate. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) and (B)(3). Therefore, the Court shall certify the class.
/s/_________
DALE A. CRAWFORD
Judge
JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶25} The Court finds that class certification is appropriate. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) and (B)(3). Therefore, the Court certifies the class.
{¶26} Now that the Court has certified the class pursuant to Civ.R. 23(A) and (B)(3), the Court will request that the parties get together in an attempt to develop an agreed statement of facts to be submitted to the Court. The Court is familiar with the facts, and why they matter can be resolved on the merits with an agreed upon statement of facts. The Court does not intend to continue the November 2-4, 2020 hearing on the merits.
/s/_________
DALE A. CRAWFORD
Judge Filed March 20, 2020
Sent to S.C. Reporter 5/12/20