Opinion
7:02-CV-212-R
July 30, 2003
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ON THIS DATE, came on to be considered the papers and pleadings filed in this action, and the Circuit finds and orders as follows:
This is a petition for habeas corpus relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an inmate confined in the James v. Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") in Iowa Park, Texas. Lovett seeks to challenge the validity of a disciplinary action taken against him when he was confined in the Rudd Unit in Brownfield Texas. In that case, Lovett was found guilty of soliciting assistance from a TDCJ employee to violate TDCJ rules after he asked for cold medication at the prison pill window without a prescription. Amended Complaint p. 4. In his sole ground for relief, Lovett claims that there was insufficient notice to inform him that his conduct was prohibited and, therefore, he was wrongfully disciplined. Id. at pp 4-8.
The due process rights of prisoners are generally limited to freedom of restraint which "impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Restrictions which alter the conditions of confinement do not implicate due process. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000) (commissary and cell restrictions); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). A prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time only if he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58; see also Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir.) (finding that Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in early release on parole), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1210, 111 S.Ct. 2809 (1991).
When a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time credits, the revocation of such credits must comply with minimal procedural due process. Henson v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 2000); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974) (holding that prisoners are entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated"). These minimal requirements are: (1) written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation at least 24 hours prior to a hearing; (2) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the hearing officer as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Federal habeas review of the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely limited. Due process requires only "some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing." Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768; see Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring the court to determine whether" any evidence at all" supports disciplinary action taken by prison officials), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 1619 (1982).
The Court initially observes that changes in custody status level or restrictions on privileges as a result of a prison disciplinary action do not implicate due process concerns. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958; Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. However, Petitioner claims that he lost previously earned good-time credits and that he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision. See Amended Petition p. 7. Therefore, it appears that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest sufficient to justify the consideration of his petition on the merits. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958-59.
Review of the claims set forth in his petition reflects that Lovett has failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas relief. He does not claim to have been denied written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation prior to the hearing and he makes no claim that he was denied witnesses, denied the right to present evidence or that he was denied a written statement from the hearing officer as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2979.
Lovett claims only that the conduct for which he was charged did not constitute a violation of TDCJ disciplinary rules. Petitioner asks this Court to reverse the disciplinary decision by considering and finding that he had a meritorious defense against the charge. Unfortunately, this Court is without authority to retry his disciplinary case on the merits. "[This] court is not required to examine the entire record, make an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weigh evidence." Hudson, 242 F.3d at 538 (Pogue, J., specially concurring). Federal courts hold no appellate authority over prison disciplinary proceedings and may intervene only to correct errors of constitutional magnitude. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982). Federal courts "do not sit as a super state supreme court in habeas corpus proceedings to review errors under state law." Cronnon v. State of Alabama, 587 F.2d 246, 250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 1542 (1979). The fact that Lovett did not prevail on his defense at the time of the disciplinary action does not give rise to any issue of constitutional magnitude. Petitioner has failed to present a ground for relief which could show that the disciplinary action taken against him was constitutionally infirm.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.