Opinion
Case No.: SACV 20-02359-CJC(ADSx)
2021-05-03
Magdalena Aguirre LUCERO, individually and as a successor in interest to Moises Guillermo Portillo Aguirre, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE and Does 1–100, Defendant.
Humberto M. Guizar, Angel Carrazco, Kent Matthew Henderson, Guizar Henderson and Carrazco LLP, Irvine, CA, Christian M. Contreras, Guizar Henderson and Carrazco LLP, Montebello, CA, for Plaintiff. Jesse Keenon Cox, S. Frank Harrell, Norman J. Watkins, Lynberg and Watkins APC, Orange, CA, for Defendant.
Humberto M. Guizar, Angel Carrazco, Kent Matthew Henderson, Guizar Henderson and Carrazco LLP, Irvine, CA, Christian M. Contreras, Guizar Henderson and Carrazco LLP, Montebello, CA, for Plaintiff.
Jesse Keenon Cox, S. Frank Harrell, Norman J. Watkins, Lynberg and Watkins APC, Orange, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [Dkt. 25]
CORMAC J. CARNEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Magdalena Aguirre Lucero brings this civil rights action against Defendant County of Orange and unnamed Does in her individual capacity and as a successor in interest to her deceased son, Moises Guillermo Portillo Aguirre ("Mr. Aguirre"). Now before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 25.) For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED .
Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for May 17, 2021, at 1:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's son, Mr. Aguirre, died on February 11, 2020, while he was an inmate housed at the Theo Lacy Facility ("Theo Lacy") in Orange, California. (Dkt. 24 [Second Amended Complaint, hereinafter "SAC"] ¶ 10.) Mr. Aguirre had been incarcerated at Theo Lacy for approximately seventeen days at the time of his death. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Aguirre "had diagnosed health conditions that [Defendant] and Theo Lacy knew or should have known of" because Mr. Aguirre "exhibited obvious signs and symptoms of medical issues and medical complications." (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) Plaintiff further alleges that "these signs and symptoms had been known and documented by Defendants over an extended period of time." (Id. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff alleges claims for (1) denial of medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) deprivation of substantive due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) negligence, and (5) violation of California's Bane Act. On March 16, 2021, the Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 23.) The Court now considers whether to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's first two claims are brought against only the individual Doe Defendants while the final three claims are brought against Defendant County of Orange. As the only named Defendant, County of Orange moves to dismiss the claims against it.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims. The issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp. , 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp. , 669 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012). However, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it for (1) municipal liability under § 1983, (2) negligence, and (3) violation of California's Bane Act. Dismissal is warranted on each claim.
A. Monell Liability
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). "[A] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Instead, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 only when "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. To show that an unconstitutional policy existed, a Plaintiff must provide evidence of either (1) an expressly adopted policy, (2) a longstanding custom or practice, or (3) action taken by a final policy-maker. See Thomas v. Cnty. of Riverside , 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Christie v. Iopa , 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). When no formal governmental policy is at issue, however, plaintiffs face additional requirements and must allege that the practices complained of are "so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). In these cases, the custom "must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy." Trevino v. Gates , 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) ; see Brown , 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382 ("Rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.").
Plaintiff's Monell claims fail because she has not alleged facts demonstrating that Defendant's purported policies caused a constitutional violation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's policies violated Mr. Aguirre's constitutional rights by denying him medical care. (SAC ¶ 39.) An inmate "asserting a Section 1983 claim for denial of medical care must allege ‘acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’ " Chavez v. San Bernardino Cnty. , 2008 WL 638150, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008) (citing Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ). This means that the officers "actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to [the inmate's] health and safety." Williams v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. , 2020 WL 3882953, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2020) (citing Bailey v. Oakdale Police Dep't , 2008 WL 298864, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008) ). Plaintiff has failed to meet this requirement because she has not alleged either that Mr. Aguirre was suffering from any specific medical condition or that Defendant ignored any specific symptoms of Mr. Aguirre's medical condition. (See SAC ¶¶ 12–14, 23–24, 33, 39–44.) Notably, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Aguirre had "diagnosed" health conditions that were "documented ... over an extended period of time," but she cannot allege any facts specifying what those health conditions were. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) Dismissal of Plaintiff's Monell claim is therefore warranted.
Plaintiff's ratification theory of Monell liability also fails for additional reasons. To establish Monell liability based on ratification, a Plaintiff must allege that a final policymaker "knew of and specifically made a deliberate choice to approve" a constitutional violation. See Model Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 9.7 (2020); Herd v. Cnty. of San Bernardino , 311 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2018) ("The policymaker must have knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it."). But Plaintiff fails to "identify a policymaker ... or articulate any facts surrounding the circumstances of ratification, including when or how it occurred." Maldonado v. Cnty. of Orange , 2019 WL 6139937, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2019).
B. Negligence
Plaintiff also fails to allege facts demonstrating that relief is plausible on her negligence claim. Under California law, a public entity "generally cannot be sued for failing to provide medical care to a prisoner," unless "(1) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care." Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria , 915 F.3d 592, 606 (9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff's claim fails because she alleges no facts indicating that any of Defendant's employees knew or had reason to know that Mr. Aguirre needed immediate medical care. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant "breached [its] duty of care and failed to exercise ordinary care in the failure to provide medical evaluation, treatment and care of the Decedent." (SAC ¶ 55.) But Plaintiff never alleges any facts indicating either that Mr. Aguirre had a medical condition requiring immediate medical care or that he was exhibiting symptoms of a medical condition that would have alerted Defendant's employees to his need for medical care. Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that Mr. Aguirre "had diagnosed health conditions" and "obvious signs and symptoms" that Defendant knew about and "documented over an extended period of time." (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12–13.) Vague statements alleging that Defendant knew about Plaintiff's unspecified medical conditions are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
C. Bane Act
Plaintiffs bringing Bane Act claims for deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs must allege that prison officials "knowingly deprived [the inmate] of a constitutional right or protection through acts that are inherently coercive and threatening." Lapachet v. California Forensic Med. Grp., Inc. , 313 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (providing examples of unlawful acts "such as housing a prisoner in an inappropriate cell, failing to provide treatment plans or adequate mental health care, and failing to provide sufficient observations"); M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda , 90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 899 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Plaintiff fails to do so. She alleges that Defendant "used threats, intimidation, or coercion or attempted to use threats, intimidation, or coercion" to prevent Mr. Aguirre from seeking adequate medical care. (SAC ¶ 65.) Again, however, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts demonstrating that Mr. Aguirre needed medical care and was prevented from receiving that care by prison officials.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED . "Although the Court recognizes that this Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and that leave to amend should be freely granted, the Court is not required to grant leave to amend if the Court determines that permitting Plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility." El Dorado Cmty. Serv. Ctr. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles , 2017 WL 6017297, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017). Plaintiff has amended her complaint multiple times and has still failed to provide the Court with any facts or argument indicating that relief is plausible. See id. Accordingly, the Court concludes that leave to amend the complaint would be futile and DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend.