Opinion
Submitted November 4, 1999
December 20, 1999
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bruno, J.), dated August 7, 1998, as denied her cross motion for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint upon the New York City Transit Authority.
Bisogno Meyerson, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Michael C. Meyerson of counsel), for appellant.
Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Lawrence Heisler of counsel), for defendant Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and nonparty respondent New York City Transit Authority.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN and NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff was allegedly injured while riding in a bus owned by the New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA). After filing notices of claim against both the NYCTA and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (hereinafter the MTA) alleging negligence, the plaintiff served the MTA, but not the NYCTA, with a summons and complaint. The MTA moved pursuant toCPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action, contending that it does not control the daily operation of any mass transit facility in the City of New York. The plaintiff cross-moved for leave to file a supplemental summons and amended complaint naming the NYCTA as a defendant.
The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's cross motion to add the NYCTA as a defendant since the Statute of Limitations had expired (see, Public Authorities Law § 1212[2]). It is well settled that the functions of the MTA and the NYCTA differ and they are not united in interest in this case (see, Steward v. New York City Hous. Auth., 205 A.D.2d 606 ; Zaiman v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 186 A.D.2d 555). Because the MTA and the NYCTA are not united in interest, the relation-back doctrine does not apply (see, CPLR 203[b]; Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173 ; LL Plumbing Heating v. DePalo, 253 A.D.2d 517 ; Desiderio v. Rubin, 234 A.D.2d 581 ).
BRACKEN, J.P., THOMPSON, FRIEDMANN, and SMITH, JJ., concur.