Summary
finding that where the "record does not reflect plaintiff's immigration status, we cannot consider whether Hoffman Plastic applies to his claim"
Summary of this case from Molina v. J.F.K. Tailor Corp.Opinion
01 Civ. 10010 (NRB)
August 21, 2002
Counsel for Plaintiff: Laura Sager, Esq.
Counsel for Defendent, Alan E. Sash, Esq., McLaughlin Stern, LLP
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Antonio Lopez brings this action against his former employer, Superflex, Ltd. ("Superflex"), under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), the New York City Human Rights Law, 15 Exec. Law § 296(1)(a), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise stated, the facts set out in this section are drawn from plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff began working in defendant's hose-making factory in November 1999. On October 12, 2000, plaintiff was admitted to Coney Island Hospital where he was diagnosed with kidney failure. After undergoing surgery twice, plaintiff began receiving kidney dialysis treatment and was released from the hospital on October 21, 2000. The following day, he returned to Superflex, where he was told that he would need a letter from his doctor in order to resume work. When he brought a doctor's note to Superflex, one of its owners allegedly told plaintiff he would not be allowed to return to work and terminated him without attempting to determine whether he could perform his previous job or any other job at the company. Since entering the hospital, plaintiff has continued to receive kidney dialysis twice a week.
Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, alleging a violation of the ADA, on November 13, 2001. After obtaining counsel, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 30, 2002, in which he sought reinstatement to his position or another position at Superflex, backpay, damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. Am. Comp. ¶ 28.
At an initial pretrial conference held on April 19, 2002, plaintiff's counsel served a Second Amended Complaint, withdrawing the claims for backpay and reinstatement in light of the Supreme Court's decision inHoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 1283-84 (Mar. 27, 2002) (holding that illegal immigrants could not sue for backpay for wrongful terminations under the National Labor Relations Act). At the conference, plaintiff's counsel expressly refused to stipulate to plaintiff's immigration status, stating that the complaint was amended in "an attempt to simplify the issues." Transcript of April 19, 2002, conference ("Tr.") at 7. In an effort to avoid reaching the issue of plaintiff's immigration status, we invited defendant to move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that an ADA claim could not be based solely on a claim for punitive damages and emotional distress without requesting backpay or reinstatement. Defendant filed the instant motion on May 23, 2002.
DISCUSSION
I. Punitive Damages as Sole Claim in ADA Cases
An award of backpay or reinstatement is not a prerequisite for a punitive damages award under the ADA. In Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit vacated a jury's award of backpay on an ADA claim on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had mitigated his lost wages damages subsequent to his termination, but it specifically affirmed an award of punitive damages even in the absence of compensatory damages. The Circuit Court stated that, although plaintiff failed to mitigate his lost earnings damages, "for the discriminatory wrong he suffered in being fired, the employee is entitled to the punitive damages awarded him by the jury . . ." Id. at 48. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp.2d 1313, 1326 (D.N.M. 1998), aff'd 202 F.3d 281 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (stating that "nothing in [the statute] conditions an award of punitive damages on an underlying award for compensatory damages."). EEOC v. Wal-Mart is particularly instructive because it deals with an award of punitive damages against a prospective employer who asked an improper question under the ADA, a situation in which the plaintiff could not receive backpay because he was never hired by the defendant, but he nonetheless suffered an injury. Id. at 1324-25.
The jury awarded plaintiff punitive damages of $1 million, but the magistrate judge, who conducted the trial, reduced that figure to $200,000, the statutory limit for punitive and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(C), which limits recoverable damages for claims brought under the ADA. Greenway, 143 F.3d at 50 n. 1.
Defendant cites 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(2), which states that the "complaining party [in an ADA action] may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)], from the respondent." Based on this language, defendant contends that backpay is a prerequisite for other forms of relief where, as here, "loss of wages and employment is the crux of the plaintiff's claim." Def. Mem. at 10-11 nn. 5-7. The defendant's "crux of the plaintiff's claim" argument fails in light of Greenway, where the plaintiff's backpay claim was the "crux" of his case.
II. Plaintiff's Immigration Status
Defendant contends that the real :issue in this case is not the "purely academic issue" discussed above but instead whether plaintiff's claim is viable in light of Hoffman Plastics. Def. Reply Mem. at 2. Defendant further asserts that, on the basis of the record, we have sufficient evidence to rule on plaintiff's immigration status. Id. at 4. Notwithstanding defendant's arguments to the contrary, plaintiff's counsel has been careful not to make any statements or concessions regarding plaintiff's status. Plaintiff's decision to withdraw his backpay and reinstatement claims does not itself constitute an admission, though his refusal to answer any questions about his status could lead to an adverse inference as to his status. As the record does not reflect plaintiff's immigration status, we cannot yet consider whether Hoffman Plastics applies to his claim.
At the conference, plaintiff's counsel indicated that she intended to instruct her client not to answer any questions related to his immigration status in order to force defendant to bring a motion to compel his testimony in order to determine its relevance. Tr. at 7. The question of whether Hoffman Plastics applies only to awards of backpay and reinstatement or whether it similarly precludes illegal immigrants from bringing suits for punitive and compensatory damages is not before us at this time. However, we note that the Supreme Court's stated that "if an employer unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien . . . the employer is compelled to discharge the worker upon discovery of the worker's undocumented status" and that "awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations." Hoffman Plastics, 122 S.Ct. at 1283-84.
A. Pleading Requirements
Defendant claims that, in light of Hoffman Plastics, a plaintiff must prove that he is legally employed in order to be entitled to federal relief, and that, therefore, he must plead that he is documented alien. Def. Reply Mem. at 6. We do not agree that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) would require a plaintiff to plead that he was legally working in the United States, even if we were to determine that Hoffman Plastics applies to ADA claims for punitive and compensatory damages. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this type of heightened pleading in the absence of a requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 997-999 (2002) (overturning Second Circuit rule requiring plaintiffs bringing Title VII claims to plead a prima facie case of discrimination). Lopez has made a short, plain statement of facts upon which relief can be granted, and therefore he has met the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).
B. Standing to Sue
Defendant also argues that plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has standing to sue. Def. Reply Mem. at 7-8. If Hoffman Plastics does deny undocumented workers the relief sought by plaintiff, then he would lack standing. As that issue is not ripe for decision, we decline to rule on it at this time. However, if plaintiff were to admit to being in the United States illegally, or were to refuse to answer questions regarding his status on the grounds that it is not relevant, then the issue of his standing would properly be before us, and we would address the issue of whether Hoffman Plastics applies to ADA claims for compensatory and punitive damages brought by undocumented aliens.
If we do ultimately reach this issue, it could result in a judicial finding that plaintiff is illegally residing in the United States and therefore is subject to deportation.