Opinion
00 Civ. 5433(GBD).
March 11, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff, an African-American female, brought this suit against defendant alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as well as a pendant state law discrimination claim. Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Plaintiff opposes this motion. For the following reasons, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiff never specifically indicates either in the Complaint or elsewhere which statute she relies upon for her state law claim of discrimination. Further, her motion papers only address her Title VII claims. Therefore, this Court will assume that whatever statute plaintiff bases her state law discrimination claim upon, it is analyzed under the same framework as Title VII.
In an Order dated February 21, 2001, this Court granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's third and fourth claims for relief which sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine factual dispute exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A court will resolve all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n, Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). If there is evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, then summary judgment is not appropriate. See Tri-State Employment Serv., 295 F.3d at 260. However, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original),quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Although "we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party on a motion for summary judgment, we do not permit an issue to go to trial on the basis of mere speculation in favor of the party that bears the burden of proof." Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff claims that her former employer, Bronx Overall Economic Development Corp. ("BOEDC"), discriminated against her because she is African American and that the BOEDC employed or permitted a pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment against other African American employees. In support of this argument, plaintiff claims that the BOEDC denied her the same support and resources as those available to Hispanic employees, denied her appropriate office space, allowed plaintiff to be publicly humiliated by Hispanic subordinates and by her Hispanic superior, prevented her from exercising authority over Hispanic subordinates, and terminated her so that it could hire an Hispanic female to her position.
Title VII prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2002). A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.See Graham v. Long Isl. R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000), citing Texas Dep't of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show:
(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.Norville v. Staten Isl. Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999);Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997).
Defendant argues that plaintiff has not met the fourth element of the prima facie case, in that plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that the circumstances plaintiff alleges give rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her race. "A plaintiff may support an inference of race discrimination by demonstrating that similarly situated employees of a different race were treated more favorably." Norville, 196 F.3d at 95. Other circumstances that can also give rise to an inference of discrimination are criticism of a plaintiff's performance in ethnically degrading terms, racial comments about other individuals in the plaintiff's same protected class, the sequence of events leading up to the adverse employment decision, and the timing of the adverse employment action. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Cntrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994).
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that the circumstances she complains of give rise to an inference of race discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that she was overlooked and that her authority was ignored by her subordinates, many of whom were Hispanic. Plaintiff's allegations in this regard, however, appear to stem from dissatisfaction with the management style of the BOEDC President, as he allowed his employees to have direct access to him, rather than from discrimination in the workplace. Plaintiff also alleges that staff were allowed to visit companies without her knowledge, and that this is evidence that she was discriminated against. However, plaintiff admitted in her deposition that after she expressed concern over this practice to the President of the BOEDC, he responded favorably by writing a memo to the staff and informing them that they were no longer allowed to visit companies without prior authorization. See Lydeatte Dep. at 67-68. Plaintiff alleges that she was denied opportunities to attend seminars and training sessions. However, in her deposition, plaintiff could not recall a single instance where she was denied an opportunity to attend a professional conference. See id. at 59. Further, her deposition testimony reveals that she was afforded every opportunity to make presentations directly to the Board of Directors. Plaintiff claims that she was only provided with a cubicle, rather than appropriate office space commiserate with her position. Plaintiff also alleges that she was never given a nameplate. However, plaintiff admitted in her deposition that within a month after starting her position, the President of the BOEDC, on his own initiative, provided her with office space, a staff of nine individuals, as well as an administrative assistant and a secretary. See id. at 39-41.
Plaintiff further alleges that she was denied equal pay because she did not receive a merit increase. However, plaintiff received a cost of living increase along with the rest of the staff. Although she did not receive a merit increase, nothing about that fact leads to an inference of racial discrimination. of the five individuals who received a merit increase one was another African American female, two were Hispanic (a male and female), one was an Asian male, and one was a white male. Lastly, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated so that her position could be filled with an Hispanic female. However, plaintiff admits that the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), an African American male, terminated her. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the CFO told her that there had been a reorganization in the company and that "the parent wanted to make some changes within the empowerment structure and I was the change." Lydeatte Dep. at 60. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she then met with the President of the BOEDC, who told her that "this decision was bigger than him and me and it is something that is breaking his heart, but he had to do it." Id. at 62-63. Plaintiff received a severance package of $10,000 and full medical coverage for six months. Plaintiff's own description of the circumstances surrounding her termination are devoid of any racial overtones or any facts that could lead to a reasonable inference that racial animus was a contributing factor. Her allegation that she was terminated so that an Hispanic woman could replace her is purely speculative and unsupported by the evidence in the record. Plaintiff took no depositions in this case and relies solely upon her Complaint and affirmation in opposing defendant's summary judgment motion.
This Court, therefore, grants summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's Title VII and state law discrimination claim as plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact to create an inference that she was discriminated against on the basis of race or that the BOEDC employed or permitted a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Plaintiff next claims that defendant unlawfully retaliated against her both during her employment and after she had been terminated in response to her filing an EEOC charge. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII or for filing an EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Under the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: 1) protected activity known to the alleged retaliator; 2) an adverse employment action; and 3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000); Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
In this case, plaintiff filed her EEOC charge after she was terminated. Therefore, as a matter of law, plaintiff can not show that defendant retaliated against her during the period that she was still employed at the BOEDC as the protected activity (filing the EEOC charge) did not occur until after she had been terminated.
Plaintiff, however, additionally asserts that defendant retaliated against her after she was terminated. Plaintiff contends that the President of the BOEDC circulated a "derogatory and defamatory letter" about her, and that she had problems for the next eleven months securing other employment. See Lydeatte Aff., Ex. C. at p. 9. Plaintiff also alleges that after she was terminated, defendant failed to provide or improperly provided reference information to prospective employers. However, plaintiff has presented no evidence other than her own bare allegations that a derogatory letter exists and that improper information was given to prospective employers. Plaintiff neither appended a copy of such a letter to her motion papers, nor took any depositions in this case to substantiate her allegations. A party opposing summary judgment may not simply rely on unsupported assertions or conclusory statements. See Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact to support the conclusion that there was a causal connection between her filing the EEOC charge and an adverse employment decision. Therefore, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.