Opinion
B227770
09-28-2011
In re T.T., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Te. T., Defendant and Appellant.
Anna L. Ollinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant Deputy Counsel, and Judith A. Luby, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK82968)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Comissioner. Affirmed.
Anna L. Ollinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant Deputy Counsel, and Judith A. Luby, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Te. T. is the mother of T.T., a dependent of the juvenile court. Te. contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's dispositional order requiring Te. to engage in drug testing. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
T.T. was born to Te. in mid-2010. Because Te. was homeless when T.T. was born, Leslie Perez, a case worker for the "Welcome Baby Program," arranged for Te. and T.T. to live in a hotel and provided Te. with homeless assistance, Medi-Cal benefits, cash aid, and food stamps. Shortly after T.T.'s birth, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral regarding T.T., which alleged that Te. had stood outside her residence swinging T.T. by the arms. DCFS found no immediate safety concerns, but asked Te. to submit to a mental health assessment and a random drug test.
Approximately two weeks later, the DCFS social worker conducting a follow-up investigation could not locate Te., who had moved out of her hotel. The social worker contacted Perez, who said that prior to T.T.'s birth, Te. had hitchhiked to California from Kentucky, where she also had been homeless. According to Perez, when Te. arrived at the hospital where T.T. was born, she told the hospital staff that she had received no prenatal care and was unaware that she was pregnant. After T.T.'s birth, Te. failed to take T.T. to medical appointments and child care referrals. In addition, Perez said that Te. talked and laughed to herself, and sometimes yelled profanities for no apparent reason.
DCFS eventually located Te. at the Union Rescue Mission (URM), where she was living with T.T. Te.'s URM case manager said that Te. appeared to be "'mentally off'" during the intake process, as she had gazed at the ceiling and walls while failing to respond to questions. Although T.T. appeared to be healthy and Te. had food and other necessities for her care, Te. was slow to respond to T.T.'s crying, even when told that T.T. might need food or fresh diapers. When the DCFS social worker asked Te. why she had not taken T.T. to medical appointments, Te. said that she lacked Medi-Cal benefits and transportation. The DCFS social worker informed Te. that she had active Medi-Cal benefits and that Perez was prepared to provide transportation.
Te. and T.T. were permitted to continue living at URM. However, although Te. signed a "safety plan" under which she agreed to undergo a mental health evaluation, submit to drug testing, and take T.T. to a specified doctor, Te. performed none of these actions. In early July 2010, Kentucky's child welfare agency informed DCFS of an open investigation regarding Te.'s son, Sean T., born in 2005. The investigation had begun in 2010 due to allegations that Te. had neglected Sean. According to a Kentucky state social worker, Te.'s family believed she had suffered a mental health breakdown, as she appeared to hear voices and hold conversations with them. The family stated that when Te. left Sean T. with her mother prior to coming to California, Te. said, "I have to get on this plane to go back and fight in this war."
In early July 2010, DCFS also received a referral alleging that Te. had been seen walking around the URM compound at 5:00 a.m. wearing sunglasses; that she left URM early in the morning with T.T., who was protected only by a light blanket that did not fully cover her; that she had forcibly fed T.T. in a manner that made T.T. cry; and that she had said that she was a 44-year old woman with 14 children ranging in age from 18 to 24. In investigating the referral, the DCFS social worker learned that Te. had been seen with T.T. on San Julian Street, an area of "[s]kid [r]ow" with numerous drug users, drug dealers, and prostitutes. T.T. appeared to be improperly dressed for the weather.
When the DCFS social worker talked to Te. regarding her noncompliance with the safety plan and the referral allegations, Te. denied any misconduct. She maintained that she had taken T.T. to see a doctor, albeit one not specified by the safety plan. She further told the social worker that she knew how to care for T.T. because she was a 44-year-old woman with 14 children, the oldest of which was Sean T., whom she described as 24 years old. According to Te., she lacked sufficient funds to buy diapers and other necessities for T.T., and had to "walk[] around asking for money to buy another [baby] bottle."
On July 7, 2010, respondent DCFS filed a petition regarding T.T. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged in count b-1 that Te. had a history of mental and emotional problems, including auditory hallucinations, and in count b-2 that she had failed to provide stable housing for T.T. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining T.T. and placed her in shelter care. The juvenile court also ordered DCFS to provide Te. with reunification services and monitored visitation. The juvenile court later found that Harold B. was T.T.'s alleged father, based on Te.'s statements in court.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
In a report dated August 25, 2010, DCFS stated that Te. had said that she first met Harold B. in March 2010. They never lived together, but dated approximately twice a month. According to Te., they talked in hotel rooms, where she would have "a shot or two, like liquor, like brandy or whiskey," while Harold abstained from alcoholic drinks. She asserted that their only sexual encounter occurred in March 2010.
Te. also stated that she loved T.T., and never forcibly fed or endangered her. She denied conversing with herself, saying she merely silently mouthed songs and poems she liked. She denied having any issues with drugs, and asserted that she had failed to test for drugs only because DCFS had failed to send the necessary paperwork to the testing facility. She also denied that she ever said, "I am a 44 year old woman and I have 14 children and I know what I am doing." Te. attributed this remark to another woman living at URM. Regarding her change of residences, Te. stated that she moved to URM because she ran out of funds to pay for her hotel room and could not obtain more money from a case worker.
In addition, DCFS reported that according to Te.'s mother, Te. departed Kentucky in 2009, leaving behind Sean T. Before Te. moved to California, she appeared to be hallucinating. Te.'s mother said: "[Te.] thought the police [were] following her and . . . that she was in the service and [that] she had to go defuse a bomb and [that] she was in Iraq." Te.'s mother also stated that Te.'s mental disorder was "a surprise," as she had attended college and had been employed. According to Te.'s mother, the mental disorder "just happened overnight."
On August 25, 2010, DCFS also submitted a mental health assessment for Te. dated July 9, 2010, which stated: "[Te.] is found to be mentally stable. She denies depression and there is no evidence of psychotic thinking or hallucinations. At this time [Te.] is able to care for her child on a permanent basis." Later, at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, DCFS reported that the agency responsible for the mental health assessment had declared the assessment to be inaccurate and "written in error," as it had been prepared by an unlicensed clinician not authorized to issue it.
A combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing occurred on September 23, 2010. In connection with the hearing, DCFS reported that it had interviewed Harold B., who was employed at the New Image Shelter. He denied any personal relationship with Te., denied fathering a child by her, and offered to submit to DNA testing. According to Harold B., he first met Te. in December 2009, and helped her find shelter. He believed that she had "mental issues," as she talked to herself, and also told him that she was a United States Marine who had served in Iraq and had seven children.
DCFS also provided additional evidence on several other matters. Case worker Perez said that after she found shelter for Te. and T.T. in a hotel and provided Te. with cash aid, she saw that Te. had procured wine coolers and cigarettes. DCFS further stated that although a paperwork error had initially prevented Te. from testing for drug use, as required under her safety plan, Te. failed to appear for testing after the error had been rectified. In addition, according to a DCFS social worker, Te. repeatedly said that she was 44 years old, even after being told that she was not that age.
The DCFS and Kentucky state agency documents in the record state that Te. was born in 1985.
On the basis of the DCFS reports admitted at the hearing, the juvenile court sustained only count b-1 of the petition, concluding that Te. had mental or emotional problems that endangered T.T. The court declared T.T. a dependent of the court, removed T.T. from Te.'s custody, and ordered family reunification services for Te.; in addition, as Te. admitted at the hearing that she did not know the identity of T.T.'s father, the court determined that Harold B. was not T.T.'s alleged father. Te. was directed to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and participate in individual counseling. She was also ordered to undergo six random drug tests; furthermore, she was to complete a drug rehabilitation program if she missed a test or tested positively.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Te. challenges only the dispositional order regarding random drug testing. She contends there is insufficient evidence to support the order, arguing that the record contains only unsubstantiated allegations that she had engaged in substance abuse. For the reasons explained below, we reject this contention.
Generally, the juvenile court "has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion. [Citations.]" (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006 (Christopher H.).) However, "the juvenile court's discretion in fashioning reunification orders is not unfettered. Its orders must be 'reasonable' and 'designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.' [Citation.] 'The reunification plan "'must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.'" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229.)
Under these principles, the juvenile court may properly issue dispositional orders not directly tied to jurisdictional findings "when [it] is aware of other deficiencies that impede the parent's ability to reunify with [a] child." (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.) In Christopher H., the section 300 petition, as sustained, alleged only that the child had high-risk medical problems, but the case plan required the father to be evaluated for substance abuse and to participate in drug and alcohol testing. (In re Christopher H., at p. 1005.) On appeal, the father contended that the dispositional order regarding evaluation and testing were improper. (Id. at p. 1006.) As the record established that the father had driven under the influence of alcohol, the appellate court rejected the contention, reasoning that the juvenile court properly determined that the father's substance abuse would impede his ability to reunify with his child if not addressed in the reunification plan. (Id. at p. 1008.)
We see no abuse of discretion here. To the extent the juvenile court's discretionary ruling rests on findings, whether express or implied, we examine the record for substantial evidence to support these findings. (See In re Jesse B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 845, 850.) We will affirm the findings if examination of the record, reviewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the order, discloses evidence that is "'reasonable, credible and of solid value'" which would allow a reasonable trier of fact to make the pertinent findings. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080, quoting In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) Upon review for substantial evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.)
To begin, the court-ordered drug testing appears to include testing for alcohol use. The evidence admitted at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing supports the reasonable inference that Te. had, in fact, engaged in drinking or substance abuse that impeded her ability to care for T.T. Te., in describing her relationship with Harold B., acknowledged that she sometimes drank liquor. Although Te. told DCFS that the cash aid she received was insufficient to provide shelter and necessities for T.T., she managed to procure wine coolers for herself. There was also evidence that Te. took T.T. to an area containing drug dealers and drug users, even though T.T. was not properly clothed for the weather.
On this matter, we note that the limited record before us includes a standardized DCFS "on demand" substance testing referral form, which shows that drugs tests rendered under the form also check for alcohol use.
In addition, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that testing would assist in resolving whether substance abuse contributed to the problem underlying Te.'s loss of custody of T.T. Te. does not challenge the court's finding that she suffers from a mental or emotional disorder that impairs her ability to care for T.T. As the source of Te.'s disorder is unknown and she has failed to test for substance abuse despite agreeing to do so, the court-ordered drug testing will facilitate the assessment of Te.'s disorder.
Te.'s reliance on In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155 and In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957 is misplaced. In Basilio T., the appellate court reversed a drug testing order imposed on a child's parents, as it was based solely on a social worker's observation that the mother behaved unusually and was obsessed with an invention that could potentially make her wealthy. (In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172-173.) In contrast, the drug testing order here was adequately based on Te.'s admitted alcohol consumption and apparent purchase of alcoholic drinks, as well as her mental disorder, the existence of which was confirmed by several witnesses. In Sergio C., the appellate court reversed a drug testing order based exclusively on an unsworn and unconfirmed allegation that a father had used drugs. (In re Sergio C., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 960-961.) As explained above, there is sufficient evidence to support the order at issue here. In sum, the juvenile court did not err in ordering Te. to engage in drug testing.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MANELLA, J. We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J. SUZUKAWA, J.