Opinion
CIVIL NO. 16-2372 (CCC)
2020-10-20
Sandra LOPEZ-LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. The ROBINSON SCHOOL INC., et al., Defendants.
Manuel E. Lopez-Fernandez, Manuel E. Lopez Fernandez Law Office, Jose G. Fagot-Diaz, Fagot Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff. Juan F. Santos-Caraballo, Maralyssa Alvarez-Sanchez, Jackson Lewis LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendants The Robinson School, Maria Teresa Larrieu. Jose E. O'Neill-Font, San Juan, PR, for Defendants San Juan Capestrano Hospital, Inc., Continental Insurance Company. Joan Schlump-Peters, Nachman & Guillemard, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Daniel M. Hildebrand. Ramonita Dieppa-Gonzalez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Melvin Santoni-Crespo, MD. Doris Quinones-Tridas, Quinones Tridas Law Office, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Angel M. Naravez-Morell, MD. Bayoan Muniz-Calderon, Saldana, Carvajal & Velez-Rive, PSC., San Juan, PR, for Defendant AIG Insurance Co-Puerto Rico.
Manuel E. Lopez-Fernandez, Manuel E. Lopez Fernandez Law Office, Jose G. Fagot-Diaz, Fagot Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Juan F. Santos-Caraballo, Maralyssa Alvarez-Sanchez, Jackson Lewis LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendants The Robinson School, Maria Teresa Larrieu.
Jose E. O'Neill-Font, San Juan, PR, for Defendants San Juan Capestrano Hospital, Inc., Continental Insurance Company.
Joan Schlump-Peters, Nachman & Guillemard, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Daniel M. Hildebrand.
Ramonita Dieppa-Gonzalez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Melvin Santoni-Crespo, MD.
Doris Quinones-Tridas, Quinones Tridas Law Office, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Angel M. Naravez-Morell, MD.
Bayoan Muniz-Calderon, Saldana, Carvajal & Velez-Rive, PSC., San Juan, PR, for Defendant AIG Insurance Co-Puerto Rico.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
GUSTAVO A. GELPI, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff Sandra López-López ("Ms. López"), a schoolteacher at The Robinson School ("Robinson" or "Defendant") in San Juan, Puerto Rico, brought this suit against Robinson, and other co-defendants, alleging violations to the American with Disability Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq , and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Docket No. 1). At the summary judgment stage, the Court dismissed Ms. López's ADA and ADEA claims. (Docket No. 145). Robinson now moves to recover attorney's fees pursuant to ADA. Docket No. 164 at 1; see 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Defendant argues that Ms. López's ADA claim was frivolous because her deposition revealed that her claims lacked legal foundation. (Docket No. 164 at 4).
Robinson cites 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) as the legal ground for recovering attorney's fees as a result of the Court summarily dismissing Ms. López's ADA claim. (Docket No. 164 at 2). Section 2000e-5(k) was enacted to recover attorney's fees to the prevailing party in litigation arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-416, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). Since Robinson is seeking attorney's fees for litigating a claim arising under ADA, which has a specific provision for attorney's fees, the Court will construe Robinson's request under ADA's provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Noteworthy, Section 12205 relies on the same standard to award attorney's fees than Section 2000e-5(k). See Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 191 F. 3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1999).
I. Discussion
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that awarding attorney's fees to defendants in ADA cases is rare. Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 241 (1st Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, Robinson correctly argues that it may recover $52,269.50 in attorney's fees if, at some point, Ms. López's ADA claim clearly became "unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable[.]" Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 191 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1999) ; see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). The Court proceeds with great caution in assessing whether Ms. López's ADA claim was indeed untenable before the suit's completion provided that Plaintiff ultimately failed to prove her case. See Lamboy-Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 241. As recognized by the First Circuit, "[i]t would be all too easy to assume that, if a claim did not prevail in the end, it must have become obvious to the plaintiff at some earlier juncture (e.g., upon completion of discovery) that the claim lacked support." Id.
In assessing whether Ms. López's ADA claim became groundless after her deposition, the Court, at a minimum, must find that "following the filing of the claim, circumstances changed to such an extent that a reasonable person could not help but conclude that the claim was no longer viable." Id. at 242 ; see also Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 946 F. Supp. 147, 150 (D.R. I. 1996) (stating that in awarding attorney's fees, "the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have recognized the claim as meritless").
After evaluating the record and parties’ submissions, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that the circumstances in this case changed "to such an extent" after Ms. López's deposition, that would render her ADA claim meritless. The record shows that Robinson moved for summary judgment after Ms. Lopez's deposition. (Docket No. 92). In moving for summary judgment, it argued that Ms. López failed to establish her prima facie case because Robinson did not engage in a prohibited employment action protected under ADA. Id. at 21. Ms. López's opposed arguing that Robinson had raised a "direct threat" affirmative defense, which she argued did not apply to the case. (Docket No. 114 at 6). After assessing their respective arguments, the Court agreed with Robinson and dismissed Plaintiff's ADA claim. (Docket No. 145 at 14-15). In its Opinion & Order, the Court further stated that even assuming that she did establish a prima facie case, Robinson established a non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. (Docket No. 145 at 15). On appeals, the First Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling. (Docket No. 159 at 21).
Although Ms. López did not meet the prima facie ADA standard, this alone does not render her ADA claim "unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable." The mere fact that a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination "does not imply that [the] decision to continue litigation up to the summary judgment stage has been frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless." Fontanillas-López v. Morell Bauzá Cartagena & Dapena, LLC, 832 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694 ); see also Garcia Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d 378, 381 (D.P.R. 2005) (denying a defendant's request for attorney's fees because it merely relied on the fact that the plaintiff failed to discrimination pretext). More so, even if Ms. López's ADA claim appeared questionable or unfavorable after her deposition, she could have had reasonable grounds to continue the suit. See Lamboy-Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 237.
No evidence on the record shows that Ms. López vexatiously continued to pursue her claim to harass Robinson or any other co-defendants after allegedly knowing that her ADA claim lacked legal support. See Fontanillas-López, 832 F.3d at 60-61 (affirming the district court's decision to award attorney's fees mostly based on the fact that the plaintiff was forewarned that the claims lacked merit and yet she continued litigation up until the summary judgment stage).
Accordingly, this Court finds that Ms. López's ADA claim cannot be deemed clearly frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Ms. López's arguments-up to the summary judgment stage-were reasonable and did not fall to a clear level frivolousness that would "shock" the Court's conscience, thus, warranting the imposition of attorney's fees. Robinson's arguments are unconvincing. The Court does not find it "obvious" that after Plaintiff's deposition, her ADA claim seemed to lack legal support. See Lamboy-Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 241.
Robinson also requests $8,500 in taxable cost, under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d), for its efforts in litigating this case. (Docket Nos. 162 at 1; 171 at 4). Under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) there is a presumption that a prevailing party is entitled to costs. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013). However, it is within the Court's discretion to award or deny costs to a prevailing party. Id. Under this sound discretion, the Court will not award Robinson the taxable costs for this case, mainly for two reasons closely intertwined.
First, awarding these fees would undercut Congress's effort to promote the vigorous enforcement of civil rights cases brought under statutes like ADA and ADEA. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) ; Lamboy-Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 236 ("Congress granted parties the prospect of a reasonable attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to encourage the prosecution of legitimate civil rights claims"). To award costs and fees in this case would create the unwanted "chilling effect" of discouraging civil rights plaintiffs to bring their claims before the courts. Plaintiffs, such as Ms. López, are going to fear that if their claims fail, they would be penalized via court order and required to pay attorney's fees and other litigation costs. Id. ("To award fees to prevailing defendants when the history of a case does not justify it undercuts that goal and chills civil rights litigation").
Second, the above mentioned "chilling effect" inevitably hinders fairness and access to justice. This Court firmly believes in promoting access to justice through equitable access to courts. Consequently, it is aware that litigation fees are one of the main barriers against advancing more access to justice in our courts. See Luis F. Estrella Martínez, ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA 20 (2017) ("[T]he costs of hiring lawyers, financing the costs of litigation and the cost of settlement disputes, are one of the main barriers that intersect with others to cause the impenetrability of the justice system") (translation ours). In this case, awarding fees would curtail the Court's efforts to promote access to justice and further deepen the gap between civil rights plaintiffs, like Ms. López, and just access to courts. See Lamboy-Ortiz, 630 F. 3d at 236.
The undersigning has employed access to justice considerations in other civil cases. See, e.g., Natal Perez v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F. Supp. 3d 215, 221 (D.P.R. 2018) (summarizing the dire situation of access to justice in Puerto Rico); see also Deborah L. Rhode & Pablo J. Hernández Rivera, Access to Justice in Puerto Rico, 86 Rev. Jur. UPR 818, 822 (2017) ("The challenges facing Puerto Rico in ensuring access to justice remain substantial").
In sum, Ms. López's ADA claim was not clearly "unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable" so that these would warrant the imposition of attorney's fees in Robinson's favor. Also, the Court will exercise its judicial discretion under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) and deny taxable costs to Defendant because it would run contrary to Congress's efforts to promote the vigorous enforcement of civil rights and limit access to justice.