Summary
noting the "well-established rule of dismissing pendant state and municipal claims where the federal claim providing jurisdiction has been dismissed"
Summary of this case from WEST 79th STREET CORP. v. CONGREGATION KAHL MINCHAS CHINUCHOpinion
01 Civ. 11400 (RWS)
July 24, 2002
LAW OFFICES OF LEONARD N. FLAMM, New York, NY, By: LEONARD N. FLAMM, ESQ., Of Counsel, Attorney for Plaintiff.
WILSON, EDSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN DICKER, New York, NY, By: RICKI E. ROER, ESQ., Of Counsel, Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
Defendant St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center ("St. Luke's" or the "Hospital") has moved under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Dahla Louis ("Louis") alleging race and disability discrimination on the part of St. Luke's. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Prior Proceedings
Louis, an African-American female, was employed as an ultrasound technician in the cardiology department at St. Luke's beginning in 1997. She sustained a shoulder injury while at work in February 2000, and subsequently left on medical leave. Louis wanted to return to work in June 2000 with three restrictions: no lifting more than 25 pounds, no repetitive overhead shoulder use, and no pushing of sonography equipment. According to Louis, St. Luke's refused her request and terminated her employment.
Louis filed a complaint against St. Luke's on December 12, 2001, asserting three causes of action: (1) racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) disability discrimination in violation of New York City's Human Rights Law (the "HRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 (15) (a); and (3) racial discrimination in violation of the HRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). Louis claims that she received "abrupt and callous treatment" by St. Luke's because of her race and disability "since similarly situated Caucasian employees with disabilities" were treated differently.
St. Luke's subsequently brought the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which was marked fully submitted on April 10, 2002.
Discussion
I. Louis Has Sufficiently Pled Racial Discrimination Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Under the HRL
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all factual allegations made in the complaint must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999); Bolt Elec., Inc. v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995). Dismissal is appropriate "only if 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" ICOM Holding, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris, 186 F.3d at 250). "At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the issue is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail ultimately, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)).
The Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for dismissal as it relates to employment discrimination claims. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Court, in reviewing this Circuit's use of a heightened pleading standard for discrimination claims brought under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), held that a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim is required only to comply with the liberal rules for notice pleading set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Id. at 995. The plaintiff must only provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (2), and "[s]uch a statement must simply 'give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 998 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
The sufficiency of claims brought under Section 1981 and related state and local civil rights statutes are commonly analyzed using the standards applied in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Hargett v. Nat'l Westminister Bank, USA, 78 F.3d 836, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Title VII analysis to Section 1981 claim); see also Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining in summary judgment context that the procedure for demonstrating race discrimination under state and city anti-discrimination laws follows the same standard as that for claims under Title VII).
St. Luke's contends that Louis' attempt to plead claims of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the New York City HRL must fail because they are premised on conclusory allegations and do not meet even the liberal requirements of Rule 8(a). However, as one court noted recently:
A complaint that complies with the federal rules of civil procedure cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is conclusory or fails to allege facts. The federal rules require (with irrelevant exceptions) only that the complaint state a claim, not that it plead the facts that if true would establish (subject to any defenses) that the claim was valid. . . . All that need be specified is the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file an answer.
Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Levesanos v. White, No. 01 Civ. 8687 (SAS), 2002 WL 1202472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2002). Here, Louis, an African-American female, has specifically alleged that she requested a reasonable accommodation during the recuperative phase of her shoulder injury, that her request was denied, and that she was then terminated by St. Luke's. She provides the names of some of the individuals involved and lists several pertinent dates, including the dates of her injury, her requests for accommodation, the Hospital's denial of the accommodation, and her termination. Louis alleges that these actions were motivated by her race and by her disability since similar situated Caucasian employees with disabilities were treated differently. Although the complaint provides few details regarding the alleged disparate treatment, it is sufficient to meet the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). See Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 999 (petitioner's complaint satisfied Rule 8(a) requirements where it "detailed the events leading to the termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with [the] termination").
II. The Faragher/Burlington Defense is Not Applicable
St. Luke's also argues that because Louis has failed to plead that she utilized the Hospital's discrimination prevention policies regarding her racial and disability discrimination claims, the Hospital has a complete and absolute defense based on the Supreme Court's holdings in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).
Faragher and Burlington were Title VII cases in which employees had alleged sexual harassment by their supervisors. Both cases, reviewing the application of agency principles to Title VII liability, held that employers are liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor with immediate authority over an employee, but that such liability can be avoided in cases where the supervisor's harassment does not result in a "tangible employment action" against the plaintiff-employee. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765. Specifically, the Court held that "[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages [which] comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
While the Faragher/Burlington defense has been applied in this Circuit to race-based discrimination claims, see, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 442 (2d Cir. 1999); Woodcock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr. Univ. Hosp. of Albert Einstein Coll. of Med., No. 98 Civ. 4420 (ILG), 2002 WL 403601, at *6-*7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2002), the allegations in the instant complaint preclude St. Luke's from asserting the defense since Louis allegedly suffered a "tangible employment action" when she was terminated. As the Supreme Court stated explicitly in Faragher and Burlington, "[n]o affirmative defense is available . . . when the supervisor's harassment culminates in tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765. Thus, even if one assumes the Hospital had a grievance procedure in place and Louis reasonably could have used it, the Faragher/Burlington defense is not applicable based on the facts alleged.
III. The Disability Discrimination Claim Will Not Be Severed
Finally, St. Luke's claims that Louis' disability discrimination claim under the New York City HRL should be severed and dismissed on the ground that this Court is not the proper forum for City discrimination laws to be applied. In support of its argument, St. Luke's quotes the recent decision by the Court of Appeals in Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001), where the court stated that "the appropriate analytic framework to be applied to discrimination claims based on a disability as defined by New York state and municipal law is a question best left to the courts of New York." Id. at 754.
However, in Giordano, the court was explicit in stating that supplemental jurisdiction was not appropriate in that case "[i]n the absence of any remaining federal claims." Id. at 754. The decision followed the well-established rule of dismissing pendant state and municipal claims where the federal claim providing jurisdiction has been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3); Marcus v. ATT Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1988)). Here, the federal claim has not been dismissed, and the remaining claims asserted against St. Luke's arise from the same facts and are part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). There is therefore no indication at this stage in the proceedings that supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Hospital's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.
It is so ordered.