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Luke v. Luke

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jun 29, 2020
356 Ga. App. 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)

Opinion

A20A0022

06-29-2020

LUKE et al. v. LUKE et al.

Mixon & Mixon, Warren L. Mixon, Ocilla, for Appellant. Savage & Turner, Brent J. Savage, Kathryn H. Pinckney, for appellees.


Mixon & Mixon, Warren L. Mixon, Ocilla, for Appellant.

Savage & Turner, Brent J. Savage, Kathryn H. Pinckney, for appellees.

McFadden, Chief Judge. This appeal challenges a trial court's finding that a provision of a will is unambiguous and shows the testator's clear intent to devise a one-fourth interest in certain real property to her son. While evidence of the testator's intent may authorize that finding, in order to find and give effect to that intent, the trial court must consider parol evidence and use that evidence to resolve a latent ambiguity. So we vacate the trial court's order and remand for consideration of that parol evidence.

1. Facts and procedural posture.

The will at issue is Edith Luke's. She and Andrew Luke were married and had five children. During the marriage, Andrew Luke conveyed a joint one-half interest in certain farm property to Edith Luke and their son, Andy Luke. Andrew Luke retained ownership of the other one-half interest in the farm property.

Andrew Luke and Edith Luke subsequently divorced. After the divorce, Andrew Luke conveyed his one-half interest in the farm property to the Andrew W. Luke Revocable Living Trust. His children are beneficiaries of that trust. Edith Luke was not. Andrew Luke died in 2001.

Although she is not a beneficiary of Andrew Luke's trust, Edith Luke's last will and testament, executed in 2009, purports to bequeath a life estate in a one-fourth interest in that trust. It provides at Item Four:

I will, give, grant, bequeath and devise a life estate of my one-fourth (1/4th) share of the ANDREW LUKE IRREVOCABLE TRUST to ANDY LUKE, for his lifetime, however, subject to his paying one-half (½) of rents and one-half (½) of timber sales to TOMMIE CLARK each year. Upon ANDY LUKE's demise this one-fourth (1/4th) shall continue to be paid to TOMMIE CLARK for her lifetime, and upon TOMMIE CLARK'S demise this one-fourth (1/4th) shall remain and be a part of the ANDREW LUKE IRREVOCABLE TRUST and subject to the provisions thereof.

Edith Luke died in 2012. Litigation ensued. Andy Luke, his sister Tommie Clark, and others filed a petition against their siblings and others seeking, among other things, construction of Edith Luke's will. Tommie Clark later withdrew from the case. Andy Luke filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Andy Luke contends that Item Four of Edith Luke's will should be construed to leave him a life estate in his mother's interest in the farm property (subject to the provisions in favor of his sister Tommie Clark). The trial court granted the motion, finding that Item Four of the will "is unambiguous, and that the testator's clear intent was to leave her share of the farm property to her son, Andy Luke for his life, subject to the provisions regarding the care of Tommie [Clark]." At another point in its order, the trial court found that "it was the clear intent of Edith Luke to devise her interest in the Andrew W. Luke Revocable Trust to her son, Andy, for his life, subject to the provisions regarding the care of Tommie Clark." The defendants appeal.

2. Construing the will.

"The construction of a will is a question of law, which we review de novo." DeMott v. DeMott , 353 Ga. App. 190, 836 S.E.2d 612 (2019).

The cardinal rule in construing the provisions of a will is to determine the intent of the testator. It is well settled, however, that there is no room for construction when the meaning of the words used in the will is so plain and obvious that it cannot be misunderstood. This is true even if the words used in the will express a meaning entirely at variance with the real intention of the testator. The plain and unambiguous terms of a will must control and parol evidence cannot be used to contradict or give new meaning to that which is expressed clearly in the will. Equally important, the entire document is to be taken together, and operation should be given to every part of it. Where the will is ambiguous, the court should apply the rules of construction and may consider parol evidence of circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of execution of the will in order to ascertain the testator's intent.

Id. at 191, 836 S.E.2d 612 (citations and punctuation omitted).

In resolving ambiguities, "the court may hear parol evidence of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of execution to explain all ambiguities, whether latent or patent." OCGA § 53-4-56. "A patent ambiguity is one that appears on the face of the will, whereas a latent ambiguity is one that is not apparent on the face of the will, but only appears when the words of the will are put into operation." Redfearn Wills and Administration in Georgia , § 7:10 (2019-2020 ed.). See also Board of Regents v. Bates , 262 Ga. 307, 418 S.E.2d 8 (1992) ; Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank v. Clark , 172 Ga. 625, 630, 158 S.E. 297 (1931) ; Scheridan v. Scheridan , 132 Ga. App. 210, 207 S.E.2d 691 (1974). So courts have "considered parol evidence to correct [latent ambiguities of] misnamed or misidentified property and/or beneficiaries in a will[.]" Smith v. Ashford , 298 Ga. 390, 393 (2), 782 S.E.2d 251 (2016). See Redfearn Wills and Administration in Georgia , § 7:10 (2019-2020 ed.) ("Parol evidence is admissible to assist in determining the intention of the testator if property has been incorrectly described in the will.").

In this case, the trial court erred in finding that Item Four of the will is unambiguous. While Item Four is not patently ambiguous on its face, it contains latent ambiguities concerning the property devised that appear only when its words are put into operation. As an initial matter, the parties agree that there is no instrument known as the "Andrew W. Luke Irrevocable Trust" as referenced in Item Four. Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court's finding that this was merely a scrivener's error in referencing the "Andrew W. Luke Revocable Living Trust." See Benedict v. Snead , 271 Ga. 585, 586, 519 S.E.2d 905 (1999) (scrivener's error not permitted to defeat clear intent).

A more serious latent ambiguity arises from the fact that Edith Luke undertook to bequeath an interest in the trust even though she had no such interest. The bequest cannot be put into operation without resolving that ambiguity. Parol evidence must be considered to determine the testator's intent in devising a life estate of a one-fourth share of the trust. "In this situation, parol evidence of all of the facts and circumstances respecting persons and property to which the will relates are admissible as legitimate evidence to show the intention and application of the words used." Legare v. Legare , 268 Ga. 474, 476, 490 S.E.2d 369 (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted). "Accordingly, we [vacate the trial court's order] and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." DeMott , 353 Ga. App. at 193, 836 S.E.2d 612 (remanding case for trial court to consider parol evidence to resolve ambiguity in will and determine testator's intent in conveying certain property rights). See also Overvik v. Overvik , 242 Ga. App. 95, 100 (4), 527 S.E.2d 586 (2000) (remanding case to trial court to hear parol evidence to explain ambiguity and determine intent of trust language distributing property).

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

Doyle, P.J., and Hodges, J., concur.


Summaries of

Luke v. Luke

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jun 29, 2020
356 Ga. App. 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Case details for

Luke v. Luke

Case Details

Full title:LUKE et al. v. LUKE et al.

Court:Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Jun 29, 2020

Citations

356 Ga. App. 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
846 S.E.2d 216

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