Opinion
Civil No. 2003-100.
November 5, 2007
Warren B. Cole, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., For the plaintiff. Lee J. Rohn, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., For defendant and cross-defendant Pablo O'Neill. Douglas A. Brady, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., For defendant and cross-defendant John J. Deluca and third-party defendant Cathy Deluca. Edward L. Barry, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., For defendant, cross-defendant and third-party defendant Karen Chasen in her capacity as Trustee of the Leonard Chasen Family Trust, H.A. Curt Otto, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., For defendant, cross-claimant and third-party plaintiff Walter G. Brunner. Yvette D. Ross-Edwards, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., For third-party defendant Nieves O'Neill.
ORDER
LPP Mortgage, Ltd. ("LPP") initiated the above-captioned action for debt and foreclosure against defendants Brammer, Chasen O'Connell (the "Partnership"), Ava-Gail Jagroop-Bourdon as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Leonard Chasen (the "Chasen Estate"), Pablo O'Neill, John J. Deluca, Michael Neely ("Neely"), Walter J. Brunner, and Karen Chasen in her capacity as trustee of the Leonard Chasen Family Trust (the "Chasen Trust").
The Complaint named Karen Chasen as the personal representative of the Estate of Leonard Chasen. Ava-Gail Jagroop-Bourdon was later substituted for Karen Chasen.
On May 4, 2004, this Court entered defaults against Neely, the Chasen Estate and the Chasen Trust. On June 18, 2004, the Court entered a default against the Partnership. The Court set aside the entry of default against the Chasen Estate and the Chasen Trust on August 16, 2004. The Court reentered a default against the Chasen Estate on July 18, 2005. The Court set aside the entry of default against Neely on November 8, 2005.
On September 16, 2005, LPP filed this motion for default judgments against Neely and the Chasen Trust.
LPP also moved for a default judgment against the Partnership and the Chasen Estate. The motion as to those parties is not addressed in this Order.
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a two-step process for a party seeking default judgment. A plaintiff must first obtain an entry of default from the clerk of the court, and then he may seek an entry of default judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55; Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981); see also 10A FED. PRAC. PROC. CIV. 3d § 2682 ("Prior to obtaining a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a)").
Here, LPP seeks default judgments against parties without having obtained entries of default. While defaults were entered against those parties at an earlier stage of this litigation, those defaults have been set aside. Thus, LPP has not yet completed the first step of seeking an entry of default. This step is the necessary predicate to a grant of default judgment against any defendant. Accordingly, LPP's motion for default judgments against Neely and the Chasen Trust must de denied. See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000); Peak v. District of Columbia, 236 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2006) (denying a motion for a default judgment where the plaintiff had not first sought an entry of default).
For the reasons stated above, it is herebyORDERED that the motion for default judgments against Neely and the Chasen Trust is DENIED.