Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:00-CV-177-J
February 20, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed April 27, 2001; Defendants' "Brief in Support of Summary Judgment," filed April 27, 2001; and plaintiffs response thereto. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The above-captioned cause of action is brought by the plaintiff, Joventino Marcial Luna (Luna), for money damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of his rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a parolee under the supervision of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division (TDCJ-PD). Defendant Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division is an agency of the State of Texas charged with the supervision of all parolees in the State of Texas. Defendant Mark Shepard (Shepard) was at all times relevant to this action employed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division as a parole officer. Defendant Victor Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any civil rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the injured party in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
According to the complaint, sometime between March 26, 1998, and May 1, 1998, defendant Shepard requested that a blue warrant be issued for the arrest of Luna for an alleged parole violation. A blue warrant was issued on May 1, 1998, for plaintiffs arrest. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested on May 12, 1998. According to Luna, the blue warrant was requested by Shepard and issued based on a police report from the Amarillo Police Department which listed Luna as a possible defendant in a disorderly conduct, offensive gesture case.
On May 8, 1998, charges were filed against Luna in the Municipal Court for the City of Amarillo, Texas for making an offensive gesture to a minor on or about March 26, 1998. According to Luna, on August 26, 1998, the offensive gesture charge was dropped at the request of the prosecution due to insufficient evidence. Luna claims that he remained incarcerated following dismissal of the charges and despite the fact that the City of Amarillo never issued a warrant for his arrest.
According to Luna, on September 3, 1998, a preliminary parole hearing was held. Luna claims that the only alleged parole violation was the offensive gesture charge. According to Luna, defendant Shepard testified at the hearing that no probable cause existed to detain Luna. Luna further alleges that Shepard testified that there was nothing in the offensive report that incriminated Luna and that he was unsure why a case had even been filed. According to Luna, the officer in charge of the parole hearing found no probable cause to detain Luna. Luna alleges that despite the finding of no probable cause by the hearing officer, he remained incarcerated for two (2) more weeks.
Luna has brought charges against the TDCJ-PD for its negligence and callous indifference in failing to promulgate rules and supervise its employees in order to make certain that individuals are not deprived of their liberty and that when an illegal deprivation of liberty is discovered the individual is immediately freed. The TDCJ-PD seeks summary judgment on the grounds of sovereign immunity. Luna alleges that defendant Shepard is liable in his individual capacity for issuing the blue warrant and because he failed to release him after he became aware that Luna had not violated his parole. Defendant Shepard seeks summary judgment on the grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. Luna alleges that defendant Rodriguez is liable in his individual capacity for failing to establish procedures that mandate the immediate release of an individual when it is determined that the allegations against him are unfounded. Defendant Rodriguez seeks summary judgment on the grounds of absolute and qualified immunity.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth the standard for summary judgment in Hibernia National Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1993). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must ask whether,
the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In making this determination, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Reid v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the non-moving party to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). While the mere allegation of the existence of a dispute over material facts is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, if the evidence shows that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, the dispute is genuine. Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
On the other hand, if a rational trier of fact, based upon the record as a whole, could not find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Amoco Production Co. v. Horwell Energy, Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1992). Such a finding may be supported by the absence of evidence necessary to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 954 U.S. 1125, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992); International Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 2504 v. Intercontinental Mfg. Co., 812 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1987).Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 97-98 (5th Cir. 1993).
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
I. Defendant Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Parole Division
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division is being sued in federal court for money damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The TDCJ-PD alleges, as a state agency, they are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. In his complaint, Luna agrees that the TDCJ-PD is an agency of the state.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subject of any Foreign State."
As a division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the Board of Pardons and Paroles is a state agency. See Alberti v. Sherif of Harris County, Tex., 937 F.2d 984, 1003 (5th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1994 (1992); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 493.002(a)(3) 493.005 (Vernon Supp. 1997); and Tex.Gen. Special Laws 1989, Reg. Sess., Ch. 785 § 1.20 (abolishing the independent State Board of Pardons and Paroles and transferring its duties to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice). In the absence of consent, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court by citizens of a state against their own state or a state agency or department. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is applicable unless the State has expressly waived such protection. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2945-46 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145 (1985). Section 1983 does not override the Eleventh Amendment bar. See Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the State of Texas has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to suits against the Department of Criminal Justice. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 492.010(c) (Vernon Supp. 1997); see also Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court).
In McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons Paroles, 47 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit decided the issue of whether an inmates section 1983 claim for money damages against the Board is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Much like the case at bar, the Board was sued following its issuance of a blue warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff and continued incarceration following the dismissal of the pending charges by the district attorney. Id. at 159-60.
In affirming the dismissal of the section 1983 action for money damages, the Fifth Circuit held that, in fact, the Texas Department of Pardon and Paroles, a division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, is "cloaked" with Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 161; citing Voisin's Oyster House v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th. 1986); see also Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998) citing Harris v. Angelina County, Texas, 31 F.3d 331, 337-38 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that as an instrumentality of the state, the TDCJ-ID is immune from suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment). Following the Fifth Circuit's opinion in McGrew, this Court finds that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division is an agency of the state and thus immune from this suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
II. Defendants Mark Shepard and Victor Rodriguez
Defendant Shepard is being sued in his individual capacity for his actions as a parole officer and employee of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division. Luna claims that Shepard failed to act in an objectively reasonable manner in deciding to issue the warrant for Luna and for continuing Luna's incarceration after he became aware that the charges against Luna had been dropped.
Defendant Rodriguez is being sued in his individual capacity as the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division. Luna has not claimed that defendant Rodriguez had any direct involvement in the incidents made the basis of this suit, but rather Luna claims that Rodriguez is liable for failing to implement procedures that call for the immediate release of individuals in Luna's position.
As members of the parole board, defendants Shepard and Rodriguez claim they are either absolutely or qualifiedly immune from this suit for money damages. The issue of parole board members immunity from suit for money damages has been discussed in great detail in the Fifth Circuit and this Court finds that defendants Shepard and Rodriguez are both immune from this suit for money damages.
When defendant Shepard decided to issue a blue warrant for the arrest of Joventino Luna, he was exercising his discretion and decision-making power as a parole officer. Defendant Shepard exercised his discretion at the request of the Amarillo Police Department who had named Luna as a possible defendant in an offensive gesture, disorderly conduct case.
The Fifth Circuit has previously held that parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for their conduct in parole decisions and in the exercise of their decision-making powers. See Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995); Walter v. Torres, 917 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1990) (those parole board members who personally participate in the parole revoking process are afforded absolute immunity); see also Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that members of the parole board who exercise quasi-judicial powers in the parole granting and denying process are absolutely immune from suit for damages). Because Shepard was exercising his decision-making powers in issuing the blue warrant, this Court finds that defendant Shepard is absolutely immune from this suit for money damages and his motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Luna has also alleged that defendant Shepard is liable for his continued incarceration following his own testimony and finding of the parole board that no probable cause existed to contain Luna once the charges for offensive gesture were dropped. In addition to finding that Shepard is entitled to absolute immunity from suit, this Court is unpersuaded that, as a parole officer, Shepard could have done anything more than testify in front of the board, as he did, and suggest that Luna be released once the charges were dropped.
The allegations against defendant Rodriguez stem from his position as executive director of the Parole board. Defendant Rodriguez, like defendant Shepard, is being sued exclusively for money damages. Because it is unclear whether Luna is suing Rodriguez in his individual or official capacity, this Court will analyze Luna's claims under both. Because Luna seeks monetary damages, his claims against Rodriguez are barred under either scenario.
Just as the Eleventh Amendment bars Luna's suit for money damages against the Parole board, a suit for money damages against a state official such as Rodriguez in his official capacity is also barred. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361-62, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (A suit for money damages against Rodriguez in his official capacity has the same effect as suing the board directly). Furthermore, neither a state nor state officials sued in their official capacities are considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 when the relief sought is monetary. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct 2304, 2311-12 n. 10, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
As to personal liability for money damages, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that state parole board members are absolutely immune from liability for damages in a § 1983 action. See Hilliard v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1985) citing Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that executive director of parole board was absolutely immune from individual capacity suit for money damages stemming from the making and application of rules).
Because Luna's claims for money damages would be dismissed under either an individual or official capacity analysis, this Court finds that defendant Rodriguez' motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendants' motion for summary judgment should GRANTED and plaintiffs claims dismissed as to each defendant named herein.
It is SO ORDERED.
FINAL JUDGMENT
Having granted summary judgment for the Defendants in the above-captioned cause of action on February 20, 2002, this Court now enters its final judgment;
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Plaintiff, Joventino Marcial Luna, take nothing from Defendant Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division, Defendant Mark Shepard, or Defendant Victor Rodriguez;
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Defendants recover their cost of this suit.
It is SO ORDERED.