Opinion
No. CV 04 4000767S
November 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ISSUE SUBMISSION
Whether the court should grant the plaintiff's Application For Order To Proceed With Arbitration. The court rejects the plaintiffs' application and grants the defendants' Motion To Dismiss because the plaintiff does not have the right to request arbitration under General Statutes § 52-410.
FACTS
Presently before the court is the Application For Order To Proceed With Arbitration filed by the plaintiff, Margaret E. Loris, on August 24, 2004. The plaintiff is asking the court to issue an order directing the defendants, the Norwalk Board of Education and the Norwalk Federation of Teachers, to arbitrate, pursuant to a certain collective bargain agreement, a grievance related to her employment as a teacher with the defendant Norwalk Board of Education. In their answers, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff does not have the right to request arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. The court heard the matter on August 30, 2004. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a supplemental brief with an attached copy of the collective bargain agreement on September 14, 2004.
The collective bargaining agreement, an excerpt of which is attached to the plaintiff's application, was in effect between the defendants from September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2004.
On September 8, 2004, defendant Norwalk Board of Education filed its answer. On September 14, 2004 defendant Norwalk Federation of Teachers filed its answer and alleged as special defenses that (1) the plaintiff lacks standing; (2) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement bar the application; and (3) the allegations in the complaint do not meet the requirements for requesting arbitration of a grievance as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. Defendant Norwalk Board of Education also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's application for lack of standing on August 30, 2004.
"If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at anytime . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 280, 823 A.2d 1172 (2003). General Statutes § 52-410(a) provides that "[a] party to a written agreement for arbitration claiming the neglect or refusal of another to proceed with an arbitration thereunder may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides . . . for an order directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in compliance with their agreement."
The plaintiff is seeking a court order compelling arbitration arguing that, under the collective bargaining agreement, she has the right, as an interested party therein, to file a grievance and submit the grievance to arbitration. The defendants assert that the terms of the agreement do not give the plaintiff the right to request arbitration. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot seek an order to compel arbitration because she lacks standing, which in turn deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
"[I]ndividual employees may be `parties' to a collective bargaining agreement for the purposes of General Statutes § 52-410 if the collective bargaining agreement so provides. An employee has input in the contract negotiations through the union, has a clear interest in seeing the contract enforced and would have standing to compel arbitration under the statute if accorded that right in the agreement. Thus, if the collective bargaining agreement contains no provision giving employees the right to submit disputes to arbitration, then an employee could not seek relief under the statute." Paranko v. State, 200 Conn. 51, 55-56, 509 A.2d 508 (1986).
In arguing that she has a right to request arbitration under the collective bargain agreement, the plaintiff relies on Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 117, 139 A.2d 611 (1958). In that case, the court interpreted a collective bargaining agreement which provided that "if the aggrieved party or the [u]nion does not take the grievance to the next higher step or to arbitration . . ., the grievance shall be deemed to have been settled and shall not be subject to further appeal or to arbitration." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 118. The court held that individual employees had a right to request arbitration although a different clause of the agreement provided that grievances "may be taken either by the [u]nion or the [c]ompany to arbitration . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 118-9.
Conversely, in Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 21 Conn.Sup. 98, 100 (1958), aff'd, 147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815, 81 S.Ct. 42, 5 L.Ed.2d 46 (1960), the court found that a collective bargaining agreement, providing that grievances "shall be submitted to arbitration upon written request of either the [u]nion or the [c]ompany," did not confer the right to arbitration to individual employees. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court distinguished the case before it from Gilden because in the latter it was the contract's reference to the aggrieved party's right to arbitration that showed the intent to confer such right to individual employees. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the decision holding that "[t]he collective bargaining agreement limits the right to arbitrate to the union and the company. No provision is made for arbitration at the request or demand of an employee. Without such a provision in the contract, the plaintiffs cannot compel the defendant to arbitrate . . . The agreement, unlike that in Gilden . . . does not contain language which affords to an employee the opportunity, personally, to seek arbitration." (Citations omitted.) Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 147 Conn. 130, 133-34, 157 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815, 81 S.Ct. 42, 5 L.Ed.2d 46 (1960).
In the present case, article 6, Section 6b, of the collective bargaining agreement provides that grievances may be submitted for arbitration "[u]pon written request of the defendant Norwalk Federation of Teachers. Not only does this provision mirror the contractual provision at issue in Arsenault, but like in that case and unlike in Gilden, no other provision in the agreement makes reference to an aggrieved party's right to request arbitration. Therefore, the court finds that, as in Arsenault, the collective bargaining agreement does not provide for such right, and consequently the plaintiff has no standing to seek a court's order under § 52-410.
The court, therefore, denies the plaintiff's application for an order compelling arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement does not provide the plaintiff with the right to submit a grievance to arbitration. The plaintiff, therefore, lacks standing, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Richard J. Tobin Judge Trial Referee