Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 30-2008-00103118, Daniel J. Didier, Judge.
Margaret Kathryn Maas, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kutak Rock LLP, Edwin J. Richards, Julie R. Beaton, and Christopher D. Glos for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
O’LEARY, ACTING P. J.
Margaret K. Maas appeals from the judgment awarding Coastal Animal Services Authority (CASA) $5,500 in attorney fees as the prevailing party on a special motion to strike. Maas had voluntarily dismissed her complaint just prior to the hearing on CASA’s motion. Agreeing CASA is entitled to its attorney fees, Maas nonetheless asserts the award constituted an abuse of discretion because CASA submitted only its attorney’s declaration attesting to the actual number of hours worked and the attorney’s billing rate, and did not include the itemized billing statements or evidence the billing rate and hours spent were reasonable. We find no merit to her contention and affirm the judgment.
The defendants and respondents are CASA, the cities of San Clemente and Dana Point, and CASA employees Rick Gilliland, Marty Schear, Jill Moran, and Patrick Robbins (hereafter referred to collectively and in the singular as CASA, unless the context indicates otherwise).
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 authorizes a special motion to strike a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) action, and is referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 85, fn. 1 (Navellier).) All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
CASA is a California Joint Powers Authority (Gov. Code, § 6500 et seq.), formed by the cities of San Clemente and Dana Point to provide animal control and animal shelter services. In February 2008, Maas sued CASA alleging various causes of action arising out of CASA’s enforcement of San Clemente’s animal control ordinance and its administrative determination one of Maas’s dogs was vicious.
CASA, represented by the law firm Kutak Rock, filed a special motion to strike Maas’s complaint, supported by a 13-page brief, two attorney declarations, and a request for judicial notice of various documents. As to attorney fees, Kutak Rock attorney Julie R. Beaton submitted her declaration signed under penalty of perjury stating, “[CASA has] incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with this Motion totaling $3,700... itemized as follows: twenty (20) hours in researching and preparing this Motion, declarations, proposed order and Request for Judicial Notice, at a rate of $185... per hour.” After the special motion to strike was filed, Maas filed a first amended complaint adding causes of action for violation of civil rights.
Maas’s opposition to CASA’s special motion to strike raised no objections to Beaton’s declaration concerning attorney fees. CASA’s seven-page reply to Maas’s opposition was accompanied by two more attorney declarations and a declaration from a CASA employee. In her further declaration under penalty of perjury Wheaton stated, “In addition to the reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by [CASA] in connection with this Motion that were identified in my original Declaration... ($3,700), [CASA has] incurred an additional $1,480... of attorneys’ fees in connection with this Motion, itemized as follows: eight (8) hours in review of [Maas’s] Opposition, Declarations and evidence, legal research, draft of Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply to Opposition and Declarations in support thereof, Objections to Declaration and Evidence submitted by [Maas] in Opposition, and Further Request for Judicial Notice, at a rate of $185... per hour. [¶]... I expect to spend another two (2) hours traveling to and from, and appearance at, the hearing on [CASA’s] Special Motion to Strike at a rate of $185... per hour for a total of $370.... [¶]... The total amount of attorneys’ fees that have been, and are expected to be, incurred by [CASA] in connection with this Motion are $5,500....”
CASA’s special motion to strike was set for hearing on April 25, 2008. On April 23, Maas filed an evidentiary objection to Wheaton’s declaration as to attorney fees, unsupported by any legal analysis or authorities, stating only, “Lack of foundation, best evidence, legal opinion, lack of supporting documents such as time logs or billing sheets[.]”
The morning of the hearing on the special motion to strike, after the trial court had posted its tentative ruling granting CASA’s motion and awarding it the requested $5,500 in attorney fees, Maas filed a voluntarily dismissal of her complaint without prejudice. She did not appear at the hearing. (In her opening brief, Maas states she has since refiled her civil rights claim in federal court.) The court declared CASA the prevailing party and awarded it $5,500 in attorney fees.
DISCUSSION
Under section 425.16, subdivision (c), a defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike is entitled to recover his or her attorney fees. Maas agrees that even though she voluntarily dismissed her complaint prior to the hearing on CASA’s motion, CASA was the prevailing party and was entitled to its attorney fees. (See Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 446 [where plaintiff dismisses action while special motion to strike is pending, defendant still entitled to recover attorney fees].) But despite that concession, Maas contends the award constituted an abuse of discretion because CASA’s request was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
“We review an anti-SLAPP attorney fee award under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.] The trial court’s fee determination ‘“‘will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’”’ [Citation.]” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322 (Christian Research Institute).)
Citing cases including Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 (Hensley), Christian Research Institute, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242 (Maughan), ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993 (ComputerXpress), and Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553 (Martino), Maas contends an attorney fees award cannot be based solely on declarations of counsel as to the total fees incurred, but must be supported by itemized time sheets or billing records and by declarations detailing the experience and expertise of the attorney and attesting to the reasonableness of the fees charged. Not so.
It is well established detailed billing records are not required to affirm an attorney fees award. “In California, an attorney need not submit contemporaneous time records in order to recover attorney fees.... Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. [Citations.]” (Martino, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 559; see also Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.)
The cases Maas cites do not aid her. Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. 424, considered an award of attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action under title 42 United States Code section 1988. The Supreme Court reversed the award because the district court failed to distinguish between the claims on which the plaintiff succeeded and those on which he did not. (Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 440.) Although the Court referred to the kinds of evidence that would aid the trial court in so allocating the attorney fees between claims (e.g., billing time records), it did not hold such detailed records are always necessary to support an attorney fees award.
Christian Research Institute and Maughan each held, in very complex litigation resolved on special motions to strike, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the prevailing defendant’s attorney fees claim due to the lack of detailed records, but neither case held detailed billing records were a requisite to supporting any award at all. (Christian Research Institute, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320 [$250,000 claim reduced to $21,300]; Maughan, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253 [$112,288 claim reduced to $23,000].) ComputerXpress reversed a trial court order denying the successful SLAPP defendant its attorney fees. The court noted that on remand because the defendant bore “‘... the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates[,]’... the [trial] court may require defendants to produce records sufficient to provide ‘“a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims[,]”’... [and] may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]” (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020, italics added.)
In Martino, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 553, the court reversed an attorney fees award where “[t]he only evidence presented in support of the motion for attorney fees was the attorney’s request for a flat fee for ‘services rendered.’ No documents, such as billing or time records, were submitted to the court, nor was an attempt made to explain, in more than general terms, the extent of services rendered to the client.” (Id. at pp. 559 560.) The court noted that “in the absence of such crucial information as the number of hours worked, billing rates, types of issues dealt with and appearances made on the client’s behalf, the trial court is placed in the position of simply guessing at the actual value of the attorney’s services.” (Id. at p. 559.) But the court also explained detailed billing sheets are not required and the attorney’s testimony as to the number of hours worked was sufficient. (Ibid.)
Here, CASA’s attorney fees request was adequately supported by the declaration signed under penalty of perjury by one of its primary attorneys setting forth the billing rate, the number of hours worked in preparing the special motion to strike, the total fees incurred and detailing the type of activities undertook (e.g., legal research, drafting, and court appearances). It was not the kind of bare “request for a flat fee” rejected by the appellate court in Martino.
“‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court....”’” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587, the court affirmed an attorney fees award based on evidence similar to that presented by CASA. The appellate court observed, “The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements. Although a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail, it cannot be said in this particular case that the absence of time records and billing statements deprived the trial court of substantial evidence to support an award; we do not reweigh the evidence. [Citation.]”
Accordingly, we conclude the attorney fees award is supported by substantial evidence. There is nothing about the award—a quite modest $5,500 when compared to the results achieved—that hints at overreaching by the defense attorneys or suggesting the trial court abused its discretion. As the prevailing party, CASA is entitled to an award of its costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal as well, in an amount to be determined by the trial court. (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs and attorney fees on appeal.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, J., FYBEL, J.