Opinion
No. CV00-0161393S
February 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET VERDICT FOR JUDGMENT NOV AND FOR REMITTITUR
This case involves a rear-end collision in which the plaintiff, who sustained severe and painful multiple injuries, was awarded total damages of $1,325,000.00. The jury tripled that award based on its finding of recklessness.
The defendant moves to set aside the verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for remittitur first on the grounds that the court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of recklessness, and second on the grounds that the verdict was excessive.
Standard
"A court is empowered to set aside a jury verdict when, in the court's opinion, the verdict is contrary to the law OR unsupported by the evidence . . . A verdict should not be set aside, however, where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchell v. Whelchel, 66 Conn. App. 574, 582 (2001). The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could determine that the defendant's speed was recklessly excessive. "To set aside a jury verdict, the trial court must find that the verdict is `so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality' . . . It is improper, however, to set aside a verdict where the jury reasonably could have based its verdict on the evidence." (Internal citations omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, 40 Conn. App. 740, 745 (1996). "While it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation . . . If the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit to the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheridan v. Desmond, 45 Conn. App. 686, 691, 697 A.2d 1162 (1997). Vona v. Lerner, 72 Conn. App. 179, 187, 804 A.2d 1018 (2002). On the other hand, "It [is] not necessary that the plaintiffs' proof of negligence negate all possible circumstances which would excuse the defendant. 38 Am.Jur. 1031, Negligence, 332. Nor was it necessary that the proof rise to that degree of certainty which excludes every reasonable conclusion other than that reached by the jury." (Internal citations omitted.) Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 318 (1968).
Evidence of Recklessness
The evidence established that the Ford Mustang, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, was stopped behind another car for a light at the bottom of an I-84 exit ramp when it was struck by the defendant's truck. As a result of the impact, all four people in the Mustang were knocked unconscious. The first person to wake up saw the driver of the truck attempting to back the truck off the Mustang. Photographs of the Mustang showed that the rear of the car was crushed up to the front seat. The impact pushed it into the car in front of them. At the time of the accident, the intersection was well-lit, and the weather was dry. The defendant admitted to having consumed several beers on that evening prior to the crash. He fled the scene of the accident on foot. The plaintiff suffered severe multiple injuries, especially to her head and face.
"The amount and type of physical damage that a car sustains in an accident" is one of the factors a jury may consider in deciding whether or not due care is being exercised at the time of the accident. Notarino v. Powers, 6 Conn. App. 300, 505 A.2d 17 (1986); Meyers v. Barnes, 2 Conn. App. 485, 488, 479 A.2d 1236 (1984). McGloin v. Southington, 15 Conn. App. 668, 676 (1988). "The issue that must always be resolved by the trier of fact in these situations is whether the facts as adduced . . . permit a rational inference that the driver evinced a reckless indifference to the rights of others in his operation of the motor vehicle." Seymour v. Garcia, 24 Conn. App. 446, 452 (1991). The court finds that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to draw a reasonable and logical inference that the accident was caused by the defendant's recklessly excessive speed.
Damages 1. Economic Damages
The jury awarded economic damages of $475,000. The defendant argues that this award is not supported by the evidence. The plaintiff suffered multiple severe injuries to her face and head, and injuries to her neck and back. At the time of trial, she had incurred approximately $88,000 in medical bills. Dr. Brown, the cosmetic surgeon who reconstructed the plaintiff's nose, testified that she would incur expenses for surgical repair of the existing nasal defect that she had. In addition, he stated that her nose would have to be redone again with more complicated rib-cartilage grafting. The oral maxillofacial surgeons testified that the implants she is to have would last approximately twenty to twenty-five years. Dr. Shin testified that the cost for future procedures in terms of grafting and re-implantation would be $50,000-$100,000 if needed only once and $100,000-$200,000 if needed twice. The evidence established that bone grafting attempts to reconstruct her upper jaw for implantation purposes had failed in the past. The jury could have reasonably inferred that the future procedures would probably need to be repeated. Dr. Chin testified that he had concerns about the ability of the bone implanted in her upper jaw to survive on its own because of inadequate blood supply. He testified that leg grafting, a complicated and lengthy surgical procedure, would then be necessary in order to provide a more stable blood supply for the jaw. In addition, the treating chiropractor, Dr. Stone, testified that the plaintiff would likely need supportive care for her neck and back for the rest of her life.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was scheduled to begin college in a couple of weeks. During her college years, she worked part-time. As a result of this accident, she lost $8,000 in wages.
In Marchetti v. Ramirez, supra, the Appellate Court, citing Seymour v. Garcia, 24 Conn. App. 446, 455 (1991), aff'd, 221 Conn. 473 (1992), held:
It is not speculation or conjecture to calculate future medical expenses based upon the history of medical expenses that have accrued as of the trial date, particularly when there is also a degree of medical certainty that future medical expenses will be necessary . . . Future medical expenses do not require the same degree of certainty as past medical expenses . . . Where the doctor testifies that the injured party might need future treatment and the injured party testifies he still suffers pain, that testimony is sufficient for consideration of the element of future medical expense.
In the instant case, the jury had evidence of the likelihood of future medical procedures which sufficiently supported its award for future economic damages.
2. Noneconomic Damages
The plaintiff's injuries were extensive, requiring multiple surgeries and hospitalizations, and continuing medical care. The evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff suffered considerably during the years following the accident. Her mother testified that she was required to perform a post-operative procedure, turning a screw in her daughter's jaw, one quarter turn several times a day, which caused her daughter exquisite pain. The plaintiff was required to spend the summers and holidays of her college years enduring surgical procedures.
The plaintiff lost her front teeth. She is required to undergo more surgical procedures in the future. There was testimony concerning changes in the plaintiff's mood and personality since the accident. She had a sixty-year life expectancy at the time of trial. In light of the evidence, the jury's award of $850,00.00 in non-economic damages does not shock the conscience.
Conclusion
The evidence as to excessive speed was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant's conduct was reckless. The amount of damages awarded by the jury falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and just damages. The motions for remittitur, for judgment NOV, and to set aside the verdict are denied.
GALLAGHER, J.