Opinion
No. 108,568.
2013-09-27
Patrick LYNN, Appellant, v. Nancy ANSTAETT, et al., Appellees.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Frank J. Yeoman, Jr., Judge. Patrick C. Lynn, appellant pro se. Daniel D. Gilligan, assistant district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Frank J. Yeoman, Jr., Judge.
Patrick C. Lynn, appellant pro se. Daniel D. Gilligan, assistant district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., POWELL and SCHROEDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Patrick C. Lynn contests the Shawnee County District Court's jurisdiction to act and to restrict his right to file litigation. The district court, instead of acting as a gatekeeper, closed the door too tight and created a bar on Lynn's ability to file litigation. A total bar on access to the court cannot stand, and we reverse.
Facts
In March 2010, Lynn filed a civil action against Panel A of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications, naming its members and many other public officials as defendants. He claimed the defendants conspired to obstruct justice and prevented him from seeking a judicial remedy. With his application, Lynn was attempting to comply with the gatekeeping restrictions imposed on him in State ex rel Stovall v. Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 81–82, 975 P.2d 813,rev. denied 267 Kan. 890 (1999). We deem it unnecessary to repeat the restrictions here as they are adequately set out in Stovall. The district court never granted his application to prosecute suit.
At the time Lynn filed his suit, the chief judge of the civil department issued a letter ruling denying Lynn the right to file pro se litigation in Shawnee County as his pleadings had become “burdensome and vexatious.” In its ruling, the district court did not preclude Lynn's right to be represented by an attorney in such matters or defend himself against suits from others.
The matter then languished in the district court with various pleadings and threats from Lynn. Ultimately, on July 30, 2012, another district court judge, assigned this case by the chief judge, issued his memorandum decision regarding Lynn's access to the court. After recounting Lynn's history of filings in the state and federal court systems, the district court pointed out Lynn's restriction was only limited to the Shawnee County courts. In those courts alone, Lynn had filed nine prior cases, all of which had been dismissed. The district court was unable to find a Lynn case that had been found to have merit. More importantly, Lynn had not complied with the restrictions established to allow continued pro se prosecution of his cases, as his writings submitted to the court had been filled with “vile, insulting, and threatening language.” Because Lynn had abused his right of access to the courts, the district court ruled that restricting Lynn from filing new pro se litigation in Shawnee County was not unreasonable and should remain in place.
Lynn timely appeals.
Analysis
Lynn raises two issues on appeal for this court to review. Lynn claims the district court judges interfered with his case without jurisdiction and the restriction created by the district court was overly restrictive. Lynn also tries to raise several issues from past cases. Those past issues are not properly before this court and they will not be considered or discussed. Since we are reversing this matter because the filing restrictions imposed went too far, we deem it unnecessary to address Lynn's complaint about the jurisdiction of the Shawnee County District Court judges to preside over his case.
Did the New Restrictions Imposed Create an Unreasonable Limitation to Lynn's Access to the Court System?
Lynn now claims the rulings preventing him from filing pro se civil cases in Shawnee County are an abuse of discretion and an unreasonable restriction.
Standard of Review
The Kansas Supreme Court “recently noted ... that a district court has substantial discretion in controlling the proceedings before it. [Citation omitted.] We therefore readily conclude that, like the federal courts, we should review district court decisions on docket management for an abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted .]” Holt v. State, 290 Kan. 491, 502, 232 P.3d 848 (2010).
An abuse of discretion occurs if discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion or goes outside the framework of or fails to consider proper statutory limitations or legal standards. O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 294 Kan. 318, 331, 277 P.3d 1062 (2012).
Is Preventing Lynn from Filing Pro Se Litigation in Shawnee County a Reasonable Restriction?
Lynn points to Holt, 290 Kan. 491, to support his contention that a ban upon his right to file pro se violates well-established Kansas law. In Holt, a district court ruled that a prisoner was barred from filing future motions in a criminal case after the prisoner filed his fourth K.S.A. 60–1507 motion. Holt, 290 Kan. at 497. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized a district court's inherent right to control its docket through reasonable filing restrictions. Holt, 290 Kan. at 498 (citing Cromer v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc., 390 F.3d 812 [4th Cir.2004]; In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 [3d Cir.1982]; In re Martin–Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 [2d Cir.1984]; In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 [D.C.Cir.1981]; Gordon v. United States Dept. of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 [1st Cir.1977]; see also Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1180 [10th Cir.2008] [“ ‘Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.’ “] [quoting Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir.2007) ] ). However, the court noted this power is limited and cannot completely foreclose a party from any access to the court. Holt, 290 Kan. at 498 (citing Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 [11th Cir.1986] ). The court agreed with various federal authorities that restrictions on filings were permitted, but noted that the restrictions must be reasonable, such as enumerated prefiling conditions. Holt, 290 Kan. at 501.
Lynn argues the restrictions placed on him by the district court are not reasonable as they create an “outright ban” on his access to that court. While Lynn does not directly compare his case to that of Holt, he does argue the Kansas Supreme Court has sided against blanket prohibitions of court access.
The State counters with the argument Lynn's case is different due to his excessively abusive filings and, even if it is not, the ban is not an absolute bar. The State acknowledges the ruling in Holt but cites to three federal cases to demonstrate filing restrictions that “go beyond the typical requirement for court screening of potential filings have been recognized.” In Wideman v. Colorado, No. 10–1096, 2010 WL 3766575 (10th Cir.2010) (unpublished opinion), the Tenth Circuit prohibited a plaintiff from filing any further pro se materials regarding four federal lawsuits previously adjudicated or regarding the plaintiff's appeal. In Evans–Carmichael v. U.S., No. 09–2031, 2009 WL 2096302 (10th Cir .2009) (unpublished opinion), the Tenth Circuit prevented a pro se plaintiff from future filings within that case unless a licensed attorney certified the filings were not frivolous. Finally, in In re Vey, 520 U.S. 303, 117 S.Ct. 1294, 137 L.Ed. 510 (1997), the United States Supreme Court prevented a pro se petitioner with a history of frivolous filings from any future in forma pauperis filings of extraordinary writs with the Supreme Court unless the petitioner paid the docketing fees.
Although all of these cases point to more stringent restrictions than issued in Lynn, the State's overall argument fails because none of these opinions involve a blanket prohibition. In each of the federal cases, the plaintiff's restrictions were limited to specific cases or filing types and did not involve a general ban on filing within that court system. Here, Lynn is prohibited from filing any pro se litigation without an attorney. This type of ban exceeds any mentioned by the State or found in our search of Kansas or federal caselaw.
Further, the court in Holt clearly had Lynn in mind when making its ruling regarding blanket prohibitions. In Holt, our Supreme Court cited to Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d at 81, as an example of reasonable restrictions on filing practices that were consistent with federal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning in Lynn that permitted the enumerated filing requirements for a prisoner who had abused the court system. Even while affirming a district court's inherent power to manage its docket, the court in Holt cautioned that blanket prohibitions would “deny a party's future access to the courts and constitute an overextension of the inherent authority ... [and] would also be contrary to certain Kansas statutory authority.” Holt, 290 Kan. at 499–501.
Kansas district courts have the inherent authority to enact reasonable restrictions to control pleadings and prevent vexatious and abusive filings. However, blanket prohibitions on a party's right to file are a violation of that authority, even when the party has clearly and repeatedly abused the court system. Despite the State's argument Lynn would still have access to file his claims, any attorney with knowledge of Lynn's history would likely be unwilling to sift through Lynn's voluminous claims to determine whether a legitimate issue could be brought before the court. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d at 1071. Therefore, this ban on pro se filings amounts to a blanket prohibition preventing Lynn access to the court. Because such blanket prohibitions have been rejected by the Kansas Supreme Court, the current ban on filings by Lynn goes too far. The district court abused its discretion in establishing the current ban.
While Lynn's numerous filings certainly present a burden for the district courts, it is a burden they must manage through reasonable restrictions, not blanket prohibitions. The district courts may certainly consider other effective ways to reduce this burden and streamline the process of dealing with Lynn's paperwork without a total ban. See Holt, 290 Kan. at 503.
There is no constitutional right to file litigation that is frivolous or malicious. Holt, 290 Kan. at 498. The courts of Kansas have limited resources and have the inherent power to manage their dockets to ensure the citizens of Kansas have access for the redress of valid grievances. 290 Kan. at 498. The court's limited resources should not be consumed addressing frivolous and meritless litigation. Access to the courts must be respected and, if not, will be controlled and limited. We reverse and vacate the order prohibiting all pro se filings as being too restrictive. The district court is referred to the gatekeeping procedure established and approved in Stovall, 26 Kan.App.2d at 81. The district court should then reevaluate the pending application filed by Lynn to see whether it is or is not in compliance with those gatekeeping procedures.
Reversed and remanded with directions.