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concluding that defectively covered manhole located more than five feet off the road was not a special defect because "vehicular passengers and other normal users of the roadway were unlikely to encounter it. Only a pedestrian whose destination required him to leave the proximity of the road was ever likely to walk on the manhole."
Summary of this case from City of Arlington v. S.C.Opinion
No. 01-05-00337-CV
Opinion issued March 9, 2006.
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 810,947.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HIGLEY, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Walter Madern, appeals from a judgment of dismissal rendered upon the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction made by appellee, City of Pasadena ("City"). We determine whether the trial court erred (1) by implicitly finding that a manhole in which Madern was injured was not a special defect under the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA"), (2) by implicitly ruling that Madern had not pleaded sufficient facts to confer jurisdiction, (3) by implicitly ruling that Madern could not assert a declaratory-judgment action regarding the constitutionality of the TTCA's special defect and premises defect definitions, (4) by sustaining the City's objection to affidavits authenticating photographs and to the photographs themselves, and (5) by allegedly reviewing the City's plea to the jurisdiction and Madern's motion for new trial in the same manner as a summary judgment. We also determine whether we need to reach Madern's challenge that the trial court erred by dismissing Madern's claims on the implicit ground that section 101.056 of the TTCA preserved the City's governmental immunity. We affirm the judgment in all respects except to the extent that it dismissed Madern's declaratory judgment action, to which extent we reverse the judgment. We remand the cause.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.001-101.109 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
See id. § 101.056 (Vernon 2005).
Facts
In February 21, 2002, Madern was walking along the side of Denkman Street in Pasadena, Texas. He stepped onto a manhole cover, which slipped, causing his right leg to fall into the manhole. Madern testified that the manhole had seemed to be normal before the accident because he walked down Denkman Street "every day." Madern sued the City, alleging that it was negligent in creating the condition that caused his injuries. Madern specifically alleged that the City's governmental immunity from suit and liability was waived under TTCA section 101.022(b) because the manhole constituted a special defect and, in the alternative, sought a declaration that the definition of a premises defect and a special defect was so vague as to be meaningless and unenforceable. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction requesting that the trial court dismiss Madern's claim for negligence because its governmental immunity was not waived. The City alleged in its plea to the jurisdiction that (1) the condition of the manhole did not qualify as a special defect because it did not pose a danger to ordinary users of the roadway and was neither unexpected nor unusual; (2) TTCA section 101.056 precluded waiver of governmental immunity because maintenance of the manhole was a discretionary act; and (3) Madern could not circumvent the City's governmental immunity by requesting a declaratory judgment on whether the definitions of special defect and premises defect were unconstitutionally vague. The City filed a written objection to Madern's Exhibits B and C, included in Madern's opposition to the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The City alleged that these exhibits had not been properly authenticated and were irrelevant. The trial court sustained the City's objections to Exhibits B and C. On February 11, 2005, the trial court granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction, without explaining the basis for its ruling and dismissed both Madern's negligence claim and his declaratory judgment action against the City.
Madern had been walking on the manhole regularly for a five-year period.
The City also alleged in its plea to the jurisdiction that, even if the manhole cover could be construed as a premises defect, rather than a special defect, the City did not actually know of a dangerous condition of the manhole or its cover. However, this argument is not before this Court on appeal for the reasons stated below.
After the City had filed its plea to the jurisdiction on January 5, 2005, Madern filed a second amended petition. After the City had supplemented its plea to the jurisdiction on January 27, 2005, Madern filed his third amended petition. Madern's previous pleadings are not in the record. However, it appears that, when Madern amended his pleading the third time, he omitted premises defect as a basis for waiver of immunity. An amended pleading supplants a prior one. Tex. R. Civ. P. 65. Therefore, Madern's "live" pleading at the time of the trial court's ruling had abandoned the theory of premises defect. See Failing v. Equity Management Corp., 674 S.W.2d 906, 908-09 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (holding that effect of pleading amendment during trial is abandonment of claim).
The photographs were identified individually and sequentially in the record. Exhibits B1, B2, B3, and B4 are collectively referred to herein as Exhibit B. Exhibits C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5 are collectively referred to herein as Exhibit C.
Standard of Review
On appeal, because the question of subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question, we review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). To determine whether a plaintiff has affirmatively demonstrated the court's jurisdiction to hear the case, we consider the facts alleged in the petition and, to the extent that it is relevant to the jurisdictional issue, any evidence submitted by the parties to the trial court. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). We must construe the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor and look to the pleader's intent. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002); Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1989).
Special Defect
In his first point of error, Madern argues that "[t]he [trial] Court erred in ruling that the defective manhole was a premises defect rather than a special defect in response to both Appellee's Plea to the Jurisdiction as well as Appellant's Motion for New Trial." Because the trial court could not have implicitly determined that the manhole was a premises defect for the reasons stated in footnotes four and ten and in our discussions that follow, we construe appellants argument to be that the trial court erred in implicitly ruling that the manhole was not a special defect.
The TTCA waives a governmental unit's immunity from suit and liability for violation of the duty to warn of special defects. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.060(c) (Vernon 2005). To establish liability against a municipality under a special defect theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) that personal injury or death occurred; (2) that it was proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee; (3) that the employee was acting in his scope of employment; (4) that the injury or death was caused by a special defect; (5) that the municipality knew or reasonably should have known of the defect; and (6) that the municipality failed to exercise ordinary care to protect the individual. State Dep't of Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992).
The TTCA does not expressly define special defects, except to state that they include "excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets." See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005); see also Harris County v. Estate of Ciccia, 125 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). The Texas Supreme Court has held that the two examples included in the statute — excavations and obstructions — are not exhaustive and has construed special defects to include other defects of the same kind or class. See City of Grapevine v. Roberts, 946 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1997); see also Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 238-39. However, to be considered a special defect, the defect must be of the same kind or class as excavations or obstructions on a highway, road, or street. Id.; Graf v. Harris County, 877 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that step on path at arboretum was not condition involving excavation or obstruction on highway, road, or street). The defect must present an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways. Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 239 (holding that unmarked culvert 22 feet from roadbed and obscured by vegetation was located far enough from road so as not to be danger to ordinary users of roadway). A condition located so far from the roadway that vehicular passengers and other normal users of the roadway are unlikely to encounter it is not a special defect. Id. at 239. A special defect is distinguished by some unusual quality outside the ordinary course of events. Id. A longstanding, routine, or permanent condition is, therefore, not a special defect. See Estate of Ciccia, 125 S.W.3d at 753-54; Stokes v. City of San Antonio, 945 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
Section 101.022 provides:
(a) If a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.
(b) The limitation of duty in this section does not apply to the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets or to the duty to warn of the absence, condition, or malfunction of traffic signs, signals, or warning devices as is required by Section 101.060.
Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Harris County v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 178-79 (Tex. 1978) (holding that oval-shaped hole six to 10 inches deep and extending across 90 percent of roadway that caused car traveling at 35 miles per hour to flip was special defect); State v. Nichols, 609 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that caved-in portion of highway three to four feet deep and extending across entire highway was special defect); State v. McBride, 601 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that slick, muddy excavation of highway that was so severe that car traveling at less than 35 miles per hour went out of control was special defect); Miranda v. State, 591 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) (holding that flood water two feet deep across highway was special defect); Andrews v. City of Dallas, 580 S.W.2d 908, 909-11 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1979, no writ) (holding that base of traffic signal extending 26 inches above street level and six inches from roadway was special defect); City of Houston v. Jean, 517 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that ditch four feet from unmarked dead end of street at poorly lighted "T" intersection was special defect).
See also, e.g., State Dept. of Highways Pub. Transp. v. Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. 1993) (holding that icy bridge during conditions of precipitation and near-freezing temperatures was not "unexpected and unusual" danger and thus not special defect); Mitchell, 855 S.W.2d at 748 (holding that 15- to 25-foot drop-off along creek bed created by construction of wall to prevent soil erosion was longstanding and permanent condition and not special defect); Villarreal v. State, 810 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (holding that roadway median cut that created condition that allowed motorist to enter exit ramp in wrong direction was permanent condition and thus, not special defect).
Madern contends that the manhole was a special defect because there were no sidewalks and the manhole would, therefore, be encountered by pedestrians walking along the street near the curb. However, the manhole was not in the roadway. It was located more than five feet away from the road, so that vehicular passengers and other normal users of the roadway were unlikely to encounter it. Only a pedestrian whose destination required him to leave the proximity of the road was ever likely to walk on the manhole.
Madern contends that the manhole was related to the roadway because it was the access to the storm sewer, which extended into the street, and it was located next to the storm sewer. However, special defects must unexpectedly and physically impair a normal user's ability to travel on the road. State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999); see, e.g., Morse v. State, 905 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. App-Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (holding that 10-inch drop-off along shoulder that prevented car's left wheels from re-entering roadway once they had slipped off was special defect); Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (holding that ice on bridge during winter was not special defect because it was not unexpected or unusual). The condition presented by the covered manhole was located five feet and four inches from the roadway. Here, Madern was not traveling on the roadway at the time of his accident. In fact, if Madern had walked in the roadway, he would have avoided the manhole.
Madern further argues that the manhole was a special defect because the broken support ring of the manhole is similar to an excavation. Madern relies on Harris County v. Smoker, in which this Court held that an uncovered storm sewer located where a pedestrian would normally walk on an unlighted street without a sidewalk constituted a special defect. Id., 934 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Smoker is distinguishable. Here, the manhole was more than five feet from the roadway and was in its permanent, covered condition. In contrast, the storm sewer in Smoker was extended one and one-half to two feet into the street, and the absence of a storm cover was a temporary condition. Id. The manhole here was covered and was, therefore, a permanent condition. See Mitchell v. City of Dallas, 855 S.W.2d 741, 747-48 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993), aff'd 870 S.W.2d 21(Tex. 1994).
Terry Rinehart, Chief Construction Inspector for the City, testified in his affidavit that the manhole cover weighed 130 pounds and, in addition to the substantial weight of the cover, the manhole was also designed so that the cover fit into a lip inside the manhole, which formed a base support at the bottom of the cover. Thus, the manhole cover was very difficult to displace without the use of mechanical devices or tools.
We hold that the covered manhole was not a special defect. Accordingly, the TTCA did not waive the City's immunity from suit, and the trial court did not err by granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction on Madern's negligence claim.
We overrule Madern's first point of error.
Sufficiency of Madern's Petition
In his second point of error, Madern argues that "[t]he trial court erred to the extent it ruled that [Madern] had not adequately pled [sic] a cause of action for negligence [involving a special defect] against [the City]." Madern also argues in his fifth point of error, in part, that "[a]ppellant Walter Madern's most recent petition alleged sufficient facts to confer jurisdiction. Certainly it cannot be said that it would be impossible to amend the petition to allege sufficient facts to do so." In other words, Madern complains that he adequately pleaded sufficient facts to confer jurisdiction and, alternatively, that the trial court should have given him an opportunity to amend his pleading to demonstrate that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction.
To prevail on a plea to the jurisdiction, the defendant must show an incurable jurisdictional defect apparent from the face of the pleadings, making it impossible for any amendment of the plaintiff's petition to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Bybee v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 331 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. 1960); City of San Angelo v. Smith, 69 S.W.3d 303, 305 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). "[I]f the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend." County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002); Galveston Racquet Club, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 178 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
Because a governmental unit is protected from suit by sovereign immunity, pleadings in a suit against a governmental unit must affirmatively demonstrate, either by reference to a statute or express legislative permission, that the Legislature consented to the suit. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Absent the government's consent to suit, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cause of action. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638.
If a plaintiff pleads facts that affirmatively demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction and such defect is incurable, then the cause is properly dismissed. Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804-05. However, the mere failure of a petition to state a cause of action does not show a want of jurisdiction in the court. Bybee, 331 S.W.2d at 917. If the plaintiff's pleadings are insufficient to demonstrate the court's jurisdiction, but do not affirmatively show incurable defects in jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to amend before dismissal. Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 555; Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 805.
In his third amended original petition, Madern alleged that the condition of the manhole constituted a special defect and that the City had a duty to inspect and to warn him of the dangerous condition or to make the condition reasonably safe. Madern alleged in his petition that the City's immunity was waived under TTCA section 101.022(b), which applies to special defects. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b).
Madern's live petition specifically asserted that the defective manhole cover and support ring constituted a "special defect." No allegation was made in his petition that the dangerous condition of which he complained constituted a premises defect, and hence we need not consider whether Madern pleaded sufficient facts to allege a premises defect. See City of Mission v. Cantu, 89 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.); Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Velasco, 40 S.W.3d 702, 704-705 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (holding that, when plaintiffs did not plead particular claim in petition, unpleaded claim could not be basis for jurisdiction, and unpleaded claim was thus not considered in determining jurisdiction in review of denial of plea to jurisdiction).
We have already held that the manhole was not a special defect. Additionally, given the undisputed evidence regarding the location of the manhole, and that it was not in the road and was covered, we hold that the court did not err in implicitly concluding that Madern's petition was incurable because he could not allege facts that raised a special defect basis for waiver of immunity from suit.
We overrule Madern's second point of error and fifth point of error, to the extent that the his fifth point of error was addressed in this section of the opinion.
Declaratory Judgment Regarding Constitutionality
In his third point of error, Madern argues that "[t]he trial court erred in implicitly ruling that [Madern] was not permitted to assert a cause of action for declaratory judgment that the definition of a `special defect' is unconstitutionally vague." Madern sought a declaration regarding the constitutionality of the TTCA's definitions of the terms "premises defect" and "special defect."
Here, Madern sought declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("DJA"), which is a "remedial" statute designed "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations" and which "is to be liberally construed and administered." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1997). The DJA allows courts to declare whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Id. at § 37.003(a). Such a declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect and has the "force and effect of a final judgment or decree." Id. at § 37.003(b). The DJA provides:
See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-37.011 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
Id. at § 37.004(a).
The Texas Supreme Court has noted that certain declaratory judgment actions do not implicate the doctrine of governmental immunity. See, e.g., Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994) (holding that declaratory-judgment action to determine proper construction of compulsory school-attendance law does not implicate governmental immunity); Tex. Highway Comm'n v. Tex. Ass'n of Steel Importers, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1963) (holding that declaratory-judgment suit against Highway Commission to determine parties' rights does not implicate governmental immunity); Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1945) (holding that declaratory-judgment suit against State comptroller to determine parties' rights under tax statute does not implicate governmental immunity). The governmental-immunity doctrine is not implicated in such actions because they do not attempt to subject the State to liability. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. Accordingly, Texas courts "distinguish suits to determine a party's rights against the State from suits seeking damages," and "[a] party can maintain a suit to determine its rights without legislative permission." Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997).
Madern asked the trial court to construe whether the relevant statutory definitions of premises defect and special defect were unconstitutionally vague. Compare IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 859-60 (emphasizing that plaintiff was "not asking the trial court to construe a legislative enactment," but, instead, sought declaration that plaintiff "performed additional work . . . and, thus, the [defendant] owed [the plaintiff] more money."). Madern did not seek money damages under the guise of a declaratory-judgment action. Compare Thayer v. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys., 95 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Because the governmental-immunity doctrine is not implicated in action, like Madern's declaratory-judgment action that do not attempt to subject the State to liability, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the relevant statutory definitions of premises defect and special defect were unconstitutionally vague. We thus hold that the trial court erred in granting the City's jurisdictional plea on Madern's declaratory judgment action.
When the trial court granted the City's jurisdictional plea, it necessarily dismissed Madern's declaratory-judgment action without reaching the merits of Madern's constitutional challenge. See Freedman v. Univ. of Houston, 110 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (explaining how court must dismiss cause of action without ruling on merits if it grants jurisdictional plea). Because the trial court has not yet ruled on the merits of Madern's constitutional challenge, we decline to do so on appeal, as Madern requests that we do. See R Communications v. Sharp, 875 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994) (holding that, because trial court had jurisdiction to hear such claim for declaratory relief, claim should be remanded to that court to permit issue to be finally resolved); see also Wood v. Wood, 320 S.W.2d 807, 813 (1959) (holding that constitutionality of statute will be considered only when question is properly raised and decision becomes necessary and appropriate to disposal of case; also holding that no statute should be overruled without careful and mature consideration).
We sustain Madern's third point of error to the extent that he complains of the dismissal of his declaratory-judgment action. We decline to reach the remainder of his third point of error, which concerns the merits of his declaratory-judgment action.
Affidavits Authenticating Photographs
In his fourth point of error, Madern argues that "[t]he Trial Court Erred in Sustaining [the City's] Objection to Attorney Englehart's Affidavit Authenticating Photos, and Also in Sustaining [the City's] Objection to Madern's Affidavit Authenticating Photos."
We review a trial court's admission of photographs under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Puremco Mfg. Co., 854 S.W.2d 240, 247-48 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, writ denied). This standard requires that we determine "whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable." Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).
Madern attempted to lay a foundation for Exhibits B and C, which were included in Madern's opposition to the City's plea to the jurisdiction, by attaching affidavits from himself and his attorney that stated that the photographs of the manhole were "true and correct" and that each affiant had "personal knowledge." The City filed a written objection to Madern and his attorney's affidavits. The City argues on appeal that the affidavits were not based on personal knowledge and that the photographs were not properly authenticated.
Assuming without deciding that the exclusion of the evidence was error, we determine whether sufficient harm resulted for reversal. A party complaining of error in the admission or exclusion of evidence need not show that, but for the error, a different judgment would necessarily have resulted, but must instead show that the error probably resulted in an improper judgment. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753-54 (Tex. 1995); McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 758; see also Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(a). We review the entire record to determine if the error was harmful. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000). A successful challenge to a trial court's evidentiary rulings usually requires the complaining party to show that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted. See Interstate Northborough P'ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001). Therefore, this Court ordinarily will not reverse a judgment for erroneous rulings on the admissibility of evidence when the evidence in question is cumulative and not controlling on a material issue dispositive to the case. See Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 396; Reina v. Gen. Accident Fire Life Assurance Corp., 611 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1981).
In this case, the trial court did not allow Madern to introduce photographs of the manhole. However, in ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court considered the following matters describing the manhole and its location: Madern's pleading; his response to the plea to the jurisdiction; his deposition testimony; a detailed map drawn by Madern, which was attached to his deposition; the affidavit of Rinehart; and the City's photograph exhibits of the location of the manhole. The pleading and evidence showed that the manhole was not in the road, the manhole was covered when Madern stepped on it, and the manhole cover did not seem unusual or different when Madern had stepped on it in the past. Exhibit B depicted not only the location of the manhole, but also the condition of the support ring, which was not relevant to determine whether the manhole was a special defect. Exhibit C clearly showed that the manhole was not located in the roadway, which in fact supported the City and was also redundant of other evidence before the trial court. After reviewing the record and Madern's arguments, we hold that any error in the exclusion of this evidence was harmless. See Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(a).
We overrule Madern's fourth point of error.
Trial Court's Manner of Review
In the remainder of his fifth point of error, Madern argues that "[t]he trial court erred in evaluating [the City's] Plea to the Jurisdiction as well as [Madern's] Motion for New Trial hearings as [the City] treats its Plea to the Jurisdiction and [Madern's] Opposition thereto, as well as [Madern's] Motion for New Trial as though [the City] had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment." Specifically, Madern argues that "[t]he trial court erred in evaluating the [City's] Plea to the Jurisdiction as a motion for summary judgment with a much deeper evidentiary investigation than was warranted." In other words, Madern appears to argue that the trial court improperly delved into more evidence than was proper for a preliminary ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction.
If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-29; Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555 (confining evidentiary review to evidence that is relevant to jurisdictional issue). When the consideration of a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction requires the examination of evidence, the trial court exercises its discretion in deciding whether the jurisdictional determination should be made at a preliminary hearing or should await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this determination must be made as soon as practicable. Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554.
In his brief, Madern specifically contends that the trial court's questioning of Madern's counsel, at the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, regarding whether there was evidence that the City had knowledge of the condition (a matter relevant to premises defect, rather than special defect, under the TTCA) was evidence that the trial court improperly delved into more evidence than was proper for a preliminary ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction based on his having pleaded a special defect. Here, the trial court had before it Madern's third amended petition; his response to the plea to the jurisdiction; his deposition testimony; a detailed map drawn by Madern, which was attached to his deposition; the affidavit of Rinehart; and the City's photograph exhibits of the location of the manhole. We have no reporter's record from that hearing and we thus cannot speculate what else may have been discussed or presented at the hearing or what the trial court's complained-of statement meant. The matters proved by the pleading and evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to Madern, affirmatively removed his negligence cause of action from the TTCA's waiver of immunity. Simply put, nothing in the record shows that the trial court imposed an improper evidentiary burden on Madern, as he alleges.
We overrule the remainder of Madern's fifth point of error.
TTCA Section 101.056
In his sixth point of error, Madern argues that "[t]he Trial Court Erred to the Extent It Dismissed [his] Claims on the Ground that the Texas Tort Claims Act Section 101.056 Discretionary Act Exception Preserved Immunity." The City's jurisdictional plea had alternatively asserted that TTCA section 101.056 prevented any waiver of immunity from suit.
TTCA section 101.056 provides for an exception to the TTCA's waiver, for discretionary decisions, of sovereign immunity from suit and liability. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann § 101.056 (Vernon 2005). If a claim does not fall within the TTCA's waiver of immunity, then section 101.056's exception to that waiver of immunity is irrelevant; a defendant need not rely on an exception to the waiver of immunity from suit if there is no waiver of immunity in the first place. We have already held that the TTCA does not waive the City's immunity from suit for Madern's negligence claim. Given that disposition, we need not reach Madern's argument under his sixth point of error regarding the propriety of the trial court's ruling under section 101.056.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment in all respects except to the extent that it dismissed Madern's declaratory-judgment action, to which extent we reverse the judgment. We remand the cause.