Summary
holding that allegations "that defendant was biased against [the plaintiff] based on her race, that she was harassed and treated poorly on the job . . . until she was ultimately wrongfully terminated, . . . even if done maliciously," did not satisfy the extreme and outrageous requirement
Summary of this case from Krause v. KelehanOpinion
00 Civ. 5433 (GBD)
February 21, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She was employed as Executive Director of defendant Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation from April 13, 1998 until August 16, 1999. Plaintiff, who is African-American, alleges that she was subjected to discriminatory treatment by defendant, and that the treatment was so outrageous that it caused plaintiff to suffer emotional and psychological harm with physical manifestations. Plaintiff alleges that this conduct was motivated by a desire and intent to discriminate against her based on her race, and that it continued until she was ultimately terminated.
Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff's third and forth claims for relief which seek damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant moves to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff opposes this motion. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "the complaint must allege facts that, if true, would create a judicially cognizable cause of action." Kittay v. Komstein, 230 F.3d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a motion to dismiss only addresses the legal sufficiency of a claim. See McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000). A claim should not be dismissed unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California et al. Merrett Underwriting Agency Mgmt Ltd. et al., 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the facts alleged in her complaint, even if true, would not reach the threshold behavior required to state a claim for relief. Under New York law, to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show "(i) extreme and outrageous conduct (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress, (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury, and (iv) severe emotional distress. The first element — outrageous conduct — serves the dual function of filtering out petty and trivial complaints that do not belong in court, and assuring that plaintiff's claim of severe emotional distress is genuine." Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121 (NY 1993); see also Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1996). The requirements of this standard are very strict, and "[l]iability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303 (NY 1983) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d). Consequently, this standard is very rigorous and difficult to satisfy, resulting in strict application of these elements by New York Courts. See Gay v. Carlson, 60 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1995).
It is particularly difficult to withstand a motion to dismiss claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment law context. New York Courts are reluctant to allow these claims in employment discrimination cases. The courts are wary of allowing plaintiffs to recharacterize claims for wrongful or abusive discharge, which are not recognized under New York law, as claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A plaintiff cannot avoid the consequences of the employment-at-will doctrine by bringing a wrongful discharge claim under a different name. Ahmed v. Compass Group, 2000 WL 1072299, *10 (S.D.N.Y. August 3, 2000); Mariani v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 982 F. Supp. 267, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). "As a result, New York courts routinely dismiss claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, except where such claims were accompanied by allegations of sex discrimination and, more significantly, battery." Ahmed, 2000 WL at *10. Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals has rarely allowed a plaintiff to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment law context. See, e.g. Mariani, 982 F. Supp. at 275 (finding that "`the New York Court of Appeals and three of the four departments of the Appellate Division have never sustained a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in an employment case,' and the remaining department, `the First Department of the Appellate Division[,] has on only two occasions of which we are aware permitted plaintiffs to proceed with intentional infliction tort claims against their employers.'")
In the instant case, the harassment alleged by the plaintiff cannot meet the threshold level established by the New York Courts for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must allege facts which indicate that the defendant, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress. The conduct alleged must be such that it can be fairly characterized as egregious, utterly despicable, heartless or flagrant. Acts which merely constitute harassment, disrespectful or disparate treatment, a hostile environment, humiliating criticism, intimidation, insults or other indignities fail to sustain a claim of infliction of emotional distress because the conduct alleged is not sufficiently outrageous.
The facts alleged by plaintiff regarding the conditions and circumstances of her employment and termination fall far short of this strict standard. Plaintiff alleges that defendant was biased against her based on her race, that she was harassed and treated poorly on the job, and that she was denied the same benefits, opportunities and conditions of employment as her Hispanic co-workers until she was ultimately wrongfully terminated. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that defendant retaliated against her by withholding and improperly providing information to other perspective employers after plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC. While the alleged behavior of which plaintiff complains may support an employment discrimination lawsuit, it is not the type of behavior that merits recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress as established by the New York Courts. The behavior alleged here, even if done maliciously, simply fails to measure up to what is require to establish this claim.
Therefore, plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's third and fourth claims for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED.