Summary
applying Pennsylvania's statute of limitations although plaintiff received a Massachusetts workers' compensation settlement and medical treatment in Massachusetts
Summary of this case from Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.Opinion
No. 13–P–540.
2013-11-6
Gerald LYNCH v. The STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC, & others.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, GRAINGER & WOLOHOJIAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This action arises from injuries the plaintiff, a truck driver, suffered in Pennsylvania while picking up goods to be returned to Massachusetts. He claims that the trial court incorrectly applied the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, barring his tort actions, instead of the Massachusetts statute of limitations, which would allow them. We affirm.
Background. The plaintiff, Gerald Lynch, is a resident of Massachusetts and was, at all times relevant to this action, an employee of Prey Trucking in Seekonk. On December 29, 2009, Lynch drove to Philadelphia to retrieve a shipment of bananas and return with them to a facility of the Stop & Shop Supermarket Corporation, LLC (Stop & Shop) in Massachusetts. Stop & Shop is organized under Delaware law, with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. The Philadelphia facility is owned by Turbana Corporation (Turbana), which is organized under Florida law and has its principal place of business in Florida. Horizon Stevedoring, Inc. (Horizon), a company organized under Pennsylvania law with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, worked with Turbana to facilitate the shipment of bananas from Central America to Massachusetts. While Lynch was at the Philadelphia facility, a forklift operator ran over his foot, causing injury. Lynch was immediately taken to a Philadelphia hospital, where he was treated for contusions and released. He then drove the banana shipment back to Massachusetts. Once back, Lynch sought and received ongoing treatments for his injuries, which were more extensive than originally suspected. Around this same time, Lynch both filed for and received a workers' compensation settlement in Massachusetts based on these injuries.
The plaintiff's brief spells the company name as “Pray Trucking.” We use the spelling from the motion judge's decision.
Lynch brought suit against the three defendants on July 18, 2012, in Bristol Superior Court, two years and six months after the accident in Philadelphia. In moving to dismiss the suit under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), all defendants contended that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for tort claims controlled, making Lynch's action untimely. The motion judge allowed the motions to dismiss, holding that Pennsylvania's statute of limitations applied. Additionally, the judge granted Horizon's motion based on a lack of sufficient contacts with Massachusetts under the standard established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524.
Discussion. In determining whether to apply Massachusetts law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction, Massachusetts uses the “functional approach” with a focus on the State with “the more significant relationship to the occurrence and to the parties with respect to the issue of limitations.” New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gourdeau Constr., Inc., 419 Mass.658, 661 (1995). Massachusetts “will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim unless: (a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.” Anderson v. Lopez, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 813, 815 (2011). The functional approach tracks the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 142 (Supp.1989). Ibid.
Here, the judge held that the matter was controlled in all material respects by Nierman v. Hyatt Corp., 441 Mass. 693 (2004). In Nierman, a Massachusetts plaintiff was injured while staying at a hotel in Texas operated by the defendant corporation. Hyatt was organized under Delaware law, with its principal place of business in Illinois; it also owned a facility in Massachusetts and frequently solicited business here. Id. at 693–694. The plaintiff brought suit in Massachusetts three years to the day after the accident, which would have been timely under the Massachusetts three-year statute of limitations but was past Texas's two-year limitations period. While noting that “Massachusetts has a general interest in having its residents compensated for personal injuries suffered in another State,” the Supreme Judicial Court held that “[i]t cannot be said ... that its interest in the timeliness of such an action is more compelling than that of [the State in which the plaintiff was injured].” Id. at 697. Accordingly, the Texas statute of limitations was found to control.
Lynch attempts to distinguish Nierman, arguing that the three defendants each have direct ties to Massachusetts, and that his subsequent treatment and workers' compensation action, which occurred in Massachusetts, are more pertinent to this case than the accident itself. We disagree.
No facts exist in this case to suggest a “significant relationship” between Massachusetts and any of the three defendants. Lynch's attempt to minimize the list of factors anchoring this case to Pennsylvania falls short. The accident occurred in Pennsylvania, making it likely that witnesses and other physical evidence are located there. The defendants are, by and large, foreign corporations. The connections between the defendants and Massachusetts are attenuated. Pennsylvania, on these facts, has a more substantial interest. Because the Pennsylvania statute of limitations controls, we affirm the lower court ruling that the plaintiff's claims were untimely.
Given our ruling, we need not reach Horizon's alternative argument.
Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, and for substantially those in the defendants' briefs, we affirm.
So ordered.