Summary
In Loper, the court declined the plaintiff's invitation to hold that the defendant-automobile repair center was a manufacturer for purposes of the LPLA where the defendant's activity consisted primarily of installing pre-assembled parts—that were themselves defective—into a Mack truck. Loper, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2406, at *3.
Summary of this case from Breaux v. Centrifuge Repair & Eng'g L.P.Opinion
No 99-1350.
March 2, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before the Court is the Motion of Acadiana Mack Sales Service, Inc. ("Acadiana") for summary judgment. After a review of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act and DENIED as to Plaintiff's claims under other tort theories.
Background
The Plaintiffs in this consolidated case were employed on the M/V C-Searcher by PGS Exploration (US), Inc. ("PGS"). PGS arranged for a van to transport PGS employees from Port Fourchon, Louisiana to the New Orleans airport for transport back to their homes. Eric Leibold, who was employed by Edison Chouest Offshore, was also riding in the van. The van was traveling northbound on Louisiana Highway 1 in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. Around milepost 28.7, a Mack truck heading southbound on Louisiana Highway 1 crossed the center line and collided with the van. As a result of the collision, the vehicle rolled over several times, coming to a rest overturned on the highway. One of the passengers, Wallace Loper, was killed in the accident and others were seriously injured.
Plaintiff alleges that the Mack truck was owned by Harris Dufrene Enterprises ("Dufrene") and was driven by a Dufrene employee at the time of the accident. This truck was purchased new by Dufrene in 1985 and designated as truck #20.
In 1990, truck #20 was involved in a collision and sustained substantial body damage. It was sent for repair to Acadiana, an authorized dealership and repair center for Mack. Acadiana used replacement parts know as a "glider kit" to repair truck #20. Acadiana's position is that the glider kit installation involves merely using pre-assembled parts that were put together by Mack to return the truck to its original condition. Plaintiff Harold Andrews argues that this repair amounts to rebuilding or remanufacturing of the truck #20 into a new 1991 reconditioned or refurbished truck using a combination of salvaged parts from the 1985 Mack truck, the glider kit supplied by Mack Truck, and other parts. (According to Plaintiffs' evidence, to do a glider kit, you take the engine, transmission and rear end out of a wrecked truck and essentially put them in a new body.) After Acadiana did this work, truck #20 was issued a new vehicle identification number ("VIN"), a new title and a new odometer. Acadiana charged $36,848.00 for these repairs, approximately $16,000 of that price was for labor and parts other the glider kit.
In July, 1992, truck #20 was in another accident. The truck was again taken to Acadiana for replacement parts. As part of those repairs, Acadiana replaced the front-end leaf spring with a pre-assembled Mack leaf spring package. Acadiana had no involvement in the design or manufacture of the leaf spring package. Again, the parties dispute the extent of the work undertaken by Acadiana. Plaintiff states that the work in 1992 amounted to a second "remanufacturing" of truck #20 and that a second glider kit was installed on the truck by Acadiana. See Depo. of Steve J. Dufrene, July 11, 2000 at p. 77. Following the 1992 repairs, truck #20 was never returned to Acadiana.
Sometime after the 1992 repairs, but before the accident in question, truck #20 was converted from a tractor-trailer into a dump truck. In undertaking, the trailer was pulled off and put on a smaller body, so that the truck could be engaged in a different type of work.
Acadiana has filed this motion for summary judgment arguing it is not liable to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 9, Section 2800.51 et seq. ("LPLA") or under any other theory of tort.
Summary Judgment Standard
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
Louisiana Products Liability Act
The LPLA establishes the exclusive theories of manufacturer liability for damage caused by their products. La. Rev. Stat. 9:2800.52.
The threshold test of liability under the LPLA is whether the defendant is a "manufacturer." LPLA defines a "manufacturer" as:
a person or entity who is in the business of manufacturing a product for placement into trade or commerce. "Manufacturing a product" means producing, making, fabricating, constructing, designing, remanufacturing, reconditioning or refurbishing a product. "Manufacturer" also means:
(a) A person or entity who labels a-product as his own or who otherwise holds himself out to be the manufacturer of the product.
(b) A seller of a product who exercises control over or influences a characteristic of the design, construction or quality of the product that causes damage.
(c) A manufacturer of a product who incorporates into the product a component or part manufactured by another manufacturer . . . .
For LPLA purposes, a "Seller" is "a person or entity who is not a manufacturer and who is in the business of conveying title to or possession of a product to another person or entity in exchange for anything of value." LA Rev. Stat. 9:2800.53(2).
Plaintiff Andrews argues that Acadiana may be liable under the LPLA as a manufacturer, or as a seller-manufacturer. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Acadiana is liable in tort as a nonmanufacturer seller.
LPLA Manufacturer Liability
Acadiana argues that to hold it liable under the LPLA would render every dealership, body shop, and auto or truck maintenance shop an LPLA "manufacturer." The Court agrees that the Legislature did not intend to impose LPLA liability on entities that sell and repair vehicles. See Masters v. Courtesy Ford Company, Inc., 758 So.2d 171 (La.Ct.App. 2 Cir. 1999) (finding that retail truck seller is not an LPLA manufacturer even in the context of performing repairs and installing parts on a truck) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 765 So.2d 1055-56. While Acadiana's repairs of truck #20 were more extensive than the repairs in Masters and more extensive than typical repairs undertaken by mechanics or even body shops, these repairs do not amount to "producing, making, fabricating, constructing, designing, remanufacturing, reconditioning or refurbishing a product" as required by the LPLA.
In Ferruzzi, USA, Inc., v. R.J. Tricon Co., 645 So.2d 685 (La.Ct.App. 4 Cir. 1994), the Louisiana Appellate court sustained a directed verdict in favor of Harbor Construction Company, a defendant who erected a gain elevator that was the subject of a products liability claim. The Ferruzzi Court treated Harbor as a non-manufacturer seller, not an LPLA manufacturer, because it received the elevator with the allegedly defective part "filly assembled" from the company which designed and manufactured it. Id. at 687-88. Further, the Court noted that Harbor "received no instructions regarding the [alleged defect] "and that the "evidence at trial showed undisputably that [the alleged defect] was not considered part of Harbor's responsibility" and that the allegedly defective part was "completely encased within the pulley mechanism, [so] Harbor could not have checked the [alleged defect] without completely disassembling the preassembled head pulley component." Id.
Acadiana is in basically the same position as Harbor in the instant case. They received preassembled parts from Mack Trucks, which they were required to utilize when servicing Mack vehicles pursuant to their authorized dealer agreement, and installed them on truck #20.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Coulon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 734 So.2d 916 (La.App. 1St Cir. 1999), writ denied, 747 So.2d 1125 (La. 1999), is misplaced. In that case, Wal-Mart was found liable under the LPLA for injures caused by a bicycle purchased from Wal-Mart. Id. The defective bicycle was assembled by Wal-Mart or by its contractor. Id. However, in that case, the defect in the bicycle was created in the assembly process. See id. at 918. In this case, the alleged defect is in the design of the part, i.e. its failure to retain enough lubrication, not it its installation on specific vehicles. So, while it is clear that a defect caused in the assembly process can impose LPLA manufacturer liability on a party when the defect is created by the assembly process, the proper assembly of a defective part does not create LPLA manufacturer liability.
Further, Acadiana is not a seller/manufacturer as that term is defined in the LPLA, La. Rev. Stat. 9:2800.53(1)(b). As the Court in Parks v. Baby Fair Imports, Inc., 726 So.2d 62 (La.Ct.App. 5th Cir. 1998) points out, an LPLA seller/manufacturer must exercise control over or influence a characteristic of the design, construction or quality of the product that allegedly caused the damage. In Parks, the Court found that a retail seller, K-Mart, was not liable as a seller/manufacturer under the LPLA even though K-Mart expressly dictated some of the manufacturing specifications of the defective product and performed some testing on the product prior to its sale. The Court reasoned that this did not amount to sufficient control or influence over the design, construction or quality of the product to impose LPLA seller/manufacturer liability.
Finally, Acadiana is not a manufacturer of a product which incorporates into its product components or parts manufactured by another manufacturer pursuant to LPLA, La. Rev. Stat. 9:2800.53(1)(c). This definition contemplates situations in which a new product is manufactured through the use of components manufactured by others. In the instant case, Acadiana merely installed pre-assembled Mack parts on truck #20; it did not create a new product. In fact, Acadiana's repairs seem less invasive or altering than the subsequent transformation of truck #20 from a tractor trailer to a dump truck.
Because the Court has found that Acadiana is not a manufacturer for LPLA purposes, the Court need not analyze whether the product in question is unreasonably dangerous or whether Acadiana provided the warnings required under the LPLA.
Non-manufacturer Seller Liability
A non-manufacturer seller of a defective product is liable for damages in tort if it knew or should have know that the product was defective and failed to notify purchasers of the defect. See Kelly v. Price-Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993); Parks v. Baby Fair Imports, Inc., 726 So.2d 62 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998). A seller is not presumed to know of nonobvious defects in a product and it is not required to inspect its products prior to sale to detect such defects. See, e.g., Kelly, 992 F.2d at 1414. A seller owes a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. See, e.g., Winans v. Rockwell International Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983). A seller also owes a duty to warn of dangers it knows about or should know about. See Slaid v. Evergreen Indemnity, Ltd., 745 So.2d 793, 798 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1999).
Acadiana argues that it had no knowledge of any alleged defect in the leaf spring assembly prior to May of 1998. In a Motion for Summary Judgment, the non-moving party is entitled to have factual inferences drawn in its favor. However, to defeat a motion for summary judgement, the non-mover must produce some evidence or specific facts that show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Here, Plaintiff's evidence is testimony by Dee Bristow, an Acadiana employee, that in his experience, a front spring pin which has metal to metal contact could, over time, create wear on the bronze bushing. Dep. of Dee Bristow, Dec. 18, 2000 at p. 72. Mr. Bristow further testified that a reasonable manufacturer should warn and instruct its customers to change such pins. Id. Mr. Bristow has been the general manager of Acadiana since it began operations in 1988, and he has been involved in the service of Mack Trucks for over 25 years. Id. at 6-7. Since its inception, Acadiana has been an authorized dealership and repair center for Mack. In short, the relationship between Acadiana, Mr. Bristow and Mack Trucks has been a long and close one. Whether Acadiana acted reasonably under the circumstances is dependant on facts and is not appropriate for summary judgment.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court finds that Acadiana's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act and DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claims under other tort theories.